Le message caché de la lettre de l'Iran

Le message caché de la lettre de l'Iran
Au président des États-Unis

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
11 mai 2006
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Le contraire à la croyance commune que la lettre du 8 mai 2006 de président iranienne au président des États-Unis, n'a eu rien à dire ou offrir pour résoudre la crise nucléaire, mon argument est qu'il a un message caché qui devrait être soigneusement et a objectivement compris. Voici mes raisons de cette controverse.

Les orientaux sont surprenants et Iraniens parmi eux sont beaucoup plus bizarre et discrets. La littérature, la poésie et les arts persans sont bon témoin à cet attribut. Les observateurs et les politiciens occidentaux ont habituellement la difficulté pour saisir ce qui à été désigné parfois sous le nom du « puzzle persan » ou du « paradoxe persan. » Beaucoup de disciples investigateurs ont essayé de comprendre et dépeindre les traits distinctifs du tempérament et perspectifs des Iraniens.

Les Persanes sont en effet les gens très étonnants avec le caractère particulier ; peut-être pas jusqu'au degré semblable à ce que James Morier mentionne dans son Hajji baba d'Isphahan. [1] Mais, comme Graham Fuller décrit dans son livre Le Centre de l'Univers, [2] les Iraniens sont semblables à leurs tapis impressionnants avec l'immense complexité dans les conceptions et les couleurs. Il est difficile s'approcher et les comprendre. Ils n'exposent pas leurs pensées facilement et ils sont maîtres de cacher leurs intentions. [3] Kenneth Pollack va encore plus loin dans sa description de caractère national iranien. Dans un livre appelé le Puzzle Persan [4], il se livre à la critique de sensiblerie iranienne, xénophobie, « arrogance » exagérée, « ignorance considérable » à propos de [leur environnement politique].


Tout ce qu’on viens de dire ci-dessus devrait nous mener à croire que :

Tout d'abord, bien que la lettre soit vue en tant que discours pompeux sur la matière philosophique, religieuse et morale plutôt banale, et identifiée avec le nom du président iranien, en réalité c'est la manifestation d'une ardeur et d'un consentement implicites à l'échelon le plus élevé de la République islamique pour briser le long tabou d'ouverture du dialogue avec les Etats-Unis. Puisque, comme nous pouvons voir, la tonalité de la lettre est semblable à celle de défunt Imam Khomeini à Gorbachov le dernier dirigeant de l’Union Soviétique. Par conséquent, la lettre n'expose pas simplement la position d'un homme d'État jeune et politiquement inexpérimenté ; plutôt elle devrait être prise comme appel du chef suprême au président des États-Unis exprimant sa volonté politique pour le règlement paisible de la question nucléaire.

Deuxièmement, ça ne devrait pas étonner quiconque qui après un quart de siècle, le gouvernement religieux en Iran a acquis assez d'expérience que l'idéalisme pure ne peut plus mener les affaires sophistiquées d'un état et peut aboutir qu’aux problèmes insurmontables qui pourraient mettre en danger son existence même. Par conséquent, un retour au réalisme semble inévitable ; même pour un régime révolutionnaire en désaccord avec les normes et les règles injustes régnantes des relations internationales.

Troisièmement, le gouvernement islamique en Iran veut démontrer qu'alors qu'il ne va pas avec la situation injuste dans la politique mondiale, il a la capacité et la volonté politique de communiquer et au besoin d'être en pourparlers avec son ennemi suprême, une fois considéré comme le « Grand Satan, » afin d'éviter l'hostilité et la confrontation qui pourraient coûter sa survie. Néanmoins, il s'attend à ce que d'autres puissants respectent sa sécurité et continuité et veut être considéré en tant qu'associé égal pour manipuler les affaires de la région.

Quatrièmement, le gouvernement islamique se rend tout à fait compte du fait que les Américains ne permettraient jamais un régime révolutionnaire, hostile a l'hégémonie des États-Unis dans le Moyen-Orient et au Golfe Persique, pour avoir accès à la force nucléaire. Il a sans doute une perception au sujet du genre et de l'importance d'intelligence que les Etats-Unis ont au sujet de ses activités nucléaires. En outre, il peut avoir au commencement contemplé un certain genre de dissuasion nucléaire indigène pour sa sauvegarde, mais maintenant vu les réactions et les défis internationaux, il pourrait être disposé de se limiter à l'utilisation pacifique de la technologie nucléaire d'une façon transparente (c.-à-d. en adhérant officiellement au Protocole Additionnel au Traité de Non-prolifération NPT), si sa sécurité est garantie.

En conclusion, si les Etats-Unis signifient vraiment ce qu'ils indiquent au sujet de la solution diplomatique de la crise, il devrait saisir l'occasion de cette lettre de s'engager dans un dialogue constructif avec le gouvernement islamique afin de trouver des avenues pour tous les problèmes en suspens entre les deux états. En effet, ceci bénéficiera les deux nations et empêchera l'occurrence d'une autre catastrophe dans cette région volatile.

* Professeur des relations internationales.

[1] Hajji Baba d'Ispahan, héros des aventures du Hajji Baba d'Ispahan par James Justinian Morier (3 vols. Londres, 1824), le roman oriental le plus populaire dans l'anglais et un stéréotype fortement influent du prétendu « caractère national persan » dans des temps modernes. Morier (1782-1849), un ancien diplomate qui avaient résidé en Perse pendant presque six années (1808-1809 et 1810-1814) à une jointure critique pendant les enchevêtrements diplomatiques avec des puissances européennes, façonnées son roman sur ses observations personnelles et connaissance directe au sujet de Perse, mais avec un trait décidément hostile et satirique. Un projet d'Orientalist par excellence, Hajji baba lance des satires des Persans comme rascals, lâches, bandits puériles, et imbéciles directs, dépeignant leur culture comme scandaleuse malhonnête et décadente, et leur société comme violente. Morier a dépeint l'est, pas simplement par les yeux arrogants d'un voyageur européen, comme ses propres comptes de ses visites à Perse (éditée en 1812 et 1818), mais sous forme de biographie d'un « indigène, » un caractère persan composé dont a imaginé que l'identité a été enveloppée dans des ambiguïtés délibérées. Voir : www.iranica.com

[2] L'ancien analyste et l'auteur de CIA, voir : Graham Fuller, Centre de l'univers : La géopolitique de l'Iran (Publication de Westview, 1991)

[3] C'est mon propre souvenir du livre. [4] Kenneth M. Pollack, ancien analyste de l'agence d'intelligence centrale (CIA), maintenant à l'établissement de Brookings. Selon quelques observateurs, il tend à faire une moquerie de l'analyse objective privée d'un tel claquer abstrait de généralisation de ce que défunt Edouard Said a marqué « Orientalism ». Cf. revue par : Atimes.com

The Hidden Message of Iran's Letter to U.S. President

The Hidden Message of Iran’s Letter to U.S. President

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
May 11, 2006
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Contrary to the common belief that Iranian president letter of May 8, 2006 to the U.S. president, had nothing to say or offer for solving the impending nuclear crisis, my argument is that it has a hidden message that should be carefully and objectively understood. Here are my reasons for this contention.

Orientals are amazing people and Iranians among them are still more baffling and discrete. Persian literature, poetry and arts are good witness to this attribute. Western observers and politicians usually have difficulty to grasp what is sometimes referred to as the “Persian puzzle” or the “Persian paradox.” Many inquisitive scholars have attempted to understand and depict the distinctive features of Iranians temperament and outlook.

Persians are indeed amazing people with peculiar character; perhaps not to the extent similar as to what James Morier mentions in his Hajji Baba of Isphahan.[1] But, as Graham Fuller described in The Center of the Universe,[2] Iranians are alike their impressive carpets with immense intricacy in designs and colors. They are difficult to approach and comprehend. They don’t expose their thoughts easily and they are master of concealing their intentions.[3] Kenneth Pollack goes even further in his depiction of Iranian national character. In a book named The Persian Puzzle[4], he indulges in criticizing Iranian emotionalism, xenophobia, exaggerated "self-importance", "considerable ignorance” about [their political environment].

All of the above should lead us to believe that:

First of all, although the letter is seen as pompous discourse on rather banal philosophical, religious and ethical topic, and identified with the name of the hard-line Iranian president, in reality it is the manifestation of an implicit eagerness and consent at the highest echelon of the Islamic Republic for breaking the long unwarranted taboo of opening dialogue with the United States. Since, as we can see, the tone of the letter is similar to that of the late Imam Khomeini to the then Soviet leader Gorbachov. Hence, the letter does not expose merely the position of a young and politically inexperienced statesman; rather it should be taken as the call of the supreme leader to the U.S. president expressing his political will for peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue.

Secondly, it should not surprise anybody that after a quarter of century, the religious government in Iran has gained enough experience that sheer idealism in running the sophisticated affairs of a state may lead to insurmountable problems that could endanger its very existence. Therefore, a return to realism seems inevitable even for a revolutionary regime at odd with the prevailing unjust norms and rules of the game in international relations.

Thirdly, the Islamic government in Iran wants to demonstrate that while it does not go along with the unfair state of affairs in world politics, it has the capacity and political will to communicate and if necessary to negotiate with its arch-enemy, once regarded as the “Great Satan,” in order to avoid hostility and confrontation which could cost its survival. Nonetheless, it expects others to respect its security and continuity and wants to be regarded as equal partner in handling the business of the region.

Fourthly, the Islamic government is quite aware of the fact that the Americans would never allow a revolutionary regime, inherently at odd with U. S. hegemony in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, to have access to nuclear capability. It eventually has a feeling about the kind and magnitude of intelligence that the United States has about its nuclear activities. Furthermore, it may have initially contemplated some kind of indigenous nuclear deterrence for its safeguard, but now considering the harsh international reactions and challenges to this endeavor, it might be willing to limit itself to peaceful use of nuclear technology in a transparent manner ( i.e. by adhering officially the additional Protocol to the NPT), provided its security is guaranteed.

Finally, if the United States means really what it says about diplomatic solution of the crisis, it should seize the opportunity of this letter to engage in a constructive all-encompassing dialogue with the Islamic government in order to find avenues for all outstanding problems between the two states. Indeed, this will benefit both nations and will prevent the occurrence of another catastrophe in the volatile region.






* Professor of international relations and political analyst.

[1] Hajji Baba of Ispahan, hero of The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan by James Justinian Morier
(3 vols. London, 1824), the most popular Oriental novel in the English language and a highly influential stereotype of the so-called "Persian national character" in modern times. Morier (1782-1849), a former diplomat who had resided in Persia for nearly six years (1808-1809 and 1810-1814) at a critical juncture during diplomatic entanglements with European powers, fashioned his novel on his personal observations and direct knowledge about Persia, but with a decidedly hostile and satirical overtone. An Orientalist project par excellence, Hajji Baba lampoons Persians as rascals, cowards, puerile villains, and downright fools, depicting their culture as scandalously dishonest and decadent, and their society as violent. Morier depicted the East, not simply through the arrogant eyes of a European traveler, like his own accounts of his visits to Persia (published in 1812 and 1818), but in the form of a biography of a "native," a composite Persian character whose imagined identity was wrapped in deliberate ambiguities. See: www.iranica.com
[2] Former CIA analyst and author, See: Graham Fuller, Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran (Westview Press, 1991)
[3] This is my own recollection from the book.
[4] Kenneth M. Pollack, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, now at the Brookings Institution. According to some observers, he tends to make a mockery of objective analysis bereft of such abstract generalization smacking of what the late Edward Said labeled "Orientalism". Cf. review by : Atimes.com

Une Lettre au " Grand Satan"

Une Lettre au « Grand Satan »


Ali-Asghar Kazemi
9 Mai 2006

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Il n’ y pas longtemps, pendant les discussions houleuses sur la question nucléaire Iranienne et tandis que le dossier était sur le chemin au Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU, les médias des États-Unis ont parle’ à propos du sujet que les Américains visent le « changement de régime » en Iran. Beaucoup de gens étaient très inquiets que l'intransigeance de l'Iran sur l'enrichissement nucléaire pourrait finalement lâcher un conflit armé dans la région. Il y a deux ans j'ai argué du fait que les chances pour une confrontation militaire entre les deux pays sont très peux pour des raisons tout à fait différentes. Plus récemment j'ai écrit dans un rapport succinct « quand….la survie est en jeu, tout est permise, puisque les fins justifient des moyens. C'est de dire que des principes peuvent être sacrifiés quand la question réduit à cette question simple : Être ou ne pas être ? »
Suivant la même ligne, quand le 11 avril 2006 le président iranien a solennellement déclaré le plein accès de l'Iran à l'enrichissement sur l'échelle industrielle et a réclamé que l'Iran devrait être considéré comme un nouveau membre du « club atomique », j'a écrit les lignes suivantes comme les remarques de conclusion à un autre papier sur « les signaux mélangés de l'Iran à l'ouest. » J'ai discuté cela : « Que le régime islamique se rendra à la demande du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU afin d'éviter davantage d'escalade de la question nucléaire, dépends de la perception de menace des décideurs iraniens et de leur capacité de contrôler la crise. En effet, s'ils se rendent compte que les risques de défier les demandes de l’ONU sont beaucoup trop hauts et au delà de leur résistance, ils sûrement viendront à leur sens et feront tout ce qui est nécessaires pour éviter le pire de se produire. » Pas étonnamment, après presque un quart de siècle d'antagonisme et des polémiques contre le « Grand Satan, » le président conservateur du régime islamique, qui a commence’ sa période d'activité avec la tenue audacieux et agressive vis-à-vis de l'ouest, a soudainement ramolli sa position en envoyant « une lettre confidentielle » au président des États-Unis en 8, Mai 2006. Le contenu de cette lettre n'importe pas vraiment, mais l’importance est dans le seul fait qu'à un moment critique, quand une résolution sous le chapitre VII de la charte de l’ONU est sous la considération sérieuse, le régime islamique se penche vers son ennemi suprême pour une trêve.J'avais toujours argué du fait dans mes écritures précédentes que la clef à l'hostilité prolongée de l'Iran avec les États-Unis se situe dans les mains des nouveaux conservateurs du régime et pas nécessairement des libéraux progressifs. Puisque, comme nous savons, les réformistes n'ont pas été censés acquérir la crédibilité dans les yeux publics. Ils ont été considérés comme les traîtres et cinquième colonne de l'ennemi qui agissait d'une façon Gorbachovian de préparer le terrain pour la chute du régime. On soupçonnait que la tendance de la démocratisation, comme conçue et portée par l’ex- président clergé libéral et éclairé (Khatami), était un chemin dangereux à s'effondrer.Maintenant que les nouveaux conservateurs ont toute puissance d'état aussi bien que le support du chef suprême, ils peuvent employer tous moyens, tactique et dons pour achever les conseils machiavéliens afin de sauver le régime et ses établissements des dangers de la dissolution et de la désintégration. Ceci ne signifie pas que le jeune président ardent a jamais eu connaissance ou même a entendu de l'art de Machiavel du sens politique : (hurle comme un lion et triche comme un renard). Mais il semble bien suivre le conseil de son instinct de la vie menant à la même conduite innée.
Comme j’ai dit avant, les nouveaux conservateurs sont plus pragmatiques que des réformistes. Ils ont un sens fort de survie et sont ainsi capables pour faire n'importe quoi afin de rester dans le pouvoir. C'est pourquoi la plupart des observateurs croient que s'il doit y avoir n'importe quelle percée dans des relations des Etats-Unis et l’Iran, seulement les conservateurs sont capables pour faire ainsi. C'est de dire que s'ils sentent leur survie et les intérêts menacés, comme a dit Winston Churchill une fois, ils iront jusqu’à l'enfer pour faire un contrat avec la « mère de Satan » [1]
Rappelons-nous que la politique est « l’art des impossibles » et ceux qui sont engagés dans ce jeu, malgré leur croyance religieuse et foi personnelle, sont de façon ou d'autre traînés au même chemin qui abouti à la « raison d’état »ou de l'instinct inhérent pour la survie.
Ainsi, pour les nouveaux conservateurs, les valeurs et les principes sont bons et tout importants seulement à condition qu’ils servent leurs causes et intérêts. Ceci ne signifie pas qu'ils sont insidieux ou hypocrites, mais ceci est considéré comme vertu impliquant la flexibilité dans l'action vers trouver des moyens pour atteindre des objectifs plus fondamentaux. En d'autres termes, quand une cause sublime est en jeu toute chose est permise même envoyer une lettre au« Grand Satan. » [2] Que les Etats-Unis prennent la lettre sérieusement ou pas, sûrement, les résultats du fait sont beaucoup moins importants que l’initiative elle-même.
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[1] C'est le cas historique dans lequel pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale le Royaume-Uni a conclu un traité de paix avec le communiste soviétique afin de faire face à la menace accablante du nazi en Europe et l'Angleterre.

[2] Comme Imam Khomeini une fois dites, pour la sauvegarde du régime islamique, même les fonctions primaires de dévot musulman, telles que des prières quotidiennes régulières, jeûne et pèlerinage de Hajj, peuvent être négligées, suspendues ou remises à plus tard. La raison principale derrière la création du Conseil de convenance d'état était en fait d'adapter à des principes religieux aux besoins essentiels de l'état contemporain.

A Letter to the " Great Satan"

A Letter to “The Great Satan”

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
May 9, 2006
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Not long ago, during the peak of heated debates over the nuclear issue and while the case was on the way to the U.N. Security Council, it was revealed by U.S. media that Americans are aiming at “regime change” in Iran. Many peoples were quite anxious that Iran’s intransigence on nuclear enrichment could finally unleash an armed conflict in the region. Two years ago I argued that chances for a clash between the two states are very slim for quite different reasons. More recently I wrote in a short paper “When….the survival is at stake, everything is permissible, since ends justify means. This is to say that principles can be sacrificed when the issue reduces to this simple question: To be or not to be?”

Along the same line, when on April 11, 2006 Iranian president solemnly declared Iran’s full access to enrichment on industrial scale and claimed that Iran should be regarded as a new member to “Atomic Club” I wrote the following lines as concluding remarks to another paper on “Iran’s Mixed Signals to the West.” I argued that:

“Whether the Islamic regime will surrender to the demand of the U.N. Security Council in order to avoid further escalation of the nuclear issue, is a matter of threat perception of the Iranian decision makers and their capacity to manage the crisis. Indeed, if they realize that the risks of defying the U. N. demands are much too high and beyond their endurance, they will surely come to their sense and do whatever necessary to avoid the worst to happen.”

Not surprisingly, after almost a quarter of century of antagonism and controversies against the “Great Satan,” the hard-line president of the Islamic regime, who ushered his term of office with bold and aggressive deportment vis-à-vis the West, suddenly softened his position by sending a “confidential letter” to the U.S. President on may 8, 2006. The content of this letter does not really matter, the importance lies in the mere fact that at a critical moment, when a resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is under serious consideration, the Islamic regime is now leaning towards its arch-enemy for truce.

I had always argued in my previous writings that the key to end Iran’s lingering enmity with the U.S. lies in the hands of hard-line new conservative elements of the regime and not necessarily the progressive liberals. Since, as we know, the reformists were not supposed to acquire credibility in public eyes. They were regarded as traitors and enemy’s fifth column who were acting in a Gorbachovian manner to pave the way for the downfall of the regime. It was thought that the trend of democratization, as conceived and carried by the previous liberal-minded and enlightened clergy president (Khatami), was a dangerous path to collapse.

Now that the new-conservatives have all the state power as well as the backing of the supreme leader, they can use all the means, tactics and skills by following Machiavellian advice of how to save a state and its institutions from the dangers of dissolution and disintegration. This does not mean that the young zealous president ever read or even heard about Machiavelli’s art of statesmanship: (roar like a lion and lament like a fox). But he seems to follow the advice by his life instinct leading to the same innate conduct.
As I said before, the new conservatives are more pragmatic than reformists. They have a strong sense of survival and thus are capable to do anything to remain in power. That is why most observers believe that if there has to be any breakthrough in US-Iran relations, only conservatives are capable to do so. This is to say that if they feel their very survival and real interests threatened, as Winston Churchill once said, they will go to hell to make a deal with the “mother of Satan.”[1]
Let us remember that politics is the “art of impossible” and those involved in this realm, disregard of their religious beliefs and personal creed, are somehow inadvertently dragged to the same path for what is known as the raison d’état or inherent instinct for survival.
Thus, for new conservatives, values and principles are good and important as long they are subservient to their causes and interests. This does not mean that they are wicked or hypocrite, but this is considered as a virtue involving flexibility in action towards finding ways and means to achieve more fundamental objectives. In other words, when a sublime cause is at stake every thing is permissible even sending a letter to “The Great Satan.”[2] Whether the United States takes the letter seriously or not, surely, the outcome of the venture is much less important than the deed itself. /

[1] This is the historical case in which during WW2 United Kingdom concluded a peace treaty with Soviet communist in order to face Nazi’s overwhelming threat to Europe and England.
[2] As Imam Khomeini once said, for safeguarding of Islamic regime, even the primary duties of Moslem devout, such as regular daily prayers, fasting and Hajj pilgrimage, can be neglected, suspended or postponed. The main reason behind the creation of State Expediency Council was in fact to accommodate religious principles to the vital needs of the contemporary state.

The Dream of "Pax Persica"

The Dream of “Pax Persica”

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
18 April 2006
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April 2006 will be remembered in contemporary history of Iran as a landmark. In this month Iran has become once again the focus of attention in international media. At the end of this month the fate of Iran‘s nuclear ambitions will be decided upon by the U.N. Security Council.

While waiting for a deadline to comply with the demand of this world body to halt its presumed peaceful nuclear activities, the Islamic regime has opted for a policy of defiance and confrontation. Claiming that it has reached the full cycle uranium enrichment, it has said that the breakthrough was for the benefit of peace and security of the all Moslem nations, leaving the impression of “big brother” trying to bring the region under its nuclear protection. This reminds the unfulfilled dreams of the old regime that, according to antagonists, wanted to revive the Persian imperium by ascending to regional supremacy and becoming “gendarme” of the Persian Gulf region. Now as a self-claimed member of the nuclear club, the Islamic fundamentalist regime contemplates the vision of achieving that objective by establishing what I venture to call “Pax Persica” among the Moslem community (Umma’h).

Once the Persian Empire ruled the largest known political dominion of the ancient times and challenged the Greeks and Romans on land and at sea. Persian supremacy in those days was not merely backed by the audacity and courage of its warriors or instruments of war but transpired from the leadership, tolerance and ingenuity of its rulers. Jewish people still remember and celebrate the memory of the Persian king, Cyrus the Great, who liberated them from the tyranny of Pharaohs in ancient Egypt.

Pax Romana and Pax Britannica were indeed the product of wisdom of great diplomats and politicians who guaranteed the capacity to tip the scales by allying themselves with the weaker nations of their times against whatever state or coalition of states threatened to become predominant. The whole idea relates to the concept of “balance of power” as a prerequisite to avoid crisis escalation and to establish a durable peace and order or to preserve the status quo in a vulnerable region.

The balance of power system was a process of checking power with a counterpower. The suitable method to accomplish this end was the formation of alliances. One chief alleged benefit of the balance was to guarantee the survival and independence of small nations who were protected by the “balancer” from being overwhelmed by the large ones or, otherwise saying, to ensure peace and stability in an anarchic world.

A careful scrutiny of this theory in the current state of affairs in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, leads one to believe that the present international relations fall short of proving the validity of balance of power. This is especially true at this critical time with respect to the Islamic regime in Iran that not only lacks the world support and that of the Islamic community in the region, but also is far beyond the current state of art and technology needed for a power to be reckoned with. Furthermore, to act as a “balancer” a state should not be guided merely by national egotism but by universal values and international altruism. In other words, if the endeavor reduces to self-interest for survival, any such plan or strategy is doomed to failure and my further aggravate the situation.

“Pax Americana” is a good example which, despite its worldwide hegemony, earnestly seeks the support of other great powers in the Security Council and elsewhere in order to form a viable coalition against the presumed threats of the Islamic regime in Iran; whereas this latter even lacks the support of Moslem nations. We should recognize that in the chaotic state of world affairs, it is not much difficult for a superpower to deal with a threat of minor magnitude in the military scale. This means that no matter how powerful a nation might be, it has nonetheless the need the support for its plans and strategy.

If a political entity is caught in the obsession of challenging the power or the very existence of other nations, surely it has to be either supported by some unknown forces beyond the actual equation of balance of material power or it should be devoid of conventional wisdom and common sense. Indeed, the power and merci of the Almighty God is not the monopoly of a specific religion, sect or creed. No single nation can claim to represent the true path to salvation and preach the other the accepted norms of ethics.

“Pax Persica” can be reached only through tolerance, compassion and sympathy towards other nations in the tumultuous region of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Great powers should abstain from aggravating the already volatile situation of this area. Since, this will only benefit the adventurers who would like to escalate the crisis situation to the threshold of an unwanted war in order to consolidate their power and guarantee their own survival. The dream of “Pax Persica can turn into nightmare if not properly handled. /

Euphorie Nucléaire de l'Iran...

Euphorie Nucléaire de l'Iran

Vers une Confrontation avec l'Occident!

Ali-Asghar Kazemi

12 Avril 2006

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Les Iraniens ont beaucoup d’étapes dans leur longue histoire. En fait, l'histoire de l'Iran est pleine des étapes importantes, des héros et des idoles qui ont aidé à sauver cette nation dans les vicissitudes des temps passes. Les Persans doivent leur survie dans l'histoire à ce don merveilleux. Beaucoup d'occurrences telles que la "nationalisation du pétrole," la révolution islamique, et la fin de guerre entre l'Iran et l’Irak, sont parmi les événements plus récents qui sont considérés en tant que tournants en Iran contemporain.

L’étape contestable la plus récente est le prétendu plein accès à l'enrichissement en carburant nucléaire qui a été déclaré avril 11, 2006. Ceci s'est produit à un temps critique au milieu la crise nucléaire, alors que le monde compte en bas les jours de délai accordes par le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU au gouvernement islamique pour stopper toutes ses activités nucléaires. En ce jour, le président controversé de dur ligne a solennellement annoncé que l'Iran à acquérir la capacité de l'enrichissement nucléaire sur l'échelle industrielle et a déclaré la date comme "jour national de fierté et prestige."

Le public moyen cependant, impatient au sujet des impacts plausibles de l'événement sur leur vie quotidienne, a montrés peu d'enthousiasme pour les nouvelles. Des citoyens plus instruits et plus expérimentés ont secoué leurs têtes et ont tranquillement exprimé des inquiétudes concernant les conséquences graves de l'entreprise. Les groupes d'opposition, étonnes par la charge lourde d'avertis la couverture médiatique et la propagande, ont exprimés leur mécontentement au sujet de l'effet néfaste du jeu sur les intérêts nationaux de l'Iran.

Il y’à beaucoup de doutes que cet événement pourrait être considéré comme borne limite et être classé comme percée dans des possibilités scientifiques du pays. On croit que la déclaration était une manoeuvre délibérée afin d'atteindre un certain nombre d'objectifs en ce moment critique: a) la consommation domestique pour ceux qui deviennent de plus en plus frustré au sujet de la réalisation du président de ses promesses de faire face à la pauvreté, à la corruption, aux inflations et à d'autres maux sociaux; b) pour encourager le directeur général de l'AIEA (attendu visiter l'Iran en 12 avril ) pour noter son rapport sur le cas de l'Iran au Conseil de Sécurité en quelque sorte pour éviter des sanctions certaines sous chapitre VII (article 41) de Charter l’ONU.; c) pour envoyer un message sombre à l’ONU le et les membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité que dorénavant elles font face à un fait accompli et devraient faire attention en faisant face à l'Iran nucléaire.Pas étonnamment, sur l'annonce de cette déclaration, tous les membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité ont pris garde et ont averti l'Iran au sujet des conséquences négatives du fait.

Seulement quelques heures après la déclaration, le prix du pétrole sur le marché international et le prix de l'or et du dollar dans des transactions domestiques ont sauté à un nouveau haut record.Les observateurs politiques croient qu'en réalité la fin de la commande réformiste dans le gouvernement iranien devrait être considérée comme borne limite importante dans la mesure où le destin politique de l'Iran et sa place dans la scène internationale sont concernées. En effet, pendant l’ autorité des progressive dans les branches exécutives et législatives du gouvernement, l'Iran à pu survivre au-dessus de beaucoup de menaces et calamités qui pourraient mettre en danger l'existence même du régime islamique. L'ouest et le monde en général ont espéré que la tendance mènerait finalement à la société civile d'épanouissement et aux établissements démocratiques qui laisseraient des idées obsédantes et fondamentalistes. Mais, l'apparition du nouveau conservateur président de dure ligne était un coup sérieux aux idéaux progressif qui a tourné les rêves doux des naïves au cauchemar.

Dans le camp des Etats Unies aussi, les Hawks néo--conservateurs semblent être déterminés pour contenir les ambitions nucléaires de l'Iran, qu'ils ont pensées pour être une menace sérieuse à l'ordre du monde. En fait, la déclaration provocatrice récente sur le plein cycle d'enrichissement est susceptible pour lâcher une vraie confrontation entre les deux camps conservateurs. En outre, le défit de l'Iran du rapport du Conseil de Sécurité et de l'infraction réclamée l'accord de Paris avec EU3 aussi bien que le protocole additionnel au NPT, pourraient préparer le terrain pour que les Américains convainquent la Russie et la Chine qu'un règlement politique n'est pas possible et elles devraient atteindre un consensus sur une résolution grave sous le chapitre VII de la Charte de l’ONU.

Peut-être maintenant les Etats-Unis ont une évidence et une justification plus persuasive pour pousser des membres du Conseil de Sécurité pour entreprendre des actions sérieuses contre l'Iran. Les Américains ont averti que s'ils n'obtiennent pas une résolution forte ils pourraient essayer de former une coalition séparée pour faire face aux menaces de l'Iran. Ainsi, il semble que si les deux adversaires conservateurs ne sont pas contenus par un certain genre de médiation ou de négociation directe, la situation pourrait escalader et mener au désastre.

Pour les raisons pratiques cependant, les chefs iraniens ne semblent pas s'inquiéter beaucoup d'un embargo certain ou des sanctions économique, bien que ceci sûrement cause un bon nombre d'ennui et de dérangement à la nation entière. Mais, ceux qui souhaitent par la suite que le peuple révolte contre le régime islamique en cas de blocus économique devraient se rappeler que depuis la révolution, ce pays a été sujet à des toutes sortes de sanctions pendant la guerre de l'Irak et Iran et après, et aucune telle chose s'est jamais produits. Au contraire, Iraniens ont prouvé qu'ils ont une tendance à consolider pendant les périodes difficiles.

En ce qui concerne les frappes de préemption sur les installations nucléaires de l'Iran ou les installations pétrolifères sur la terre ou en mer, directement par les Etats-Unis ou par l'Israël, il y’à peu de chances que ces opérations pourraient produire les résultats prévus. Ceci peut seulement produire des résultats contradictoires: réveille le nationalisme iranien en consolidant la nation contre l'invasion étrangère, ou donne un dessus au régime islamique pour augmenter plus loin sa poignée domestique.

Le gouvernement islamique a réclamé dans plusieurs occasions que s'il perçoit une vraie menace dans le golfe Persique ou ailleurs sur son territoire, il a la capacité de rendre la région entière dangereuse pour tous. L'exercice naval récent en golfe Persique, détroit de Hormoz et mer d'Oman, où un certain nombre de nouvelles armes ont été examinées, était organise' assurément pour envoyer le signal que l'Iran peut engager dans une série d'opérations peu usuelles qui pourraient décourager et intimider tous les adversaires potentiels. En fait, l'Iran a déjà montré à d'autres occasions, (en Afghanistan, en Irak, au Liban et en Palestine) qu’elle est capable pour frustrer la stratégie ou les actions des Etats Unies dans toute la région.

Si l'euphorie nucléaire de l'Iran a n'importe quelle justification raisonnable autre que l'agitation et l'irritation autour du monde et si les actions intrépides et provocatrices récentes pourraient décourager l'ouest ou il peuvent aboutir au désastre, nous n'avons aucun autre choix que pour attendre et voir comment les politiciens compétents contrôleront sagement la crise imminente. ___________________________

Iran's Nuclear Euphoria...

Iran’s Nuclear Euphoria
Heading for a Clash with the West!

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
12 April 2006
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Iranians have many landmarks in their long history. In fact, Iran’s history is full of milestones, heroes and idols that helped to save this nation through the vicissitude of times. Persians owe their survival in history to this marvelous gift. Many occurrences such as “oil nationalization,” Islamic revolution, termination of Iran-Iraq war, are among the more recent events which are considered as turning points in contemporary Iran.

The most recent disputable landmark is the so-called full access to nuclear fuel enrichment which was declared on April 11, 2006. This happened at a critical time amid the nuclear crisis, while the world is counting down the time limit set by the U.N. Security Council to the Islamic government to halt all its nuclear activities. On that day, the controversial hard-line president solemnly announced Iran’s enrichment capability on industrial scale and declared the date as a “national day of pride and prestige.”

Average public however, anxious about the plausible impacts of the event on their daily life, showed little enthusiasm about the news. More educated and experienced citizens shook their heads and quietly expressed concerns about the grave consequences of the venture. Opposition groups, surprised by the heavy load of media coverage and propaganda, voiced their discontent and warned about the detrimental effect of the gamble on Iran’s national interests.

Whether the event could be considered as a landmark and be filed as a breakthrough in scientific capability of the country, is subject to doubt. It is believed that the declaration was a deliberate maneuver for the purpose of achieving a number of objectives at this point of time: a) domestic consumption for those who are becoming increasingly frustrated about the president’s fulfillment of his promises to cope with poverty, corruption, inflations and other social evils; b) to encourage the IAEA Director General (expected to visit Iran on April 12) to write down his report on Iran’s case to the Security Council in a manner to avoid eventual sanctions under Chapter VII (Article 41) of the U.N. Charter; c) to send a somber message to the U.N. Security Council and its permanent members that henceforth they are facing a fait accompli and should be careful in dealing with nuclear Iran.

Not surprisingly, upon the announcement of this declaration, all permanent members of the Security Council condemned the action and warned Iran about the negative consequences of the deed. Hours after the declaration, oil price in international market and the price of gold and dollar in domestic transactions jumped to a new record high.

Political observers believe that in reality the end of reformist control in the Iranian government should be considered as an important landmark as far as Iran’s political fate and position in the international scene are concerned. Indeed, during the progressive rule in the executive and legislative branches of the government, Iran was able to prevail over many threats and calamities that could endanger the very existence of the Islamic regime. The West and the world in general hoped that the trend would ultimately lead to flourishing civil society and democratic institutions that would leave behind obsessive and fundamentalist ideas. But, the emergence of the new hard-line president was a serious blow to the progressive ideals that turned naives’ sweet dreams to nightmare.

In the US camp too, the neo-conservative hawks seem to be determined to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which they believed to be a serious threat to world order. In fact, the recent provocative declaration on the full enrichment cycle is susceptible to unleash a clash between the two conservative camps. Furthermore, Iran’s defiance of the Security Council Statement and the claimed breach of Paris Accord with EU3 as well as the Additional Protocol to the NPT, could pave the way for Americans to convince Russia and China that a political settlement is not possible and they should reach a consensus on a severe resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. Perhaps now the United States has more persuasive evidence and justification to push members of the Security Council to undertake serious actions against Iran. Americans have warned that if they fail to get a strong resolution they might endeavor to form a separate coalition to face Iran’s threats. Thus, it seems that if the two conservative opponents are not contained through some kind of mediation or direct negotiation, the situation could escalate and lead to disaster.

On practical grounds however, Iranian leaders do not seem to worry much about an eventual embargo or economic sanctions, though this surely will cause lots of trouble and inconvenience to the overall nation. But, those who eventually wish that the people would revolt against the Islamic regime in case of an economic blockade should remember that ever since the revolution, this country has been subject to all kinds of sanctions both during Iraq-Iran war and after, and no such thing has ever happened. On the contrary, Iranians have shown that they have a tendency to consolidate during the hard times.
With respect to an eventual preemptive strikes either on Iran’s nuclear facilities or oil installations on land or offshore, directly by the United States or through Israel, there is little chances that these operations could produce the expected outcome. This may only generate contradictory results: either awakens Iranian nationalism by consolidating people against foreign invasion, or gives an upper hand to the Islamic regime to further expand its domestic grip.
The Islamic government has claimed in several occasions that if it perceives a real threat in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere on its land territory, it has the capacity to make the whole region insecure for all. Recent naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormoz and Sea of Oman, where a number of new weapons were tested, was undoubtedly organize to send the signal that Iran can engage in a series of unconventional operations that could deter and intimidate any potential opponents. In fact, Iran has already shown on other occasions, (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine) that it is capable to frustrate U.S. strategy or actions throughout the region.
Whether Iran’s nuclear euphoria has any rational justification other than stirring up irritation around the world and whether recent bold and provocative actions could deter the West or it may end up to disaster, we have no other choice than to wait and see how competent politicians will wisely manage the impending crisis./
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Strategy of Asymmetric War

Strategy of Asymmetric War
Iran’s Mixed Signals to the West

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
7 April 2006
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While the count-down of the remaining 30 days for Iran to comply with the demand of the United Nations Security Council to halt its nuclear activities has started, the Islamic regime has been giving mixed signals to the international community. On the one hand Iranians took a conciliatory and cooperative stance urging the Western powers to continue their negotiating efforts within the IAEA for the benefit of world peace and order, and on the other hand they embarked on a bold and confrontational venture in the Persian Gulf.

A major naval exercise was carried in this strategic region, including the Straits of Hormoz and the Sea of Oman, where an assortment of new weapon were brought into play. Among these, a new version of ballistic missiles (Shehab III) with multiple warhead or MIRV (Multiple Independently targeted Reentry Vehicle) capability and a very high speed torpedo, both of which claimed to have radar and sonar hidden ability. A number of other new weapons and platforms of rather offensive character were also demonstrated in the week-long maneuver.

The media coverage of the exercise was rather unprecedented, leaving the impression that the Islamic hawks intended to send a strong message to the West, especially the United States, that they must think twice before deciding to pass a harsh resolution against Iran in the Security Council or threaten the survival of the revolutionary regime. In fact, the defense doctrine of the Islamic Republic is based on a Qur’anic verse that commands the Moslems to acquire all sorts of weapons and equipments they can afford in order to deter and scare their opponents and the enemies God. Not surprisingly, this canon is coined as the symbol of the Revolutionary Guards and appears as an emblem on their flag and as a badge on their military uniform.

One important aspect of this exercise which eventually escaped the eyes of observers was the almost total absence of the regular Iranian navy whose functions are normally limited to classical tasks of sea denial and power projection ashore in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormoz. We know by experience that in a purely classical naval engagement the Iranian navy would not be able to sustain combat capability and will soon be out of effective operation. That was the case in the late 1980s where Iranian navy lost some of its warships in an unequal interface with the American units.

That experience led the defense planners to devise new tactics with limited but effective light and fast units to hit and run, which was initially termed as “guerilla warfare at sea.” In fact, like operations on land, when two unequal opponents face each other, the best way for the weak side is to recourse to war of attrition and guerilla operations. In an enclosed narrow and rather shallow region such as the Persian Gulf, this tactic can be very decisive against large units and can deny the enemy from effective deployment, sea lines of communication and power projection.

Thus, the rationale behind the April 2006 Iranian joint forces maneuver in the Persian Gulf should be found in the strategy of “asymmetric warfare” carried by the Revolutionary Guards with the objective to deter the Americans from risking any adventurous plan to ultimately topple the Islamic regime as they did in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time Iran is taking up other long-term strategy in the region which relates to confidence building and gradual rapprochement with the Persian Gulf littoral states pursing the following objectives:

- Inhibiting more and more the U.S. presence in the region of the Persian Gulf;
- Making the future American interventions in the region much more difficult and costly;
- Building an anti-American shield against the United States policy of “forceful democratization” in the region;
- Narrowing down the gap between the Iranian regime and the conservative Arab States;
- Encouraging the Persian Gulf States toward Asian markets and other world great powers, such as Russia, China, India and Japan, while limiting economic interaction with the U.S.;
- Making the strategic environment much more difficult for the United States force deployment in crisis situations.

All these would suggest that it would indeed be hard for the United States to bear the consequences of a serious entanglement with Iran in the near future, unless the American policy with respect to Iran and the Persian Gulf changes its contents and context. That is to say, the American objectives and therefore ways and means to reach them should be adapted to the new emerging environment. The new environment is not necessarily in favor of the American military presence in the region. It is not however quite certain that Iran’s hostile signals during the April 2006 exercise would deter in any way the neo-conservative hawks in Washington who are leaning toward the use of hard power to achieve their objectives.

However, we should recognize that there is a major difference between “force” and “power.” A nation may have one but not the other, since for example, sea force is only one of the many composing elements of sea power. Geographic position, indigenous technological base, industrial productive capacity, scientific potentialities, strong communication and economy, wisdom of leadership and above all domestic and international supports are among other prerequisites of power. Failure to comprehend these principles together may lead a nation to the “illusion of power” and consequently to risky situations which could jeopardize the vital interests of a nation.

Whether the Islamic regime will surrender to the demand of the U.N. Security Council in order to avoid further escalation of the nuclear issue, is a matter of threat perception of the Iranian decision makers and their capacity to manage the crisis. Indeed, if they realize that the risks of defying the U. N. demands are much too high and beyond their endurance, they will surely come to their sense and do whatever necessary to avoid the worst to happen./

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L'Iran: Le moment de la vérité

L'Iran: Le moment de la vérité

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
Mars 17, 2006

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Quand on est guidé par la seule force du dogme ou de l'instinct et non pas de la raison, et la survie est en jeu, tout est permis, puisque les buts justifient des moyens. Ce doit dire que des principes peuvent être sacrifiés quand l'issue se réduit à cette question simple: Être ou ne pas être?

Vingt sept ans après la chute du Chah pro ouest et l’émergence d’un régime qui a commencé son règne religieux avec la prise d'otage des diplomates américains pendant 444 jours, l'Iran révolutionnaire fait face maintenant aux réalités brutes des règles du jeu dans la politique mondiale. Le dossier nucléaire de l'Iran a été enfin envoye’ pour une décision au sein du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies. Ce qui va sortir du Conseil décidera le destin politique du seul régime théologique au 21ème siècle.

Pendant les trois décades passées l'Iran pouvait d’une façon ou d'autre échapper au châtiment attendu pour ses actes controversés dans la scène internationale. Ceci a été possible grâce aux manoeuvres bien habiles en tirant profit de ses riches souterraines soit pour acheter l'appui ou par alimenter la haine et les inquiétudes dans la région. En effet, pour surmonter des menaces multiples et des complots, l'Iran a dû payer un prix très élevé. Mais, il n'est pas tout à fait sûr s'il pourra soutenir les conséquences des gaffes politiques et diplomatiques étonnants pendant les six derniers mois.Le conflit de l'Iran Irak était une guerre par la procuration conduite par ceux qui ont voulu diminuer à zéro les deux régimes de déstabilisation controversés dans la région.

La stratégie américaine de (double Containment) « double emballage » a seulement fonctionné jusqu'à la fin du monde bipolaire et a alors changé le cours sans résultats prévus. Plus d’un million ont péri dans cette guerre futile et les deux pays belligérants ont finalement sortis sans résultat attendu des hostilités sanglantes. L'agression contre le Kuweit par l'Irak a fourni l'occasion pour l’Iran d’acclamer son innocence au conflit blâmant son voisin des intentions agressives dans la région. Le cas temporairement a fini par la première intervention militaire américaine en Irak, choisissant de ne pas enlever le « bourreaux de Bagdad » craignant l'ascendance de l'Iran à la puissance régionale. La mission a été finalement accomplie par une deuxième intervention des Etats Unis dont les résultats étaient l'effondrement du régime de Baath comme hostile et ennemie éternel de l'Iran. Tous ces développements se sont produits en faveur absolue du régime islamique en Iran.

La chute de Saddam Hussein et l'agitation conséquente en Irak étaient en effet un miracle qui seulement pourrait être réalisé par des mains du dieu tout-puissant. Miraculeusement, ces mains sont sorties des douilles du grand Satan. En fait, le président des Etats Unis peut être considéré comme l'ange sauveur pour l'Iran révolutionnaire; puisque toutes choses qu'il a faites jusqu'ici est dans la direction de réaliser ses intérêts. En outre, aussi longtemps que les forces américaines sont empêtrées dans le ravage de l'Irak, le régime islamique sera à l'abri de toute envahissement qui mettrait en danger son existence.Pendant les deux gouvernements précédents, constitués par le Rafsanjani pragmatique et le soi-disant Khatami réformiste, les autorités iraniennes sont parvenues à éviter une confrontation directe avec les États-Unis. Quelque fois ils ont préféré régler leurs conflits (y compris les affaires des otages, d'Airbus et les platforms de pétrole) par la Cour de Justice internationale (ICJ). Ceci a signifié que la propension globale du régime islamique de s'engager en conflit avec une superpuissance a été très basse. D'autre part, les Américains n'ont pas trop souhaité d’engager à l'hostilité active avec l'Iran pour les raisons au delà de la portée de cet essai court. C'était en dépit de tous les rhétorique et défis verbaux faits contre des Américains pendant les années passées.

Seulement six mois après l’élection du nouveau président conservateur, la situation subit un changement soudain en ce qui concerne l’affaire nucléaire de l'Iran. Le dossier relatif à ceci a finalement été soumis pour considération du Conseil de Sécurité de L’ONU. Cela signifie préparer le terrain pour des sanctions et en cas de besoin l'intervention militaire afin de renverser pour de bon un régime non désiré qui a été énuméré sur l' « axe du mal » pendant les dernières années. Ceci a été incité par un certain nombre de dénonciations imprudentes faites par le nouveau président inexpérimenté, qui par naïveté politique ou de l'ardeur religieuse pure, a permis à la communauté internationale d’atteindre un consensus contre le danger de l'Iran pour la paix et la sécurité mondiale.

Ce développement entier expose un nouveau visage du régime islamique qui jamais avant apparu sur la scène. Certains arguent du fait qu'il y a rien de neuf dans ces perspectives; puisque M. Ahmadinejad représente vraiment l'âme de l'énigme religieux de Shiite, et un régime révolutionnaire qui proclame le devoir de guider le monde entier au chemin du salut. Assez curieusement, ce régime tâche d'acquérir la technologie nucléaire et prétendu être prêt à payer le prix son entreprise contestée. Qui dans le monde de la politique est prêt à traiter avec confiance un gouvernement si controversé?


Malheureusement, le moment de la vérité s'approche avec tous son amertume et animosité. Maintenant que la gravite’ de la situation est senti par les intransigeants, ils déclarent leur promptitude pour se reposer et être en pourparlers avec le grand Satan. Il n'importe pas vraiment que le dialogue soit sur la situation de l'Irak, la question nucléaire, les droits de l'homme ou le terrorisme. Ils veulent juste donner le message que finalement nous n'étions pas tellement sérieux au sujet de ce que nous avons dit avant.

Sûrement, ils peuvent lancer leur machine de propagande afin de justifier leur nouvelle position pour le public. En fait, non seulement les gens ne s'opposeront pas à la matière mais également seront beaucoup reconnaissants avec un tel dialogue, s'il s'assurerait qu'il n'y aurait aucune intervention étrangère dans leur pays. Beaucoup de gens croit que ces entretiens directs devraient avoir eu lieu il y a plusieurs années avant qu'il pourrait infliger tellement des dommages matériels et humains à ce pays. Mais, comme j'ai discuté ailleurs, seulement les conservateurs pourraient oser soulever la question de dialogue avec les Américains et réaliser cette tâche.

Les Américains cependant ont dit que ce n'est pas vraiment un processus de négociation mais un certain genre d'avertir en Iran au sujet de la violence continue en Irak et la nécessité que l'état voisin devrait s'abstenir de se mêler dans ses affaires internes. Le régime islamique souhaite que pendant les entretiens avec les Américains Il puisse bénéficier l'occasion du nouvel environnement de diminuer la tension de l'état de crise. Ceci peut alternativement aider à réorienter l’affaire nucléaire du Conseil de sécurité au Conseil régissant de l’AIEA pour continuer les négociations.Être ou ne pas être, c'est la question. Nous attendrons et verrons si cette manoeuvre peut faire n'importe quel bien d'atténuer la situation grave.

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Iran: The Moment of Truth

Iran: The Moment of Truth
Ali-Asghar Kazemi
March 17, 2006
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When one is guided by mere force of dogma or instinct and not reason, and the survival is at stake, everything is permissible, since ends justify means. This is to say that principles can be sacrificed when the issue reduces to this simple question: To be or not to be?

Twenty seven years after the coming into power of a regime which started its religious reign with the hostage taking of the American diplomats for 444 days, the revolutionary Iran is now facing the crude realities of the rules of the game in world politics. Iran’s nuclear case has been referred to the U.N. Security Council and is awaiting a crucial decision which will eventually decide the fate of a theological regime in the 21st century.

During the past decades Iran was somehow able to escape the long awaited chastisement for its controversial deeds in international scene, either through smart maneuvers or by taking advantage of its God-given riches to buy support or to fuel hatred and disturbances in the region. Indeed, to overcome multiple threats and complots, Iran had to pay a very high price. But, it is not quite sure whether it will be able to bear the consequences of appalling political and diplomatic blunders during the past six months.

Iran-Iraq conflict was a war by proxy conducted by those who wanted to diminish to nil the two controversial destabilizing regimes in the region. The “Dual Containment Strategy” only worked until the end of the bipolar world and then changed the course without the expected results. More than a million perished in this futile war and the two feuding powers managed to come safe out of the bloody mess.

Aggression on Kuwait by a frustrated powerful Iraq provided the opportunity to Iran to pose as an innocent party to the conflict blaming its neighbor for aggressive intentions in the region. The case temporarily ended up through the first American military intervention in Iraq, choosing not to remove the “butcher of Baghdad” fearing Iran’s ascendance to regional power. The mission was finally accomplished through a second U.S. intervention whose outcome was the collapse of Baath regime as Iran’s perennial hostile and archenemy. All of these developments occurred in absolute favor of the Islamic regime in Iran.

The fall of Saddam Hussein and the consequent turmoil in Iraq was indeed a miracle that only could be achieved through hands of the Almighty God. Miraculously, these hands came out of the sleeves of the Great Satan. In fact, U.S. President is regarded as the savior angel for revolutionary Iran; since every thing he has done so far is in the direction of achieving its interests. Furthermore, as long as the American forces are entangled in Iraq’s havoc, Iranian rulers feel secure from any harsh action that would endanger their existence.

During the two previous governments, formed by the pragmatic Rafsanjani and the self-styled reformist Khatami, Iranian leaders managed to avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S. A couple of times they preferred to settle their disputes (including the hostage, Airbus and Oil-platform cases) through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This meant that Islamic regime’s overall propensity to engage in a conflict with a superpower has been very low. On the other hand, Americans too did not wish to entertain active hostility with Iran for the reasons beyond the scope of this short essay. This was despite all the rhetoric and verbal challenges made against Americans during the past decades.

Only six months after the coming into power of the new conservative hard-line president, the situation changed and on U.S. persistence Iran’s nuclear case was referred to the U.N. Security Council. This means paving the way for sanctions, military intervention and ultimately toppling an unwanted regime which has been listed on the “axis of evil” for quite sometimes. This was prompted by a number of unwise statements made by the inexperienced president, who out of naïve political beliefs or pure religious zeal, provided a fertile ground for the international community to reach a consensus against Iran’s danger for world peace and security.

This whole development is exposing a new face of the Islamic regime which never before appeared on the scene. Some people argue that there is nothing new in this outlook; since Mr. Ahmadinejad truly represents the soul of the religious Shiite enigma, and a revolutionary regime that pledges to guide the whole world to the path of salvation. Curiously enough, this regime is striving to acquire nuclear technology and claimed to be ready to pay the price for its contested venture. Who in the world of politics is ready to deal confidently with such a controversial government?

Unfortunately, the moment of truth is approaching with all of its bitterness and glumness. Now that the seriousness of the situation is felt by the intransigent hard-liners, they are declaring their readiness to sit and negotiate with the Great Satan. It does not really matter whether it is on Iraq’s situation, nuclear issue, human rights or terrorism. They just want to convey the message that finally we were not so much serious about what we said before. Surely, they can launch their propaganda apparatus in order to justify their new position for public. In fact, not only people will not object to the matter but also will be much grateful with such broken covenant, provided it would insure that there would be no foreign intervention in their homeland. To many, these direct talks should have taken place many years ago before it could inflict so much material and human damages to this country. But, as I argued elsewhere, only hard-liners could dare to raise the issue and achieve this task.

Americans however have said that this is not really a negotiating process but some kind of warning to Iran about the continued violence in Iraq and the necessity that the neighboring state should abstain from meddling in its internal affairs. The Islamic regime wishes that once ices are broken they can benefit the opportunity of the new environment to de-escalate the crisis condition. This may in turn help to redirect the nuclear case from the Security Council to the IAEA Governing Council for further negotiations.

To be or not to be, this is the question. We shall wait and see whether this maneuver can do any good to attenuate the grave situation.

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The Shdow of Terror Over Iraq

The Shadow of Terror over Iraq

Ali-Asghar Kazemi[*]
March 10, 2006
__________________________________________________________


The unfortunate bombing of one of the holiest Shi’a shrine in Samara is considered the most dramatic event since the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Some observers even went so far as to equate the incident as another 9/11 attack which would eventually decide the fate of new Iraq and American presence there. The immediate reaction of Shi’as against Sunnis escalated the crisis to a full-scale bloody confrontation between the two Moslem factions, and brought the country on the verge of a civil war. This whole situation happened at a critical point of time when the new democratically elected parliament was in the process of forming a permanent government.

What are the immediate and long term consequences of the impending crisis? How the neighboring nations, especially Iran as a Shiite state, will be affected by the event? What should be done to curb the negative implications and avoid the worst case situation to happen, namely the total disintegration of Iraq?

One of the most urgent outcomes of the crisis is the new obstacles before the formation of the Shiite-led government which has been charged for its anti-Sunni attitude. Mr. Al-Jafari, accused to be incompetent to establish law and order, is already under serious pressure from all sides, including secular Shiites and the Kurds, to withdraw his candidacy for premiership. The Sunni faction in the parliament (with 44 seats) may harden its position to participate in a national unity government and invest its supporting strength in the legitimacy of the political process.

Among the neighboring states, Iran has multiple interests in the current situation of Iraq. With a long history of rivalry, hostilities and war, Iran will be indeed affected in many ways by any haphazard development. Iranians perceive the present condition very volatile and fear eventual collapse of the new Iraq. Of course, this will not meet the expected objectives, aspirations and potential opportunities opened to them with the majority Shiites in Power.

First of all, we should realize that Iran’s national interests are very much tied to all political, strategic and structural changes in Iraq. The collapse of the Baath regime, through the American military intervention, has created a new strategic environment for the Islamic regime in Tehran. Thus, Iran’s national interests are best served by a stable, democratic and free Iraq with a legitimate strong government willing to cooperate with its neighbors in the promotion of regional calm and security.


From a realistic point of view, Iran has every reason now to support the established Shiite-led government in Iraq and try its best to promote the delicate balance and stability there. Of course, at the beginning of U.S. military intervention in Iraq, Iranian leaders were quite anxious and believed that a quick victory in Iraq would bring the Americans in a face-to-face confrontation with the objective of toppling the Islamic regime. But now, after three years of harsh violence and bloodshed, Iran has gained some sort of assurance that the Americans would not venture another gamble whose outcome is quite uncertain.

As a point of interest, we should remember that since the beginning of U.S. intervention in Iraq, Iran has followed a clever policy that may be termed as a ‘two pillar strategy’ with respect to Iraq. On the one hand, it condemned American military intervention as an unlawful and aggressive act against a Moslem country, on the other it considered the downfall of Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime as a God blessing.

In fact, the downfall of Iran’s archenemy and longtime hostile produced a number of challenges and opportunities for Iran. The most threatening challenge was and still is the presence of American forces all around Iran, which virtually encircle Iran’s strategic position on land and at sea. This dimension of U.S. intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan could have been very alarming if Americans had succeeded to a quick round up in Iraq and did not encounter serious challenge by insurgents.

Thus apparently, it seems that the continued turmoil and insurgency in Iraq has an immediate benefit for Iran, since the United States may not be tempted to use hard power against Iran in the foreseeable future. But, at the same time, if chaotic situation continues and passes a certain threshold, it would be counterproductive for all neighboring states and the region as a whole. This proposition is especially true with respect to Iran, which has a lot of common interests with the newly established Shiite majority in Iraq. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that Iran should rationally do everything in its power to attenuate the ethnic, religious, sectarian and tribal conflicts in Iraq; since, it is itself very vulnerable on these matters.

With respect to the United States, public opinion is rapidly changing course not only inside but outside U.S. as well. Most recent survey show that an average of 60 percent in the 33 nations agreed that the March 2003 invasion of Iraq had increased the likelihood of terrorist attacks around the world. Indeed, the new situation is quite alarming for the American strategy in the Middle East, and many U.S. traditional friends are under severe pressure to do away with the horrible hurdle.

It has now become quite evident that American military planners failed to anticipate or prepare for any serious resistance and insurgency after the downfall of Saddam Hussein and perhaps less so after his miserable capture and trial.

Still now the intelligence about the identity of peoples who commit suicide attacks is very vague and unreliable. Even Iraqi officials have little understanding of the relative strength of Iraqi nationals and foreigners including Al-Qaeda, among fighters and the probable connections between the two groups. Iraqi officials have always put the blame on “extremist groups from abroad that merely objected to the presence of Americans and other foreign troops in Iraq.” It was also claimed that these groups are out to set “a sense of permanent violence to intimidate people and turn them against the government.”

Despite the fact that attacks on the Shiite shrine have triggered widespread violence in Iraq, it appears that those who wanted to foment an all-out civil war with the evil objective to topple the fragile government are not being much successful. An optimistic assessment leads one to believe that the majority of Iraqis now have every reason to be willing to avoid bloodshed and benefit from the potential democratic environment created at a very high price. Yet, they too seem to think that terrorism in Iraq is now a direct consequence of American and foreign presence, and thus would prefer to see their gradual withdrawal from their lands. Eventually, a quick solution to the crisis would be the replacement of U.N. Peace-keeping forces, composed of major elements of the existing coalition and other states, to take charge of security and order in war-torn Iraq.

_______________________



[*] Professor of International Relations, Tehran-Iran.

The Dilemma of Iran's Foreign Policy...

(First Draft: March 4, 2006)


The Dilemma of Iran’s Foreign Policy
Identifying Friends and Foes

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
_____________________________________________________________


Keywords: Iran’s foreign policy, nuclear diplomacy, NPT, International Atomic Energy Agency -IAEA,

Introduction

One of the major impediments of Iran’s foreign policy, almost three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, seems to be the continuing persistence on its revolutionary nature. In fact, this feature has created a strong barrier before Iran’s national objectives and aspirations in setting clear criteria for determining friends and foes. This does not suggest however that the same quandary is settled in domestic sphere. Perhaps many unfortunate events and vicissitudes during the lifespan of the Islamic regime so far are geared to this very important dimension of the revolutionary Iran.

Nevertheless, when states choose to engage in interactions with their peers, they must have a lucid definition of their ends and means, a realistic assessment of their partners and above all a faithful commitment to certain primordial standards (rules of the game) in international relations. Indeed revolutions have their own peculiarities and manners and do not necessarily follow conventional norms and expected behavior. They usually have a tendency to challenge the status quo and even alter those rules. Thus, many states prefer not to be in love with revolutionary regimes which by nature have a propensity to be rejective rather than receptive.

Is there a clear understanding of Iran’s vital national interests and capabilities in the decision making system? How far a state claiming to be guided by its ideological aspirations and revolutionary fervor can achieve its goals in international relations? Who is interested to make real friendship with an unpredictable partner? What are the consequences of foreign policy failure in the current nuclear crisis?




The Instrument of Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the major instrument of foreign policy by which a state can achieve objectives, realize values and defend national interests. Governments have the function to communicate through their diplomatic agents with those whose actions and behavior they wish to influence, deter, alter or reinforce.[1] This process requires a clear definition of a state’s objectives, rationalizations for them, threats, promises, and the setting up plans and strategies to tackle with problems and contentious issues.

Thus, in its widest meaning the task of diplomacy is fourfold:
· It must determine state’s objectives in the light actual and potential power available for the pursuit of these objectives;[2]
· It must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available to them for the pursuit of their objectives;
· It must determine to what extent these different objectives are compatible with each other;
· It must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.


It goes without saying that failure in any of the tasks cited above may jeopardize the success of foreign policy and is susceptible to increase the risk of confrontation and hostility[3]. Therefore, a logical deduction from this statement is that a nation that sets itself goals and objectives which it has not the power to attain may have to face the risk of war, unless it changes its aspirations or its strategies. Unattainable goals, which have become national slogans, may induce a sense of national frustration, strain national resources in vain and lead a country to confrontation, isolation or internal crisis.

By the same token, a wrong assessment of other nations’ objectives and capability may end up to similar disasters. Therefore, nations must always have a realistic assessment of their friends and foes’ power and capabilities as well as the objectives they pursue. This is in fact one major limitation of Iran’s foreign policy during the whole life of Islamic regime after the revolution. The impending nuclear issue, which has created a major foreign policy crisis, might be considered as the consequence of poor assessment of international strategic and political environment.

The Nuclear Diplomacy

The problem of not being able to distinguish between its ideological concerns and vital national interests has impeded the revolutionary Iran to identify its friends and foes and this has almost paralyzed Iran’s diplomacy during recent nuclear crisis. While international pressure was gradually increasing in order to push it to stop all nuclear activities, Iran was helplessly looking for friends here and there in order to get some support for its intransigent position. To this end, a number of lucrative deals were offered to some potential partners,[4] but, at the critical moment when Iran needed their help, they turned to its opponents.

Iranian leaders should not be surprised by this unfortunate experience. Indeed, this is the golden rule of the game in international relations; states only have permanent interests and no permanent friends or foes. Yet, an intelligent and rational foreign policy should put the right emphasis at any particular moment on the means and leverages it has on its potential friends in order to neutralize or bypass the negative impacts of its presumed foes’ actions and decisions. When a state puts all of its eggs in one basket, it may soon end up with unpredictable situations in which it should sacrifice all at once. No diplomacy that would stake everything on mere rhetoric and intimidation or concessions deserves to be called intelligent.
When the IAEA adopted a Resolution on September 24, 2005 on Iran’s nuclear activities[5] the matter rather surprised Iranians who were counting on the negative votes of NAM[6] states as well as Russia, China and India. The two first abstained from voting and India voted for the resolution. The only negative vote was that of Venezuela, which presumably because of its quarrel with the United States and perhaps not necessarily out of its amicable relations with Iran, did not support the resolution.
Immediately after the adoption, Iran rejected the resolution as purely political and blamed countries which had voted in its favor, and cautioned that it shall review its economic relations with them. High officials in the government threatened to retaliate against any state which would support any document with the effect of referring Iran’s nuclear case to the UN Security Council. Among other retaliatory measures, Iran’s vainly threatened to use its economic leverage, including the stoppage of Iranian oil to unfriendly nations. Furthermore, it claimed it will withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and its Additional Protocol, signed but not yet adopted by the Parliament. It also announced that it will resume all nuclear activities, voluntarily suspended in earlier agreement with the EU3, and will bar IAEA agents from any further arbitrary inspections of nuclear sites.
In fact, soon after when the negative impacts of each of the above tentative actions was assessed by the opponents, the whole campaign suddenly faded and a more compromising stance emerged in official statements. However, when the IAEA decided to report the case to the Security Council by a resolution adopted on February 4, 2006,[7] Iran decided to put into action only some of its previous threats, including the resumption of some limited nuclear activities. Even this retaliatory measure proved to be mere symbolic gesture, since it was immediately declared that this was part of research scheme which had nothing to do with enrichment activities. This meant that we are indeed not so much serious in our claims and contentions and with a bit of more pressure we are ready to do more to satisfy international demands.
A number of diplomatic actions took place by Iranian officials since the time the IAEA adopted the resolution of February 4, 2006. On the one hand, the prime preoccupation was the Russian plan on the nuclear enrichment which had to be decided upon before March 6, 2006 (the prospective date for the final report of the IAEA Director General to the Board of Governors). On the other hand, Iran had to gather some friends with the hope to use them as buffer to the mounting pressure against it with a view to halt the referral of the nuclear case to the U. N. Security Council. However, due to lack of insight and concrete position, the endeavor did not prove to induce much help.[8]
The problem at this stage with Iran’s nuclear affair is that the consensus is so much strong that no single state dares to contradict the demand of the international community, except of course those few who for one reason or another have decided to support Iran. It is worth to be noted that the supporting states have no leverage or influence on the matter and almost all of them have their own particular problems.

The Price of Foreign Policy Flop

While new conservative government and policy makers in Iran persist on a return to revolutionary slogans of the regime and do every thing to show this feature, the international community seems quite alarmed with the development. Thus, most states are reluctant to engage in deep interaction with a nation defying the prevailing norms. This is not to suggest that those norms and rules of the game are necessarily ethical, just or fair.[9]
We should not forget that there is an intimate relation between power politics and the function of diplomacy and a successful foreign policy normally depends on the relative position of a state in the international power structure. However, a comparatively weak and small state can achieve grand goals and aspirations through tactfulness and arts of statesmanship. Unfortunately, the new conservative hard-line government in Iran lacks both of these attributes and this might cost a lot for the fate of the overall nation at this critical juncture of history.
Iranian president’s ambiguous and controversial declarations during his short tenure in office, very much complicated the already volatile situation of Iran. He has taken unnecessary positions with respect of a number of critical issues without knowing that he willingly paved the way for building a strong international consensus against Iran’s nuclear issue. This whole mess happened at an untimely and critical point in time. Indeed, if the present trend continues the way it has gone during the last months, the nation should be prepared to pay an unbearable price.
___________________

[1] Cf. K.J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, Prentice –Hall of India Private Limited, New Delhi, 1981, p.183
[2] See: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace, Alfred A. Knopf. New York, Fifth edition, p.517-518
[3] Ibid. p.518
[4]The recent deal on liquefied gas with China, which amounts to an overall value of $100 billion, is one such undertaking which would tie Iran’s political fate to China’s growing needs for energy over the next 25 years. Russians on the other hand, are very happy about the current nuclear plant in Bushehr and the prospective other nuclear plant deals with Iran and seemed not to be ready to forego this lucrative business just for the sake of giving a hand to American plan to contain Iran’s ambition to use nuclear technology, which in their view, is not harmful. But, as we have seen, both of them voted against Iran at the IAEA. India was also supposed to support Iran for promoting its interests in the prospective gas line project, but this did not happen either.
[5] The International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board approved the resolution despite threats by Iran to begin enriching uranium. The resolution was drafted by Britain, France and Germany and backed by the United States, who had wanted Iran to be immediately referred to the Security Council, but it was watered down by the Europeans. With 22 votes for, one against and 12 abstentions, the outcome highlighted the split between Western nations and others such as Russia, China and South Africa, which disagree with the EU three and Washington on how to deal with Iran. The resolution requires Tehran to be reported to the Security Council at an unspecified date, meaning Iran would probably not be referred to the Security Council until the IAEA board meets in November,

[6] Non-Aligned Movement
[7] The vote had been expected on Friday February 3, 2006, but was delayed by an attempt by NAM (developing countries of the Non-Aligned Movement) to soften the resolution, which was rejected by EU3 (Germany, France and the UK,) who had drafted it. Egypt made a proposal to include a reference to making the Middle East a nuclear weapon free zone. This was rejected by the US, which saw it as an attack on Israel's nuclear arsenal. But it was finally accepted the clause after it received overwhelming backing from European allies. BBC NEWS World Middle East Iran reported to Security Council.htm. Russia and China agreed to support the resolution on condition it did not contain any immediate threat of sanctions against Iran. Only Venezuela, Cuba and Syria voted against it. India voted in favor of the motion in spite of the government coming under intense domestic pressure to stand by Iran. US ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte said the vote sent a "very powerful signal" and the ball was now in Iran's court. He further said. "Iran, rather than threatening the world, should listen to the world and take steps to regain its confidence."

[8] Successive visits by Iranian president to Kuwait and Malaysia, Foreign minister to EU Parliament, Japan, Pakistan; and National Security Secretary to Russia and EU3 foreign ministers, are among the diplomatic attempts in the interval.
[9] See my paper: Ali-Asghar Kazemi, Iran: The Price of Going Nuclear, Middle East Academic Forum, October 2005

Iran's Nuclear Gamble: Boldness vs. Prudence

[First Draft, February 7, 2006]

Iran’s Nuclear Gamble
Boldness vs. Prudence

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
_________________________________________________________


Keywords: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran's nuclear crisis, crisis management, U.N. Security Council.


Introduction
The IAEA Board of Governors finally adopted a resolution on February 4, 2006 to report the long awaited Iran’s nuclear activities to the U.N. Security Council.[1] The resolution urged Iran to extend "indispensable and overdue" co-operation to the IAEA and help it "clarify possible activities which could have a military dimension". But it decided to put off any action until the report of the agency’s Director General is submitted at the next IAEA meeting on 6 March.[2]
Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, Iran announced that it would resume all voluntary suspended operations on uranium enrichment. This rather intransigent attitude vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA may leave the impression that the Islamic government is a bold actor in the international scene, seeking to challenge the rule of the game in world politics. However, this behavior may only please those who have no notion of history and prevailing norms and rules in the fuzzy and chaotic realm of international relations. Many crises in the past dragged nations into hostilities and bloody conflicts[3], because lack of vision of political leaders overwhelmed by their ideological obsessions, religious beliefs or by mere illusion of power. What are the plausible consequences of the impending crisis? Who should be blamed for crisis escalation? How it should be managed? How a confrontation should be avoided?

How to Spell Boldness in Politics?

Boldness may be considered as a virtue in individual performance and in areas such as risk-taking and entrepreneurship. When the risk of an action or decision only has a limited impact upon one’s interest or yield, bold choices may be a value. But in a wider perspective, when it comes to the problem of a nation and its overall interests with large scale and enduring impact upon domestic and world order, then the same virtue becomes a vice to be avoided like pest.
As stated elsewhere[4], for a number of reasons, Iranian leadership has been very uncompromising on the matter of “perpetual cessation” or “indefinite suspension” of uranium enrichment operation. They had always claimed that they may only temporarily suspend their nuclear activities on a voluntary basis, as a measure of confidence building. Now that a consensus has been reached on February 4, 2006 in the IAEA to report the case to the UN Security Council, as threatened before, Iran has decided to undertake the risk of a bold maneuver to resume all suspended activities, based on a domestic law passed by the parliament to that effect.
However, with the recent charges against Iran regarding some dubious activities and “Update Brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards on 31 January 2006”, [5] it appears that Iran has a weak hand in the game. Perhaps, it would not be a remote assumption that due to some misunderstanding and lack of confidence, Iran’s provocative and bold behavior would escalate to a full scale crisis susceptible to lead ultimately to extremely dangerous situations which could jeopardize Iran’s national interests.[6]

Prudence Should Prevail

On the basis of the above, it seems rational that boldness should be spelled differently in political realm than in individual interaction. We may even suggest that boldness should mean prudence which is itself based on tactfulness in interaction among nations. The argument here is that prudence and perception of vulnerability may push Iran to move away from the rhetoric of the inexperienced new conservative government and opt for a more cautious, compromising and cooperative stance.[7]
As a matter of fact, despite the initial harsh criticism by the Islamic government officials, two days after the adoption of the resolution by the IAEA, they started to soften their position by sending compromising signals[8]. There are a number of reasons for which the course of action may not necessarily lead to a full scale confrontation.[9]
First of all, there are many indications that the overall political system in Iran is not ready to engage in an adventurous and risky situations in which the very existence of the Islamic regime might be geopardized. Of course, there may be some elements inside the political apparatus that would eventually anticipate some benefits in a limited confrontation with an outside power. But, given that the new conservative government lacks the necessary experience and capacity to deal with uncertain issues, most probably they would abstain to test their chances in such a hazardous issue as nuclear matter.
Secondly, it does not seem that the government and especially those in charge of the nuclear project and the related negotiations have been able to convince the public at large and less the educated people on the rationale of the nuclear project, even for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nation as a whole seems not prepared to accept and wholeheartedly support another hostility and military engagement or to endure severe economic sanctions and limitation.[10]
In other words, the general public really does not consider the issue to be a vital national interest touching the daily life of the people. Moreover, expectations of those who voted for the new conservative government are quite different and they would not go along with policies that would push them even further down the bottom of poverty line.
Therefore, bold action and behavior is no remedy to the current nuclear crisis and the chances that prudence and rationality will prevail are very high.

How to Manage Crisis Consequences?

First of all, from a legal point of view, Iran’s line of reasoning about its inalienable right to nuclear energy under the NPT may be convincing and no flagrant breach of contractual obligations has yet been reported that necessitate the referral of the nuclear case to the U. N. Security Council. But, the argument fails to appreciate the fact that unfortunately Iran has already lost the confidence of the world community ever since it’s past 18 years secret nuclear activities were revealed by political opponents.

On practical grounds, Iranian leaders do not seem to worry much about an eventual embargo or economic sanctions, though this surely will cause lots of trouble and inconvenience to the overall nation. But, those who eventually wish that the people would revolt against the Islamic regime in case of an economic blockade should remember that ever since the revolution, this country has been subject to all kinds of sanctions both during the war and after, and no such thing has ever happened. On the contrary, Iranians have shown that they have a tendency to consolidate during the hard times.

Other implications of a resolution against Iran, relate to an eventual unilateral decision of this country to withdraw from the NPT altogether, which is the right of every member state in conformity with the provisions of the treaty. In such circumstances the IAEA will be devoid of legal standing to continue its supervision on Iran’s nuclear activities.
Bearing in mind that the most vital objective for the Islamic regime in Iran is its very survival, and to that end it seems ready to sacrifice many things, it would not be an unrealistic postulation that in case of its withdrawal from the NPT, the regime might feel a free hand to contemplate developing its own deterrent nuclear force, somewhere along the line with South Korea. In such circumstances the West, including the United States and all those who fear Iran’s nuclear activities, would be in a much worsen situation.
With respect to an eventual preemptive strikes either on Iran’s nuclear facilities or oil installations on land or offshore, directly by the United States or through Israel, there is little chances that these operations might produce the expected outcome. This may only produce contradictory results: either awakens Iranian nationalism by consolidating people against foreign invasion, or giving the upper hand to the Islamic regime to further expand its domestic grip. [11]


How to avoid Confrontation?

This whole gloomy landscape may leads to the conclusion that even if the West and other contenders fail to obtain some sort of UN Security Council resolution on the nuclear issue, because of Russian or Chinese vetoes, the Americans or their allies in the region, will not hesitate to use other hostile measures, including military option as a preventive self-defense, by direct strategic targeting on Iran’s nuclear sites. In such case, there seem to be little chances that the international community as a whole and even the presumed friends of Iran may object or take any action against or condemn such eventual attack.
However, we should not forget that the squabble between Iran and the United States is deep rooted and goes back to hostage case after the revolution. Therefore, it is safe to suggest that the American decision makers shall think twice before engaging in any actions that would threaten Iran’s survival or undermine its regional interests.

In an earlier paper I argued that for a number of reasons the new conservatives in Iran are not ready to engage in a real hostile confrontation, which might put the survival of the Islamic regime at risk[12]. This means that when the overall existence of the system is at stake, the chance to see a drastic change in Iran’s position are high and we may expect pragmatism to prevail.

An optimistic assessment of the present situation, and considering the new conservative cautious attitude, which I tried to describe here and elsewhere, leads to the conclusions that chances for the new government in Iran to avoid a confrontation on nuclear issue are high, provided that Iran is not totally barred from pursuing its declared peaceful use of nuclear technology in a faithful and transparent manner. The face saving aspect of an eventual solution is also an important dimension of the crisis management.
The proposed scheme by the IAEA Director General, who has suggested a cooling period of about 10 years during which Iran would freeze all nuclear enrichment, seems a rather immature plan in order to avoid confrontation between Iran and the nuclear contenders. It is not quite sure whether he has coordinated the matter with other interested parties.

Now that the nuclear case is going to be considered by the U.N Security Council, the best option is to review the case under Chapter VI of the Charter. This will give a chance to all interested parties to further seek peaceful solution to the situation and avoid a harsh decision that could destabilize the whole region and the world. In other word, the West should endeavor to engage in a fair non-zero-sum game with a positive outcome in which neither side feels defeated.

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Notes


[1] The vote had been expected on Friday February 3, 2006, but was delayed by an attempt by NAM (developing countries of the Non-Aligned Movement) to soften the resolution, which was rejected by EU3 (Germany, France and the UK,) who had drafted it. Egypt made a proposal to include a reference to making the Middle East a nuclear weapon free zone. This was rejected by the US, which saw it as an attack on Israel's nuclear arsenal. But it was finally accepted the clause after it received overwhelming backing from European allies. BBC NEWS World Middle East Iran reported to Security Council.htm
[2] Russia and China agreed to support the resolution on condition it did not contain any immediate threat of sanctions against Iran. Only Venezuela, Cuba and Syria voted against it. India voted in favor of the motion in spite of the government coming under intense domestic pressure to stand by Iran. US ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte said the vote sent a "very powerful signal" and the ball was now in Iran's court. He further said. "Iran, rather than threatening the world, should listen to the world and take steps to regain its confidence."

[3] Saddam Hussein is one recent example of this genre who by his foolish defiance against world public opinion and international community dragged Iraq and its people into pointless chaos and bloodshed.
[4] See my previous papers, especially : Iran-U.S. Nuclear Wrangle: The crisis of Credibility, Middle East Academic Forum
[5] The latest accusation against Iran from IAEA sources is that it possesses a document that shows how to mould highly enriched uranium into a nuclear warhead. Iran has shown this to the IAEA. The US and its allies contend that the document indicates Iran's interest in nuclear weapons but Iran counters that it was simply given the document, unasked for, by the renegade Pakistani nuclear scientist A Q Khan, from whom Iraq once secretly acquired enrichment technology. BBC NEWS World Middle East Iran stand-off moves to new level.htm

[6] There are a number of obstacles which could hinder serious actions against Iran at this stage:
First and foremost of these impediments relates to legal matters regarding the submission of a case before the Security Council. As we know one of the functions of the Council is “to determine whether the continuance of a dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” Furthermore, for acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in order to pass an effective resolution under articles 41(economic sanctions) or 42 (military intervention), the Council shall determine the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. At this stage, the Security Council may prefer to act under chapter VI the Charter by referring to Article 37 and a situation the continuance of which might endanger international peace and security and invite parties to the dispute to seek solution by negotiations …or other peaceful means…
[7] In an earlier paper I had argued that the overall propensity of the high official’s decision makers to conflict and confrontation is very low, especially when it comes to the matter of survival of the Islamic regime. See e.g.: Iran’s New President and the Nuclear Issue, August 2005, http://www.blogger.com/Iran
[8] While Iranian officials first claimed that diplomacy has failed and Iran will no longer pursuit Russian proposal for joint venture, Iranian chief negotiator later admitted that they will continue to talk and cooperate in finding solution to the crisis.
[9] I have taken this portion from my earlier paper: Ali-Asghar Kazemi, Iran: The Price of Going Nuclear, October 2005 Middle East Academic Forum

[10] It is necessary to note that despite some sporadic state-organized rallies in support of the nuclear project, there no scientific findings as to the overall public opinion with respect to that matter in Iran.
[11] Iran has claimed in several occasions that if it perceives a real threat in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere in its land territory, it has the capacity to make the whole region insecure. In fact, Iran has already shown in other occasions, (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine) that it is capable to frustrate U.S. strategy or actions throughout the region.

[12] See: “Heading for a Clash! Iran-US New Conservatives’ Line-up Over the Nuclear Issue,” Prepared for: The Regional Security Conference UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, 9-12 September 2004