Iran National Interests Victim of Blind Radicalism

 

Iran National Interests Victim of Blind Radicalism

Ali Asghar Kazemi

April 21, 2009

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Almost two months before the presidential elections in Iran, on April 20, 2009 president Ahmadinejad made another controversial speech at the UN Conference on Racism in Geneva (Durban II), creating further dismay about this country in world public opinion. While many observers were expecting some kind of softening in Iran’s position with respect to world critical issues at this juncture, the speech came as a cold shower to naïve wishful thinkers.

The unfortunate events that overshadowed the substance of the conference at its start, are now well known to all; since the show was covered live on many world TV’s. Besides Mr. Ahmadinejad direct allusion to Zionism and Israel, which prompted the mass walkout of European delegates from the conference room, he took on other critical issues such as racism, segregation and intolerance that nobody can logically deny the fact as indefensible plagues in many countries including Iran and the West. But, hearing such accusations from the mouth of a pompous character, whose intolerance takes regular victims even among his own entourage in the cabinet (let aside the critics and opposition groups) for expressing their views, is indeed very strange.

How much ideological drives are permitted to encroach upon national interests? Are these conflict-ridden statements intended to promote Iran’s national interests or to satisfy personal hatred of an obsessive individual who happens to assume the responsibility of a nation?

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Common sense dictates that national interests should be the guiding principles and compass of a state domestic and foreign policies. Ideology and other major elements of national power should be at the service of those interests. However, this is not always the case when “national interests” are not properly defined and “ideology” assumes the lead and trespass the requisites of states’ vital interests.

Man’s view of his universe and the realities of his existence have been shuttered by his acquired ideology, his faith and his environment. This has caused the progress or stagnation of civilizations in their challenge and competition for survival. Tactical use of religion has always been present, either to endorse an ideology which helps to establish or strengthen the legitimate power, or to supplant it by beliefs more attune with the wishes of power-holders.

In that case, ideologies are usually intended to simplify complex phenomena into a series of slogans, myths and dogma which can easily manipulate average people. In politics actors tend to use ideologies in order to disguise the immediate goal of their actions and behavior. The goal of ideology is power exerted over the mind and actions of men and not necessarily vital interests of a nation.

Ideology is thus an instrument for making the world look simpler and more consistent than it is. In the words of Karl Deutsch, “ideology is simplified picture of the world;” it serves as a map by which to create and guide certain behavior. In making distinction between moderate or reasonable ideologies, on the one hand, and radical ideology on the other, Deutsch argues that the difference between the two hinges upon “the capacity to recognize reality and to test the truth of opinions”.

Within the range of these two modes of ideology we can observe the ethics of Aristotle and the amoralism of Machiavelli; the constitutionalism of Cicero and the totalitarianism of Stalin, the natural law of Thomas Aquinas, the economic determinism of Karl Marx, the dictatorship of Nazi Hitler and the fundamentalism of Moslems. All of these fall in the broad spectrum of political ideologies which, once at work may shape human behavior, national character as well as state’s socio-economic and political attitude.

With the above academic clarification, one may question the rationale and necessity of Mr. Ahmadinejad presence in the Durban II Anti-racism conference in Geneva and his controversial speech at this very critical point of time. One gets the impression that neither he nor the speech writer has any idea about justice and fairness in international relations. They naively feel they are the first to discover and expose these anomalies in a world forum. A quick inquiry into the United Nations archives from its inception to this date and the related literature , will reveal the fact that thousands statesmen, diplomats, jurists and academics have written and spoken more eloquently about tantamount problems of the world and exposed much brighter ideas and thoughts for their remedies. Yet we are still where we stand today with not much progress.

Thus, what benefits we may envisage from these conflict-ridden statements for Iran except the widening gap between nations and deepening hatred at the expense of our national interests, prestige and reputation? Those who applauded for the president at the conference are not our friends. They are intentionally or inadvertently pushing our country to further radicalism and isolation. They know well that Iran has already paid very heavy price for sacrificing national interests for the sake of ideology.

Let it be clear to all peace-lovers around the world that there are other voices among academic, intellectual and ordinary people in Iran that are in discord with the prevailing situation and perception. We want to live in peace, harmony and good relations with all nations. We have no mandate to solve perennial issues in the Palestine, Lebanon, Hamas, Hezbollah, Jihad and the likes which do not fall in the realm of our vital national interests by any sane calculation and even not in the periphery of the presumed ideology. We have no business to straighten all the evils of the world and to guide humanity to the path of salvation. All we can do is to rectify our own actions and perceptions and set example for other to follow the suit. We fully realize that guiding principles of today’s statehood are tolerance, interdependence, cooperation towards mutual benefits.

The time has come to stop the unfortunate trend of blind radicalism before our nation falls in the disarray of populism, ideological obsession and delusion which could endanger peace and stability of the region and risk total disintegration of the country. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran-Iran.

Prospects for Iran-US Negotiations

 

Prospects for Iran-US Negotiations

Ali Asghar Kazemi

April 9, 2009

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Barrack Obama’s Nowruz message to Iranians and leaders of the Islamic regime leaves the impression that the new US president intends to demonstrate that he is sincere to put into action his presidential campaign promises with respect to Iran. He had pledged to open direct talks with Iran for the purpose of alleviating the mutual misperceptions accumulated during the past 30 years with the purpose of paving the path for normalization of relations through diplomacy. While the Iranian supreme leader did not reject categorically the offer in response, he nonetheless used harsh words to criticize the United States past policies and advised the new president to take real actions in order to prove his good intentions.

Assuming that the two parties are indeed ready to engage into some sort of talks and negotiations, before this could materialized two important questions should be clarified: first, how to negotiate; and second, what to negotiate? It seems that without resolving these essential problems any ushering of the talks would be doomed to failure. This short comment shall try to discuss briefly the matter as preliminary thoughts on the point.

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The assumptions we made at the outset are rather arbitrary and perhaps not realistic. Therefore, before discussing on the whereabouts of the questions, let’s examine how much reasonable are our initial suggestions. It is true that for the sake of simplicity we assumed the two sides agree to start negotiations, but we should not lose sight of the intrigues and suspicions that might be involved in this proposition.

On the one hand, Iranians might think that Obama’s offer to open direct talks is not genuine and his diplomatic initiative is merely a trap to push the Islamic leaders to the corner for bitter concessions on vital issues (redlines). This may also give the Americans a chance to build-up the necessary consensus to put more pressure on Iran and further isolate the Islamic regime from the mainstream of international affairs.

On the other hand, Americans too might perceive that Iranian leaders are not really sincere in their agreeing to negotiate with the “Great Satan” and they are just pursuing a treacherous tactics for the purposes of: a) buying time to reach final stages of their nuclear undertaking; b) reducing the effect the mounting threats of pre-emptive strike coming from the new right-wing Israeli cabinet; and finally c) demonstrating that the Islamic regime is a rational actor and partner that can help the new US president to straighten out various American burdens in the Middle East including Iraq and Afghanistan.

These quandaries and similar misperceptions might detract the two parties in their initial engagement for negotiations. In fact, as many believe, this initial phase which consists of mutual “confidence building” is much more important than the modalities and substance of the negotiations.

Now, coming back to our opening questions and assuming that the above mistrust is settled, the problem remains as how to open negotiations and what to negotiate upon?

Diplomacy in theory is by and large the promotion of the national interests through accommodation and peaceful means. It is the major instrument of foreign policy by which a state can achieve objectives, realize values and defend national interests. Governments have the function to communicate through their diplomatic agents with those whose actions and behavior they wish to influence, deter, alter or reinforce. This process requires a clear definition of a state’s objectives, rationalizations for them, threats, promises, and the setting up plans and strategies to tackle with problems and contentious issues. Furthermore, diplomacy requires tact, patience, good- faith and above all will to negotiate with a quid-pro-quo (give and take) objective.

With respect to the modalities of diplomatic negotiations, it is important to settle before anything the problem of formalities and procedure. This relates to the question of open or secret diplomacy. In other words, at the initial stage of diplomatic endeavor, parties should agree on whether it must be open and public or close and secret. History of important diplomatic breakthrough between hostile parties has shown that psychological environment of the issues involved requires secrecy and confidentiality of the talks at initial stages. Since, the rival parties are usually not prepared for ideological reasons or other pretexts to enter publicly into negotiations. This however does not guarantee the success of the approach. Secret approach to China during Nixon and Kissinger was a major success but Iran-Contra initiative during the Reagan administration ended into major foreign policy flop. On the contrary, Iran’s secret dealing with US on other matters such as American strike on Taliban in Afghanistan after September 11 proved to be also a success.

It seems that the Islamic leaders are not yet prepared to enter into an open public diplomacy with the United States due to a number of understandable reasons for a revolutionary-ideological regime that has created a taboo about any rapprochement and dealing with the “Great Satan” during the past thirty years. Controversies surrounded the Hillary Clinton public announcement about unscheduled meeting between Iran and US representatives during an international conference on Afghanistan at The Hague on March 2009, is an example of open diplomacy. It seems therefore that Iranians are very cautious about how to engage into some sort of talks with the United States without losing face at home.

Americans eventually do not mind to deal secretly with Iran provided the approach fulfills their objectives. However, the risk of revelation of such negotiations by US media, over which the government has no control, is very high and Iranians may think twice before undertaking such dealing in secret. The price of open talks is also too high for Islamic leaders, since it is hard for them to move away from their official positions in public forum. Consequently, we may argue that any attempt towards starting negotiations between Iran and the United States might encounter serious difficulties at the initial phase.

Assuming that the “How” question is settled, the next thorny problem of “What” to negotiate upon still remain to be worked out. In diplomatic talks, states usually try to find common grounds upon which they can negotiate without difficulty. This means that after preliminary testing mutual interests on simple and trouble-free issues, the parties gradually move to more difficult subjects that require patience, tolerance and will to compromise or “give and take.”

This requires the preparation a meticulous plan or agenda for negotiations. The agenda should reflect issues of mutual interests upon which the parties declare ready to talk and negotiate. Here again we may encounter insurmountable problems which are susceptible to totally frustrate the whole effort. Since, as we know so far, Iran has a number of “redlines” from which supposedly diplomats and negotiators are not allowed to trespass. They may be tentatively enumerated as follow:

· Permanent suspension of nuclear enrichment process;

· Cessation of financial and military supports to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah;

· Recognition of Israel as a legitimate Jewish state in the Palestinian territory;

Other issues such as the following may be subject to negotiations:

· Non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Iraq and Afghanistan and other Muslim states of the region;

· Human rights;

· Traffic of narcotic substances through the Iranian borders and territory;

· Lifting of the sanctions and embargo imposed upon Iran;

· Release of Iranian assets in the United States;

· Other issues of mutual interests.

Given that the United States major preoccupations fall within the periphery of Iranian “redlines” upon which apparently no negotiations can take place, the prospects for a comprehensive settlement of Iran-US differences appear far remote. Yet the two sides may engage in some kind of talks along with the 5+1 states without substantive outcome.

As we stated in our previous comments, the Islamic regime perceives that a normalization of relations with the United States not only will not promote its interests, but might have adverse impact upon its security and survival in the long-run. Therefore, it will raise the costs of any eventual settlement to the point impossible to bear by the Americans. Some of these requests already put forward by the Iranian president are of the kind impossible to achieve. These may be considered as the American redlines upon which no compromise can take place, such as: cessation the support of Israel and withdrawal of all forces from the region.

For these clear reasons and other grounds which we tried to explain briefly here, the prospect for a normalization of relations between Iran and the United States are very meager. The shadow of pessimism is already surrounding the preliminary diplomatic efforts. Therefore we should not expect a miracle to happen suddenly in this difficult game in the weeks and months to come. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations at the IAU, Science and Research Center, Department of Law and Political Science, Post-Graduate Program. Tehran, Iran. For detail see: http://www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Legality of ICC Action against Sudan President

 

 

Legality of ICC Action against Sudan President

Ali Asghar Kazemi

March 7, 2009

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On March 5, 2009 the International Criminal Court issued a writ of arrest against General Omar al Bashir, the incumbent Sudanese president, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although the matter was on the agenda of the court for some time and several month ago the prosecutor of the Court had announced the completion of preliminary investigations and gathering of evidences for possible criminal prosecution of the “Darfur Case,” public announcement of the warrant of arrest against the Sudan president came as a shock to those who may be liable for similar deeds.

Indeed, such court order for the arrest of a sitting president is a formidable event and “will further erode that sense of impunity shared by dictators the world over” as one human right activist said. In the past several years we had similar proceedings against Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia and Charles Taylor of Liberia by ad-hoc criminal courts. The news of the Sudanese president warrant sparked throughout the globe and alarmed authoritarian regimes that did not hesitate to condemn the matter as a political action and challenged the legality of the court order.

What is the legal foundation of the case? Who should be scared from this precedent and what are the ramifications of the case for repressive regimes? What are the prospects of bringing into justice heads of oppressive regimes in the future?

In July 2008, the prosecutor of the court (Luis Moreno-Ocampo) had charged Omar al Bashir with ten counts in total, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. After several months of deliberation and thorough examination of evidences provided to them by the prosecutor, the pretrial panel made up of three judges from Brazil, Ghana and Latvia finally decided to issue the warrant. They rejected charge of genocide against Mr. Bashir and only affirmed his “essential role” in the murder, rape, torture, pillage and displacement of large numbers of civilians in Darfur.

Although a number of states and organizations like China, the African Union and the Arab League had warned the warrant would be counter-productive and could destabilize the region; peace loving states and human rights activists welcomed the action as an historic victory for victims of repression, tyranny and subjugation. In issuing the order, the judges deliberately disregarded eventual political ramifications and social backlash that could aggravate the situation for innocent people in Darfur.

It is well to remember that about 2.5 million Darfur residents have been evicted from their homes and some 300,000 have died over the past five years in a ferocious conflict between non-Arab rebel groups and the Arab-dominated government and its allied militias. The court issued warrants for two other Sudanese citizens in 2007 — a government minister and a former militia leader — but neither has been arrested.

Iran along a number of Arab states have condemned the warrant of arrest against Sudanese president and Mr. Larijani, speaker of the parliament, paid a visit to Khartoum for expressing sympathy to Mr. Bashir. Iran accused the court to be under the influence of “Zionism and Imperialism;” whereas we know that neither the United States nor Israel is member of the International Criminal Court.

Article 63 of the Statute of Rome regarding the proceedings of the International Criminal Court, requires that the accused person be handed over to the court for trial. Yet there is no reason to believe that Sudanese ruler will voluntarily appear before the ICC or, for that matter, travel outside the Sudan and risk arrest. Accordingly, Bashir is likely to escape justice.

Sudan has always claimed that it has no effective control over feuding tribes; which is a self-indicting declaration of guilt. Since, it puts the raison-d’être of the government under serious doubt. The prosecutor believes that state support and coordination have been behind the outrages in Darfur.

The Sudanese government has repeatedly asserted that the human rights violations that have occurred were the work of independent forces, the so-called “janjaweed”” militia. It is true that these irregular units have committed many of the bloodshed, but the warrant application explains that they have done so “at the behest of the government.” While the warrant application acknowledges the right of a sovereign nation to respond to insurrection with armed force, but it also makes plain that Al Bashir has directed attacks specifically against civilians.

Sudan’s supporters, including the African Union and Arab League, have called for the UN Security Council to suspend any indictment. But France, Britain or the United States would probably use a veto to block such a move. The United Nations Security Council can postpone the prosecution against Mr. Bashir, but so far it has remained largely divided on the matter.

It is too early to conclude that the bold action of the International Criminal Court against the Sudanese president will create a deterring impact on the way of dictators and totalitarian rulers around the globe. Legal and criminal sanctions alone cannot bring justice, peace, democracy and human rights to a society. It may even worsen the situation for those under subjugation. Since, the international community still lacks an efficient police force to put into effect court orders. In rare occasions the United Nations Security Council may intervene under Chapter VII of the Charter (Article 42), but that also depends on a number of political factors which are not easily accessible.

Yet, as it is the first time that the tribunal in The Hague charges a sitting head of state with crimes against humanity, the case represents a major step by the court to implicate the highest level officials of a government for atrocities committed against innocent people. Certainly, it is hard to believe that the Sudan government would pay attention to the ICC warrant, but the case has a symbolic value and will create an important precedent in international humanitarian law. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations at IAU, Science and Research Center. Tehran, Iran

Strategic Games in the Middle East

Strategic Games in the Middle East

Ali Asghar Kazemi

March 5, 2009

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On March 4, 2009 the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted a two-day international conference on Gaza and Israeli breach of humanitarian law and war crimes against Palestinians during the recent armed conflict between the two hostile parties. The conference took place after a similar meeting in Egypt backed by the United States for the reconstruction of Gaza Strip that endured severe material and human losses during the 22-day conflict. While the two conferences had more or less similar themes, they followed diverse objectives. The Gaza conflict can be visualized as a set of strategic games in which actors involved pursued different aims in the Middle East political arena.

How various actors perceive the games they are playing in the Middle East? What are the objectives, gains and losses pursued by rival states? What are the plausible outcome and implications of the games?

The United States under Obama appears to continue the traditional American policy of previous administrations in the Middle East namely: the unequivocal support of Israel and the establishment of a comprehensive and durable peace which would promote the stability of the region and interests of moderate Arab states and Israel. This policy can be characterized as a non-zero-sum benefiting all parties directly involved in the game.

The United States however perceive some obstacles on the way of this policy emanating from the Islamic regime of Iran.

Not long ago, on February 12, 2009, US Director of National Intelligence, Admiral (Ret) Dennis C. Blair provided a wide ranging assessment of threats involving the American security before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Referring to Iran, Admiral Blair stated the following remarks:

· “Hezbollah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry, and Iran’s senior leadership has cited Hezbollah as a model for other militant groups. We assess Tehran has continued to provide Hezbollah with significant amounts of funding, training, and weapons since the 2006 conflict with Israel, increasing the group’s capabilities to pressure other Lebanese factions and to threaten Israel.”

· “Iran’s provision of training, weapons, and money to Hamas since the 2006 Palestinian elections has bolstered the group’s ability to strike Israel and oppose the Palestinian Authority.”

Tying together the Middle East peace process with Iran’s nuclear undertaking, Admiral Blair observed:

· “With Hamas in control of Gaza and Hezbollah growing stronger in Lebanon, progress on a Palestinian- Israeli accord is growing more difficult. With Iran developing a nuclear weapon capability and Israel determined not to allow it, there is potential for an Iran-Israeli confrontation or crisis on that issue as well.”

· “Moderate Arab states fear a nuclear-armed Iran, want progress on Palestinian settlement—the absence of which deprives US Arab allies of crucial political capital to defend strategic ties to the US and wish to sustain a moderate, state-centered politics for the region.”

The testimony further predicted that:

· “Progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace track would increase opportunities for the US to broaden its engagement with Arab publics, including those aligning with the growing ideology of Islamic nationalism.”

· Israel and Iran are liable to enter into a confrontation or a crisis sometime this year (2009) “due to Tehran's progress in its nuclear weapons program and Jerusalem's determination to thwart it.”

This is to say that Israel fearing an Islamic regime with nuclear capability would not allow Iran to reach the point to threaten its survival and therefore there is potential for a clash between the two states. Israel has already shown its resolve in similar cases in Iraq and more recently in Syria.

With respect to varying intentions and perceptions behind rivalry in the Palestinian issue, they can be tentatively identified as follows:

Egypt, representing the pro-West moderate Arab states, tries to isolate Iran from the Middle Eastern issues related to Palestine and the peace process. Egypt seems to pursue a zero-sum-strategy which would exclude the Islamic regime from the game. To that end it intends to:

1. Strengthen Arab unity vis-à-vis Iran’s undesired interfering in the Palestinian problems;

2. Support the position of Mahmud Abbas as the legitimate Authority in all Palestinian territory including Gaza Strip;

3. Build a strong coalition of pro-West Arab states against the Islamic regime’s growing influence in the Middle East;

4. Take the initiative of the peace process by neutralizing all internal and external encumbering forces;

5. Ensure the continuity of incumbent moderate conservative regimes in the Middle East;

6. And finally, pave the way for a comprehensive peace settlement with Israel including all Arab states.

Iran also seems to be following a zero-sum strategy in a different direction with the intentions to:

1. Bring together all revolutionary movements in the region in a unified resistance front as leverage against the United States and its close ally Israel;

2. Demonstrate that it is the only true supporter and caring power for the Palestinian cause;

3. Show that no problem in the Middle East can be solved without its help;

4. Press on the Western powers that they should recognize Iran as an influential actor not only in the region but throughout the world;

5. Continue its nuclear undertaking without encumbrance from the 5+1 states, the Security Council or any other world bodies;

6. Consolidate and ensure its power grip in domestic affairs so that no opposition group could envisage challenging the regime.

Gaza crisis had already its impact over the elections in Israel and paved the way for the resurgence of the right wing to assume power. This means that reaching a just and equitable solution for the Palestine has become more difficult than ever. With respect to Iran’s nuclear venture, given President Obama’s reluctance to curb the presumed threat, Israel is susceptible to perceive still greater danger and may contemplate to engage in a real conflict with Iran.

With this somber and gloomy picture in the horizon of the Middle East political landscape, it does not seem that there would be a satisfactory outcome of the games in the foreseeable future, unless the parties involved change their rigid and uncompromising attitudes. In order to reach a mutually acceptable saddle point, actors are have to review their assessments and try to optimize their trade-offs in a non-zero-sum game with positive outcome which would benefit all parties concerned./

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations at the IAU, Science and Research Center, Tehran- Iran. For detail see: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Dilemma of Iran's Next President

Dilemma of Iran’s Next President

Ali Asghar Kazemi

February 16, 2009

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Three decades after the downfall the Pahlavi regime and the ascendance into power of a clergy rule in Iran, the Islamic leaders still insist on the revolutionary nature of their institutions. While each revolution has its own follies and romantic slogans common to all at the beginning, the persistence of religious leaders on its continuity until the reappearance of the hidden Shiite Imam, is a peculiar phenomenon with important consequences on the national and international scene.

Despite widespread publicity about the miraculous achievement of the incumbent hard-line president, it seems rather obvious that Iran’s overall international standing has terribly diminished during the arch-conservative rule. With respect to domestic affaires the situation is much worse. An economy in shamble, a galloping inflation, and a general discontent of the accomplishment of Mr. Ahmadinejad who’s various promises simply did not materialize.

Ahmadinejad was the product of a period of eight years of controversies between two conflicting views: that expressed by a moderate soft-spoken clergy, Mr. Khatami who was considered as “reformist” by Western political standards; and the opposite represented by the conservative religious-revolutionary groups who pretended to be the legitimate guardian of the Islamic regime. During his two terms in office, president Khatami failed to accomplish much due to obstacles on his way created by his opponents in the legislative body and judiciary. Feeling betrayed, young and enthusiastic people who had voted for Khatami turned back to him and reformist movement and supporters gradually disintegrated and vanished from political scene, leaving the ground to hard-line conservatives with new attractive promises.

Now, almost four years after the conservative grip of absolute power, with a nation at the brink of social and economic crises, the reformists are embarking for a new comeback. Upon several months of speculations, finally former president Khatami has decided to run for president with the slogan of saving the country from total collapse and insolvency.

What are the chances of the opposing groups to win the presidential elections next spring? How far Mr. Khatami or his reformist comrades are able to restore the lost confidence of the populace to the competence and capacity of the Islamic government to respond to their widespread expectations? What are the prospects of normalizing relations with the United States under the new president?

*

In order to pass judgment on the performance of a high position office-holder such as the president in Iran, one must consider the facts against the religious-revolutionary natures of the Islamic regime and its worldwide objectives reflected in its constitutional structure and ideological aspirations. In present Iran, no one individual can trespass the redlines predetermined either by Shari’a, as interpreted by the appropriate body instituted for that purpose, or by the “supreme leader of the revolution”. Even the supreme leader who has the final say in matters of “high politics” or “strategic decisions” is bound to follow those rules. Of course, he has the prerogative to assess the situation and decide according to his evaluation of a particular issue. This is to say that the chief executive and other legislative and judiciary bodies are subordinate to the “supreme leader.” This means that nothing substantive can take place in the country without the consent of the leader.

With that assumption in mind, one of the major impediments of the Islamic regime overall conduct in running the business of the state seems to be the continuing persistence on its revolutionary nature. In fact, this feature has created a strong barrier before Iran’s national objectives and aspirations in setting clear criteria for determining friends and foes. This does not suggest however that the same quandary is settled in domestic sphere. Perhaps many unfortunate events and vicissitudes during the lifespan of the Islamic regime so far are geared to this very important dimension of the revolutionary Iran.

Nevertheless, when states choose to engage in interactions with their peers, they must have a lucid definition of their ends and means, a realistic assessment of their partners and above all a faithful commitment to certain primordial standards (rules of the game) in international relations. Indeed revolutions have their own peculiarities and manners and do not necessarily follow conventional norms and expected behavior. They usually have a tendency to challenge the status quo and even alter those rules. Thus, many states prefer not to be in love with revolutionary regimes which by nature have a propensity to be repelling rather than receptive.

The problem of not being able to distinguish between its ideological concerns and vital national interests has impeded the revolutionary Iran to identify its friends and foes and this has almost paralyzed Iran’s diplomacy especially during recent nuclear crisis. While international pressure was gradually increasing in order to push it to stop all nuclear activities, Iran was helplessly looking for friends here and there in order to get some support for its intransigent position. To this end, a number of lucrative deals were offered to some potential partners,[1] but, at the critical moment when Iran needed their help, they turned to its opponents in the UN Security Council.

Iranian leaders should not be surprised by this unfortunate experience. Indeed, this is the golden rule of the game in international relations; states only have permanent interests and no permanent friends or foes. Yet, an intelligent and rational foreign policy should put the right emphasis at any particular moment on the means and leverages it has on its potential friends in order to neutralize or bypass the negative impacts of its presumed foes’ actions and decisions. When a state puts all of its eggs in one basket, it may soon end up with unpredictable situations in which it should sacrifice all at once. No diplomacy that would stake everything on mere rhetoric and intimidation or concessions deserves to be called intelligent.

While the conservative government and policy makers in Iran persist on a return to revolutionary slogans of the regime and do everything to show this feature, the international community seems quite alarmed with the development. Thus, most states are reluctant to engage in deep interaction with a nation defying the prevailing norms. This is not to suggest that those norms and rules of the game are necessarily ethical, just or fair.

Recent American offer by President Barack Obama to open direct talks with Iran may simply be regarded as a calculated move in order to disarm the conservative groups from their revolutionary slogans and push Iran to the corner to comply with accepted norms in international relations. While Obama is pursuing his strategy through soft power and diplomacy[2], the Bush administration pursued the same objectives by threatening Iran by hard power. However, for the Islamic leaders, compromising on principles means giving bitter unnecessary concessions which would devoid the Islamic regime from its fundamental ideological drives and values.

While reformists have better chances to win next presidential elections, it is faire to suggest that neither Ahmadinejad nor Khatami or any other person in that capacity is powerful enough to make substantive changes in the structure or religious-revolutionary nature of the Islamic regime. They are both pursuing the same goals with different styles. They can merely act within a limited boundary determined to them either by law or by the authority of the leader. The difference is purely that of approach reflecting individual character, social background and philosophical outlook.

In the typology of political leaders, as classified by Harold Lasswell, Ahmadinejad represents the “agitator” type with extreme intransigence who sacrifices immediate gains for abstract principles and always seeks to instigate the emotional response of the public. While Khatami is a “negotiator” who is more concerned with acceptable solution to a conflict than a just or perfect resolution. Thus, he does not mind to compromise with his opponents. Nonetheless, important issues such as: relations with the United States, the nuclear project, the Middle East problems and the likes are only dependent variables geared to the very nature of the Islamic regime in Iran. /

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* Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. For detail see: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

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[1]The deal on liquefied gas with China, which amounts to an overall value of $100 billion, is one such undertaking which would tie Iran’s political fate to China’s growing needs for energy over the next 25 years. Russians on the other hand, are very happy about the current nuclear plant in Bushehr and the prospective other nuclear plant deals with Iran and seemed not to be ready to forego this lucrative business just for the sake of giving a hand to American plan to contain Iran’s ambition to use nuclear technology, which in their view, is not harmful. But, as we have seen, both of them voted against Iran at the IAEA. India was also supposed to support Iran for promoting its interests in the prospective gas line project, but this did not happen either.

[2]See: Ali Asghar Kazemi, “US Democrats are Pushing Iran to the Corner”: Strategic Discourse February 3, 2009.

US Democrats are Pushing Iran to the Corner

US Democrats are Pushing Iran to the Corner

Ali Asghar Kazemi

February 3, 2009

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In his first two weeks in office, Barack Obama sent an array of signals to various directions among which the Middle East and Iran are most vital spots to the new democrat president. In an interview with Al-Arabia, Obama implicitly invited Iran to come forward and get ready for direct dialogue with the United States. This offer might have been interpreted as a friendly gesture of the new president who had pledged to open direct negotiation without precondition with Iran in his presidential campaign. But, the reaction of the Islamic government pronounced by the hard-line president Ahmadinejad was rather cool and repulsive.

To what extent Iran is prepared to normalize relations with the United States? What are the consequences of such eventual rapprochement for Iran and the region? What are various scenarios that might emerge from the new US endeavor to solve the Iranian issue?

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In tackling with the Middle East and Iran’s interrelated problems, the new democrat administration has to strike a delicate balance between two differing views i.e. that of Hillary Clinton and her associates which is harder than that of the president who promised to talk directly to Iran without preconditions. This however does not mean that there would be any difference between the two in the final account, in the sense that one is more proactive than the other leading to the same results. The ultimate objectives are: a) containing Iran’s appetite for power; and b) forcing it to take a more cooperative attitude vis-à-vis various problems of the region.

To that end, Americans are believed to be ready to use all available leverages including the use of hard power. The expected outcome would eventually make the situation much tougher for Iran’s defying stance pushing it to the corner in a manner to commit itself to some sort of bitter concessions on various pending issues including the nuclear project.

The new American approach may be shaped around the following facts and criteria:

1. Any viable solution to the Middle East problems including Israeli-Palestinian issue as well as Iraq and Afghanistan depend on settling Iran-US perennial quarrel;

2. The Islamic regime’s ties with radical movements in the Middle East and its defiance to this date to comply with the UN Security Council demands with respect to the nuclear enrichment issue are serious barriers to the settlement of all other issues in the region;

3. The United States alone cannot force Iran to adopt a cooperative stance merely by using hard power, especially after the awful quagmire created by the US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq;

4. Iranian leaders are more vulnerable to soft power effects such as diplomatic pressure and sanctions than military engagement, since this latter would consolidate all people behind the regime against the invader;

5. Gradual pressure through legitimate instruments may push the regime to the corner in such a way that it would finally surrender to the will of the international community.

Iran seems to be conscious of the fact and the plausible outcome of direct negotiations with the US will before anything disarm the Islamic regime of its most important ideological pillar. Besides that, as we said in our previous comments, Iranian conservative hard-line leaders firmly believe that their security and survival could not be secured through normalization of relations with the US. It is not much difficult to rationalize the apprehension of Iranian conservative hard-liners that in such circumstances, this would expose the regime’s vulnerability to US malicious covert operations for the purpose of toppling the revolutionary regime through “soft power.” Thus, instead, they would prefer to remain as rival to the United States by challenging American power and presence in the region.

Perhaps not incidentally, Mr. Ahmadinejad first reaction to Obama’s comment was rather cool. While he welcomed change in the new US democrat administration, he did not hesitate to emphasize that change should take place in the substance of American foreign policy and not in form. To that end, he went on to set a number of preconditions as prerequisites to any eventual direct talks. He said that the new president should take the following actions in order to show his good-will:

· The United States should excuse for its harmful deeds against Iran in the past 70 years;

· The United States should cease to support Israel ;

· The United States should withdraw all its forces from the region;

· Etc...

These unusual requests leave the impression that Iran is quite happy with the present hostile situation. As can be seen, the demands are so much impractical and unrealistic that can hardly be conducive to any logical arrangement in the foreseeable future. In effect, the Islamic president is willfully walking toward the trap skillfully laid by US democrats. By raising the costs of an eventual settlement, he is paving the way for the remnants of the neo-conservative hawks in the US Department of Defense to put forward the military option to the table of the new president.

Meanwhile the situation may give a good basis of justification for US democrats to take advantage of the case in order to reach a solid consensus in the UN Security Council in adopting harsh sanctions against Iran. Though the Islamic leaders claim that they don’t fear UN sanctions, there is no doubt that the country is susceptible to suffer severely in the wake of declining oil price and upcoming budget deficits.

Americans policy makers seem to realize that president Obama has little time to capitalize on his popularity in the United States and around the world for settling outstanding issues before things get out of control. Yet, they may be cautious not to open negotiations with Mr. Ahmadinejad, a subordinate of the supreme leader who has the final say in strategic decisions. Besides, this may give credit the incumbent president which will boost his position in the upcoming presidential elections next spring.

Thus, it is safe to say that the United States will either try to reach the supreme leader for an eventual effective dialogue or wait until the time the results of the elections are known. However, US may arrange to take part in some sort of collective talk with Iran along with 5+1 states. Meanwhile, US foreign policy will be directed towards exhausting all possible diplomatic avenues before it embarks on applying harsher measures. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran. For detail see:

www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Obama and a World of Expectations

 

 

Obama and a World of Expectations

Ali Asghar Kazemi

January 23, 2009

We live in an age no prophet ever predicted. Our present world is under constant changes affecting the form and substance of our life. Changes usually bring expectations whose lack of fulfillment may induce desolation.

There is no doubt that leadership change in the United States affects many aspects of world affairs. Since, this country besides huge wealth and power assumes worldwide missions and generates more than 25% of the world production. Therefore, Obama as the new US President will have to face not only with a host of problems inherited from George Bush but also has to respond to huge and widespread expectations created around the world.

What are the prospects of this historic change in the Middle East? What should we anticipate from this change in Iran? How the Islamic regime should act in order to take advantage from this rare opportunity?

*

Indeed, Obama’s election as the President of the United States has raised the expectations of not only the American people but the whole world about prosperity, peace and security. But, as he warned in his first speech after election, “the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime, two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial crisis in a century.” In fact, the troubles that Obama inherits from his predecessors are so profound and complex which go beyond the capacity and power of this young leader and his fellow democrats.

First of all, we should not anticipate much from this change at least in this part of world where we live in i.e. the Middle East. We should recognize that change in “agency” will not necessarily bring about change in “structure.” This means that Barack Obama is before anything the president of the United States and is duty bound to protect American national and world interests. This process may eventually work to the detriment of other rivals or opponents.

Though President Obama did not speak explicitly about Iran in his inaugural speech on January 20^th 2009, in his broad observation with respect to the use of force to promote American interests, he said:

“As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals…. America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more. “Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions.”

He further recognized that “…. power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use. Our security emanates from the justness of our cause; the force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”

With regard to the American entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan Obama kept his promises during the presidential campaign by emphasizing that America guided by the principles and legacy of its founding fathers “….can meet…new threats that demand even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We'll begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard- earned peace in Afghanistan.”

Referring to the nuclear challenges ahead, he assured that the United States will work tirelessly “with old friends and former foes… to lessen the nuclear threat ….” He further warned: “those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that, "Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you. For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness.”

As to American relations with the Muslim world, he noted that the United States will “… seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” But, at the same time he warned:

“To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict or blame their society's ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”

Indeed, these words reverberate not only fundamental American ideals but also a realistic grasp of prevalent world malaises that inhibit the establishment of a just and durable peace.

President Obama seems to be receptive to all advises coming from personalities and institutions experienced in their fields of specialties. One such institution is the “Bipartisan Policy Center” which has recently released a “Comprehensive Report on Iran.”

The report titled: Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development, considering a nuclear weapons-capable Iran "strategically untenable,” argues that it "may pose the most significant threat to the United States during the new Obama administration. It further argues "The stakes are enormous…They involve not only U.S. national security, but also regional peace and stability, energy security, the efficacy of multilateralism, and the preservation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime."

The Task Force sponsored by the US National Security Initiative also found that Iran's nuclear program cannot be adequately safeguarded by the international inspections regime as currently designed. Furthermore, "It would be technically possible," once Iran has developed a sufficient feedstock of low-enriched uranium, for it to "enrich 20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium--the minimum necessary for a nuclear device--in four weeks or less."

This whole development and observations bear good witness to our earlier contention that the new US democrat administration under Obama is much more serious to counter the perceived challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear undertaking. Backed by a strong support, Obama is likely to use all means at hand to stop the Islamic regime’s quest to become a nuclear actor.

Based on the above facts, Islamic hard-liners in Tehran shall act cautiously in their future moves and are advised to be prudent in dealing with the new democrat administration if they are sincerely committed to stability and security in the Middle East as well as peace and prosperity for Iran./

Strategic Implications of the Gaza Conflict

 

Strategic Implications of the Gaza Conflict

Ali Asghar Kazemi

January 14, 2009

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Israel’s carnage and excessive violence in Gaza and Palestinian resistance to this date is drastically changing the balance of world public opinion in favor of Hamas movement on the one hand and strategic configuration in the Middle East on the other. Even moderate Arab states and intellectuals, who implicitly endorsed the Israeli operations by keeping silent initially, are being forced to condemn the Palestinian civilians suffering in the conflict. Indeed, it is no longer possible for American allies in the region to close eyes on the ongoing slaughters and this is causing a sharp division between the radical camp in the region led by Iran, including Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas on one side and the rest of pro-western Arab states on the other.

Disregard of the outcome of the conflict, which could be only an unfortunate loss of human lives and material devastation for both sides, Islamic leaders in Iran are proving to be right in the eyes of Arab people at large in their harsh position with regard to Israel. Perhaps, never before Israel has been so much low in international public opinion, even during the 33-days war with Hezbollah in 2006. Those who used to denounce Ahmadinejad rhetoric about Israel in the past several years may now change their minds in the wake of the heart breaking events in the Gaza Strip.

This is indeed a quite favorable strategic gain for hardliners in Tehran who have been giving wide coverage in the official mass-media, depicting relentlessly the horrendous aspects of the Gaza conflict including the shocking pictures of dead and injured children and women. Moderate Arab states should now be very cautious about their unequivocal approval of US policies with respect to Israel and the Middle East at large. This will certainly make the job of the new democrat president, who conquered the White House by his two magic words “hope” and “change,” very difficult. Indeed, Obama will be facing with a real challenge and deadlock in the Palestinian affaire and US allies in the region. No longer will any of the Arab leaders dare to shake hands with the Israelis.

This whole gloomy picture could not but please hardliners in Tehran who will eventually succeed to divide the Arab world and undermine the power of Palestinian Authority in favor of Hamas and other radical movements in pursuit of their grand strategy in the Middle East. As a necessary byproduct of this shifting paradigm, the Islamic regime may feel to have a free hand to pursue its nuclear strategy without much hindrance and mistrust, at least among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. This will break the recent consensus among them against Iran’s nuclear project, reached under the patronage of the United States.

The Gaza crisis will have an unavoidable impact on Israel’s upcoming elections. It is not quite sure which faction may have upper hand, but there are vivid indications that Israelis are moving more to the right (Likud Party) because of policy failure of the incumbent government (Kadima-Labor Party) especially with respect to Gaza problem.

One should understand that Gaza conflict is different from the 33-days war with Hezbollah in summer 2006 in various aspects. Gaza has been under de facto Israeli occupation since Six-Day War in1967 and despite the fact that they have left the territory in 2005, they are still considered as occupying power. This means that Israel has a number of legal obligations according to the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). Israel still controls access to the area, imports and exports, and the movement of people in and out. Israel has control over Gaza’s air space and sea coast, and its forces enter the area at will. Therefore, as an occupying power, Israel has the responsibility under the said Convention to ensure the safety and welfare of the civilian population of the Gaza Strip.

As a consequence, when Israel finally ceases military operations in Gaza through some kind of settlement at the international level, it has to be legally accountable for its breach of obligations, namely excessive use of force against undefended civilian targets and causing unnecessary suffering to Hamas resistant groups by using forbidden lethal materials. This will have a wider impact on Israel arsenal of unconventional arms and materials in the future. The Islamic government Judiciary has recently set up a criminal tribunal for that purpose and has invited Islamic states to cooperate in the proceedings of this body.

Israeli leaders had mistakenly thought that they have gained experience in their previous war with Hezbollah in South Lebanon in 2006. They wanted to use that in Gaza against Hamas’ unyielding position on the path of peace process. However, they missed one important point: that is, unlike Israel’s mental vulnerability on human losses and casualties, Hamas resistant forces, despite their obvious shortcomings from strategic point and war equipment, have an unprecedented zeal and devotion for sacrificing their lives for their sublime cause. This factor is susceptible to change the balance in favor of those poor and subjugated people who have really nothing to lose in their resistance against the occupying forces.

Though one may argue that Israel is also fighting for its very survival in a hostile environment, yet, it will have extreme difficulty to restore the negative image it has created in handling the Gaza crisis in the foreseeable future. It will probably lose the support and sympathy of world public opinion including American citizens for its cruelty in Gaza. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. For detail see: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Iran-US Relations:From Enmity to Rivalry

Iran-US Relations: From Enmity to Rivalry
A. A. Kazemi
January 8, 2009

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George Bush will soon be leaving the White House with a huge burden of failures in domestic and foreign policies. The legacy of the “new conservative hawks” however will haunt the new democrat’s administration for some time. This is not to say that democrats have had a brighter achievement in the past, at least with respect to the Middle East insurmountable problems.

So far, many presidents have been awarded the “Noble Peace Prize” for their untiring effort to settle the Middle East tribulations and ordeals. Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, Menahem Begin, Yasser Arafat… are among those who only left a number of signed documents and photos of “hand-shaking hostiles” without much success. Perhaps George Bush should also be given a special award for his bold attempt to wipe out Iran’s two ferocious adversaries, the Baath regime in Iraq and Taliban in Afghanistan. Since undoubtedly, he has rendered the biggest service to the Islamic regime in order to claim a regional superpower status in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Among the many horny problems Obama’s administration will be facing, the issue of Iran will certainly be on the top of the agenda. Though it is not yet quite clear what kind of strategy the new democrat president will opt, before anything he has to decide how to look at Iran in the first place; whether it should be considered as part of the problem or part of the solution in the Middle East.

Recent development in Iran’s nuclear issue which brought a US high official to the negotiating table in Geneva and subsequent letter of congratulations to US president-elect Obama by president Ahmadinejad leaves the impression that the two countries are no longer enemies but, rather mutual rivals! Many Middle East observers believe that the unfortunate ongoing Gaza crisis and the previous 33 days war between Hezbollah and Israel are vivid indications of Iran’s power contest and rivalry with the United States in the region. Though it may look odd to consider the Islamic regime as a serious US competitor in the Middle East affairs, it appears a quite defendable hypothesis for the reasons explained here.

Is the United States really considered as an enemy or a rival party for Iran? How far the Islamic government and Iranian conservative hard-liners are prepared to re-establish normal relations with US? Who will benefit from this relation and for what purpose? Where the two rivals are headed in the weeks and months to come?

*

More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since Iran’s revolution driven out this country from the Western camp to what can be characterized as swinging between East and West, Islamism and nationalism, radicalism and tolerance. While many European states did not mind to deal with the Islamic regime in time of peace and war, the United States has never digested the existence of a religious ideology to run the affairs of a strategically important oil-rich country in the 21st century Middle East.

Several attempts to disperse the clouds of animosity and misperception between the two states proved to be ineffective and futile. It should not surprise anybody that the squabble over the nuclear issue is just a tiny portion of a wider and deeper range of problems overshadowing Iran-U.S. long-term relations. The already gloomy situation between Iran and the United States, which for several years has been put in the shade by the unfortunate hostage taking affaire at the very beginning of the revolution in Iran, has jumped to its critical stage after the American military interventions in Iran’s two neighboring countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, following the September 11th events.

Though these military interventions in two hostile neighbors of Iran were a heavenly gift for the Islamic regime from a strategic point of view and inadvertently promoted its position in the region, nonetheless, the United States remained as a serious contender of Iran’s new status. Now, the US is puzzled as how to put rein on Iran’s appetite for power. For Iranian leaders, still the main source of anxiety is perceived as the U.S. threat to their very existence.

As we said elsewhere, Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, have been characterized as the “axis of evil” by U.S. president, essentially for their quest of becoming a nuclear actor in international scene. Iraq’s Baath regime and Saddam Hussein were overthrown essentially on the pretext of possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although such things were never found in that country. North Korea has partially surrendered to severe international pressure to abandon its nuclear project. As to Iran, it was quite clear from the beginning that the United States would not allow a revolutionary regime flagrantly hostile to Israel to ascend to the rank of a nuclear actor.

This hypothesis is especially true after the end of the cold war, the unfortunate events of September 11, and the emergence of terrorism as a non-state phenomenon, threatening peace and order of the whole world and challenging the established rules of the game in international political arena and power structure.
Islamic leaders in Tehran seem not to be deterred by UN sanctions or various military threats, although at a point of time they are very much scared about an eventual pre-emptive strike by Israel or the US. They keep emphasizing on diplomatic talks and negotiations with all interested parties. But, at the same time they refuse to accept any precondition for that purpose and stress on equal footing in the negotiation process. In other words they want to be treated as an “important world power” and equal partner.

As a matter of fact, Iranian president did not hesitate to remind the 6+1 nations on this very contention in his last speech after the Geneva meeting. He said something along the following lines: “I advise you sincerely don’t threaten us; we are not scared since we are a superpower…! If you are polite and you accept our inalienable rights for nuclear enrichment and our supremacy in the region you can sit on the negotiating table and talk about various issues of mutual interests…”

This clearly shows the president unyielding stance that Iran should be dealt with as a rival power in the region in which no problem can be solved without its consent. In fact, so far the regime has shown that it can destabilize the whole region through its proxies. Many observers regard the unfortunate Gaza crisis is in effect the product of a power contest in which Iran has an active part. Recent missile exercises and other signals were designed to demonstrate that Iran has the power and will to become what has been termed as a “world power” by Mr. Ahmadinejad.

Iranian conservative hard-line leaders firmly believe that their security and survival could not be secured through normalization of relations with the US. Since, in such circumstances, this would expose the regime’s vulnerability to US malicious covert actions for the purpose of toppling the revolutionary regime through “soft power” in the long-rum. Thus, instead, they would prefer to remain as rival by challenging the power and presence of the United States in the region.

Iran has been using various diplomatic tactics and economic leverages to divide between the United States and its European allies with the hope of benefiting from their conflicting relations. The same means have been used with respect to Russia and China without much success. Though these latter have been giving lip service to the Islamic regime, in practice they always consented to various UN resolutions putting sanctions against Iran.

It is not quite clear how the new democrat president in the United States intends to deal with Iran. But it appears that Obama’s administration is being advised to consider Iran as a serious “part of the solution” to insurmountable problems of the Middle East without whose help neither the Arab-Israeli peace process nor the stability in Iraq and Afghanistan can be achieved. While George Bush acted with perplexity in regard to the Iranian hurdle, it seems that the new US president is determined to straighten the matter once for all. We shall wait and see how much this optimism is well founded.
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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of law and international relations in Tehran, Iran.
For detail see: Middle East Academic Forum

Barack Obama and Iran

Barack Obama and Iran (After Election)
A. A. Kazemi*
November 5, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________
Almost half a century after the historic speech of Martin Luther King Jr. that cost him his life, “wishes come true!” Barack Obama, a black man who seeks his ancestors’ roots in Africa (Kenya), has been elected as 44th President of the United States to lead the most powerful nation on earth at least for the next four years. Indeed, the power of democracy can make miracle in an open and free society!
What does this mean to the Islamic regime in Iran? Shall it be happy for this historic change and consider it as the will of God who promised the victory of the oppressed over the arrogant powerful? Can the Islamic regime continue to evade from the chastisement of its defying behavior in the nuclear venture?
*
Before we let ourselves drawn by the joy of this astonishing event, we should listen to Obama’s speech before the Jewish lobby AIPAC after his victory over Hillary Clinton in the Democratic Primaries, which has all the answers to the above questions. Perhaps, for the first time a presidential candidate took so bold and explicit stance vis-à-vis Israel’s security and survival in the tumultuous Middle East political strata. This is indeed a direct consequence of Iran’s hard-line president’s vicarious statements about Israel during the past years.
Obama’s further observations on Iran’s role in the instability of the Middle East, terrorism and the security of Israel bear good witness that the election of a democrat president will not change American political environment in favor of the Islamic government in Iran. To the contrary, as we can read through the document titled: “Bipartisan Policy Center Releases Comprehensive Report on Iran” there is enough evidence to believe that from now on things will be much tougher for the Islamic hard-liners in Tehran.
Those who think otherwise are either naïve or have no grasp of history. Since, Democrats have shown in the past that they are very strict on matters such as human rights, Israel’s security, Palestinian problem and WMD proliferations. On the issue of terrorism they are as much preoccupied as the republicans. They may even venture more risky and malicious plots such as “regime change” if they perceive that this will promote their cause. The previous regime in Iran has been toppled during the democrats.
Americans are amazing people and know well how to use their constituent power to express their ideas and decide their choices and preferences. Like many nations, they don’t compromise their solidarity on common causes. This means that they are not prepared to accept humiliation because of mishandling of crisis situations by their leaders. Barack Obama came at an opportune time when America was split on matters of terrorism after September 11, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Obama’s election as the President of the United States has risen the expectations of not only the American people but the whole world about prosperity, peace and security. But, as he warned in his first speech after election, “the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime, two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial crisis in a century.” Indeed, the troubles that Obama inherited from his predecessors are so profound and complex which go beyond the capacity and power of this young leader and his fellow democrats.
Besides that, Obama’s election may reawaken the residue of dormant racism in America susceptible to cause problem in future. I don’t want to speculate on an unexpected ominous event, such as those that happened to late Martin Luther King Jr., Kennedy brothers etc. But, there is always a foolish racist around the corner that would be tempted to fire a gunshot.
With respect to Iran- US relations under Obama, chances of some sort of rapprochement are very meager as things stand at present. Since, we should recognize that the problem of Iran-US entanglement goes well beyond the conventional bilateral relations and party politics. This is to say that in all assessment we shall take into account the problem pertaining to US most close ally in the region, Israel, as well as other Middle East critical issues on which the Islamic regime has shown stringency.
In fact, American foreign policy in the Middle East is intimately tied to Israel’s survival and everything that goes with it. To put it in a more sophisticated strategic context, Israel and its continued existence in the Middle East is an important dependent variable in US strategic schemes, disregard of who and which party is in power in Washington.Obama’s election as US president could generate a potential opportunity to break ices between the two countries. But, this is not an automatic occurrence and needs tactful planning and political will from the two sides. Despite the unpleasant situation that the Americans are now experiencing in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would not seem strange that a democrat president in the White House, backed by a strong democrat Congress, become persuaded to settle the Iranian issue by force if necessary.
Therefore, it is safe to suggest that Iranians leaders should watch carefully their future course of actions and avoid any provocation that might push further the democrats towards the republican hard-line policies. They should also be cautious not to fall in a dangerous trap on the naïve belief that U.S. democrats will endorse the Islamic regime and will give it “carte blanche” on the nuclear issue. /
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* Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran- Iran.

Crisis of Governance and new Generation of World Leaders

 

Crisis of Governance and new Generation of World Leaders

Ali Asghar Kazemi

October 25, 2008

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Governing the sophisticated and diverse affairs of today’s nations has become so much complicated that goes beyond the capacity of any individual leader. This requires collective knowledge, initiative and action directed and managed by good leadership towards the fulfillment of national objectives and interests. Lack of sound management usually reveals during crisis situations, especially when it encompasses global peace and order.

September 11 crisis and its ramifications upon the international order have produced new generation of political leaders around the world which is different from the past. In the United States these changes appear more pronounced to the point of altering the course of history.

As the chances for Barrack Obama to conquer the White House increases, a new typology of leadership is emerging in the fields of political science and international relations. The new generation of world leaders seems to possess common traits and characteristics different from the traditional one. We are not yet quite sure about the direction and substance of these changes, but based on similar occurrences around the world, we may be able to build the main body of tentative new propositions which will eventually supersede the traditional theories of public opinion, governance and political leadership.

Are we experiencing a radical shift in world public opinion about the qualities and characters of political leaders? Are we witnessing fundamental changes in expectations and political taste of people on traits, capacity and orientation of leaders? Are these changes a necessary outcome of confidence crisis in leadership? Are these changes conducive to peace and harmony or we should expect more conflicts and hostilities around the world?

This introductory comment is merely the product an of an off-hand hunch which should be examined more closely by students of social sciences, politics and international relations in order to arrive at a clear and all- encompassing theory about the characteristics of emerging new leadership and governance in the world.

                                                      *

Without plunging deep into the old times and reminding reputes of great leaders who changed the course of history, names of famous political figures of contemporary world history, such as Churchill, de Gaulle, Eisenhower, Adenauer, Gandhi, Tito, and the likes, are still remembered with respect and grandeur. Indeed, they lived at a critical epoch of historical transformation after the Second World War when people still recognized heroes for their achievement and believed that they could save their respective nations from the moral and material catastrophe and devastation of the war.

As we move up towards our present time, we see a flagrant decline in the quality of leaders. In fact, leaders with mediocre capacity, intelligence and sense of accountability are emerging here and there whose performance is damaging the political status of their proper nations and endangering peace and order in the world. Is this the necessary outcome of the so-called “liberal democracy” and power of mass media to manipulating public opinions towards the election of weak leaders? Are new leaders more to the left or right? Are they more democratic or authoritarian? Are they more pragmatic, ethical, more pacifists or the opposite? How could we explain the current economic and financial crisis which has plunged the whole world into such deep trouble? Are we facing a crisis of leadership around the world?

Though we are not yet able to form a convincing argumentation about either of the above propositions, there is no doubt that September 11 and the subsequent events have drastically changed not only our perception, but also the political configuration and quality of leadership in the world. The truth is that we don’t have yet ready answers to these queries and in fact in some cases we have evidences to prove both sides of the dichotomy. For example, in Latin America we are witnessing the emergence of rather young aboriginal and rude leftist leaders whose main trait is feuding with the United States. They are challenging American policies and power to the point that they have become strategic allies of the Islamic regime in Iran. Though they have nothing in common with Iranian hardliners except their hostile attitude toward US, the Islamic regime is investing hard in order to gain partners and influence in the region.

In the United States, President Bush, son of a living ex-president, whose poor performance brought America and the world to the brink of political and economic insolvency, will soon leave the office eventually in favor of a democrat president who promised drastic changes in the American leadership.

How shall we explain such a strange phenomenon that may pave the way for the election of an “African-American” as the leader of the most powerful nation on earth? Is it due to the alteration of people’s political taste or shall we look to other causes for this metamorphosis? How comes that the American Public ended up to prefer a clever black man without much noble background to a war hero whose father and grandfather were among high ranking flag officers of the US Navy?

In Europe the crisis of leadership is felt all over the continent. People are protesting constantly against their leaders. They have little confidence on their government’s capacity to tackle with growing problems originated on the other side of the Atlantic. US mishandling of the post-September 11 crises by means of “hard power” has put NATO’s global mission in serious qualm and member states are not quite sure about the functionality and viability of this remnant of the cold war period. New leaders of not much charm such as France’s Sarkosy, Italy’s Berlusconi, and few others, while in deep trouble at home, are trying to identify themselves with the American political leadership. They may think that this will boost their position within EU and in the world.

East European political leaders are still in transition from the era of iron curtain to be integrated into a greater liberal community whose outcome is not yet clear. In the Middle East we have an array of left to right, from revolutionary hardliners challenging the West, to traditional conservative regimes whose new leaders are liberal minded and pro-West. Radical Muslims who staged the September 11 attacks (Al-Qaeda) are among the archenemy of this latter generation of leaders in traditional societies and earnestly seek to uproot their rules.

In the vast Asian continent, we still have the remnant of the old communist intelligentsia who have transformed to the requisites of the 21^st century. Incumbent Russian leaders, who come from an intelligence background (KGB), have now partly recovered from the shock of the collapse of the old Soviet empire. While Russians are trying to follow policies dictated by their geopolitics, most of the new young republics of the Central Asia and Caucasus are mired by the American hegemony and dance to the tune orchestrated by Washington. They are also in transition and their final fate is yet to be written in future. Georgian recent experience may well be repeated in other territories of the old union.

Besides China whose pragmatic leaders are distancing from the ideological dogma of the past and are now experiencing real miracle in their economy, new political leaders in East Asia are continuing to rely on American capitalism. They already have paid very onerous price for their ties with the West and are now going through further economic hardship due to recent financial crisis in the United States. Opposition leaders will soon capitalize on the matter and embark to take over the political leadership through launching anti-capitalistic slogans which now seem to please public at large.

*

We had no intention to cover and exhaust all the political leaders of the world in this introductory comment. We only attempted to give exemplary samples on the emerging new generation of leaders, and pose questions rather than to provide answers or justification to the main argument. The issue seems enough worthy for further academic debates and directed researches.

As a preliminary conclusion we may advance the following hypotheses to be tested through more in-depth debates and researches:

· September 11 phenomenon has changed not only world political configuration but also altered people’s perception of leadership;

· Inability of world leaders to take appropriate measures and policies to face the dangers of what is labeled as “international terrorism” has created a crisis of governance and leadership;

· People of advanced societies no longer trust their traditional leaders and are changing political taste and orientation towards unconventional faces who promise changes;

· It is not quite sure that they will get the expected satisfaction in their choices, nonetheless they prefer to test their chances;

· Only the future can reveal the rationale and benefits of this new trend and experience for peace and order in the world.

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US Economic Crisis and the Middle East

US Economic Crisis and the Middle East

Ali Asghar Kazemi
October 10 2008
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The crisis that swept world financial markets in recent weeks did not surprise many analysts who expected the curse long before its occurrence. Some have compared it to the great American depression of 1930s which changed the political landscape of the world by the emergence of militarism and fascism that ended up to the Second World War.

There are solid indications that the American crisis that reverberated throughout the globe within days is a multidimensional phenomenon that seeks its causes in a number of dependent and intervening variables among which American military interventions in the Middle East and mounting threats against the Islamic regime in Iran are the most decisive.History bears good witness that the United States has always sought cure to economic crises and recession in massive military build-ups and interventions outside the American continent. Two world wars and wars in Korea, Vietnam and more recent military interventions in the Middle East are cited as vivid examples of this contention.

How far this argument is tenable in present international relations? What are the hidden dimensions of the crisis? What would be the impacts of the crisis for the Middle East as a whole and Iran in particular, as a plausible target of US preemptive strike? How the crisis should be managed in order to avoid the worse to happen?
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The crisis that engulfed the world financial markets in the past two weeks was in fact not a surprise to most economic and political analysts who had foreseen the initial signs and symptoms of the anomaly well before its occurrence. Two years ago in 2006, a significant estimate was issued by the Laboratoire européen d’Anticipation Politique Europe 2020 - LEAP/E2020 which had predicted with high probability that an economic and financial crisis of a scope comparable with that of 1929 is on the way which will have most adverse political impact the world has known since the fall of the Soviet empire in 1989. It was referred to as ‘The End of the Western World we have known since 1945.' According to the same document, in case an American or Israeli military intervention is conducted against Iran, the probability of a major crisis to start rises up to 100%.

The study has based its estimates on two verifiable events related to decisions taken by two key-actors: the United States and Iran. Here is the main argument of the survey:

• On the one hand there is the Iranian decision of opening the first oil bourse priced in Euros on March 20th, 2006 in Teheran, available to all oil producers of the region;

• On the other hand, there is the decision of the American Federal Reserve to stop publishing M3 figures (the most reliable indicator on the amount of dollars circulating in the world) from March 23, 2006 onward.

According to the document, these two decisions constitute altogether the indicators, the causes and the consequences of the historical transition in progress between the order created after World War II and the new international equilibrium in gestation since the collapse of the USSR. Their magnitude as much as their simultaneity will catalyze all the tensions, weaknesses and imbalances accumulated since more than a decade throughout the international system. (LEAP/E2020)The survey further predicted in 2006 that as a consequence of the above phenomenon, a world crisis is susceptible to emerge in seven important sectors which will affect the whole planet in political as well as military fields as follow:

1. Crisis of confidence in the Dollar;

2. Crisis of US financial imbalances;

3. Oil crisis;

4. Crisis of the American leadership;

5. Crisis of the Arab-Muslim world;

6. Global governance crisis;

7. European governance crisis.

As can be seen in the above estimate, the financial crisis is just the tip of the mountain of a deeper and more systemic crisis situation which we should expect throughout the world.

There is little doubt that the first repercussion of the current financial crisis will be seen in the domestic affairs of the United States where the fate of the next American president will soon be decided. Democrats have now more chances to conquer the White House, not that they have better solutions for the crisis but just because the republicans have lost their credibility in the American leadership for sound governance.

The psychological shock of the crisis in the mind of the American public in an inopportune time will eventually lead them to vote for a democrat president, although they may not like him. The setback for the republicans is almost certain, because they ought to pay the price of horrendous mistakes of an unpopular president who engaged Americans into futile entanglements in the Middle East which is still going on. That is not to say that democrats are more pacifist or more lenient and restraint towards engaging into conflicts and hostility with their contenders, especially Iran. Since surprisingly, as I have said elsewhere, most major wars the United States engaged into were initiated by the democrats and terminated by the republicans.

Seen from the vantage point of the Islamic leaders in Iran, the crisis is yet another sign of American decadence behind which lay the invisible hands of the omnipotent Allah. They may naively think that an America in crisis will neither have the incentive nor the guts to go for a preemptive strike or put further pressure on Iran for its nuclear venture.

Unfortunately, hardliners in Iran miss an important truth. Whether they like it or not, the fate of the global economy is intimately interwoven with the American financial market. This is especially true for Iran’s two potential supporters, Russians and Chinese, whose economic viability is more exposed to the crisis than any other states. Thus, they should avoid tying their fate with unreliable partners. They should remember the financial and economic shocks of the past decades which brought down to nil Asian flourishing economy. In all of these crises the United States was able to recover smoothly at the costs of other developing and oil producing countries.

Though Iran holds important geo-strategic assets in the current crisis and so far has been able to stay somehow aloof of its negative impact, it should be cautious about taking provocative decisions that could aggravate the situation and give pretext to its contenders to further apply severe sanctions or to form a coalition for an eventual military strike.

In conclusion, the world has to cross fingers that the United States recovers safely and promptly from the ongoing crisis and does not endure much structural harm susceptible to endanger the present vulnerable international order. Otherwise, adverse condition is susceptible to further aggravate hostilities and conflicts, by spreading the plague of terrorism and militarism around the world.

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