Strategic Discourse

I don’t pretend to be a futurist, but, based on realistic assessment of the past events, one can have a good hunch of eventual trends and expectations of the future. The year 2010 crossed in a way the threshold of peaceful diplomatic interaction that the West could afford to deal with the overall issue of Iran. A portion of those efforts is scheduled for the beginning of the New Year 2011 as to indicate perhaps the final call for compromise. Depending on the position of Iranian decision-makers, one of the following scenarios may take place on which basis the West’s eventual plan for action will be formulated:

Given its internal problems, particularly in the field of domestic economy which is seriously affected by UN sanctions and those inflicted by the West and its allies, Iran will take an unprecedented bold step to go along with the UN Security Council demand in agreeing to suspend(at least temporarily) its nuclear enrichment activities for the sake of confidence-building;
Iran will try to put forward a third solution through initiating an international consortium with the participation of the West and third parties acceptable to it, for handling and supervising the enrichment business as a mean of confidence-building;
Iran will continue its evasive tactics through vague and non-relevant statements without squarely and frankly repudiating negotiations for eventual compromise on the nuclear issue;
Iran will categorically reject all demands and appeals for halting its nuclear activities and warn the West and its allies against intervening in its internal affairs and threaten to use forces directly or by its proxies in case of opening hostilities in the region and the Persian Gulf.

Among the above alternatives, we start from the best optimistic to the worst case scenarios. Indeed the first scenario is most ideal for the West and international community as a whole as well as for Iran; which actually needs a favorable domestic and international environment for safe and secure implementation of its newly initiated economic reform plan. This alternative, if accepted, will give Iran a break to handle its domestic affairs which is quite susceptible to threaten the very survival of the Islamic regime. The West can promote this option by offering Iran an acceptable incentive package which would be hard to reject.

Though the first scenario is quite appealing and could eventually benefit all parties involved, alternatives two and three may be considered as suitable complementary for Iran; in the sense that both fit in the same category of negotiating fashion of Iranian diplomats. However, alternative two has been already tested and has set a bad precedent for Iran’s good intention in the last round of negotiations in Geneva two years ago. It is not sure that the 5+1 powers will be ready to go along with scenario two, given their previous experience with similar scheme which was aborted by Iran.

The most probable alternative would be the third one which by experience seems to satisfy Iran’s vagueness and ambivalent positions so far. In such case, the 5+1 powers will be tempted to go for a fifth draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council. Such resolution will surely attempt to tighten the rope around Iran’s neck by adopting harsher sanctions to the extent allowed by Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Iran’s response to this last UN action will determine whether the threshold of tolerance would be crossed paving the path for activating Article 42 of the UN Charter, which calls for military operations against the defying party to a dispute.

With regards to the fourth alternative, despite hostile rhetoric of Iran’s hard-line conservatives against the West, the worst case scenario appears a far remote option; since the overall nation seems not prepared to engage in another war and active hostilities in the near future. This means that the West should not really take much serious hostile messages coming out of Iran; they are in most part for domestic consumptions.

The overall assessment is that the year 2011 will be decisive for Iran and its relations with the West. So far the West has been able to reach a quasi conclusive consensus on Iran’s nuclear activities, separating Russia and China from the Islamic government. This has already put a heavy burden on Iran’s diplomacy, which invested so much to keep these two powers in its side.

The Islamic Republic will have a hard time and a very busy year ahead in struggling concurrently in two fronts (domestic and foreign) to keep the ship of the state afloat. High politics decision-makers should make a realistic assessment of the present situation and formulate the strategy that best insures Iran’s national interests while assuring the rest of the world of its good intentions with respect to the nuclear activities./

‎ ‎* Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and -International Relations in Tehran-Iran.
- Students, researchers, academic institutions, media or any party interested in using all or parts ‎of this article are welcomed to do so with the condition of giving full attribution to the author and ‎Strategic Discourse. ©All Copy Rights Reserved.‎

‎Dilemma of Iran’s Economic Reform Plan

2010-12-27T21:04:00.000-08:00

‎

Dilemmas of Iran’s Economic Reform Plan

Ali Asghar Kazemi

December 201o

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Nobody can logically contest the need for a major overhaul and structural change of the Iranian economy which suffers from a number chronic malaises inherited from wartime situation. The end of eight long years Iran-Iraq war was an opportunity to lead Iran’s economy to a rational and normal path that could promote productivity, efficiency and growth. But, fear of social unrest and negative political ramifications impeded successive governments to embark on such a risky plan as to cutting subsidies or at least its faire distribution among needy layers of the society. Thus, during the past two decades, people got habituated to consume cheep energy resources in such a way unparallel in the whole world. (Average energy consumption in Iran is 6.5 times that of the world.‎)

Experts believe that previous pragmatic (Rafsanjani) or reformist (Khatami) governments could initiate such reforms more easily because domestic and international environments were somehow more favorable than today ’s hard-line president Ahmadinejad, who is engulfed with horrendous problems at home and abroad. However, this did not take place merely for the lack of insight and political expediencies. This has caused the nation as a whole tremendous loss because of the unprecedented waste of national resources.

At last, the Islamic government became conscious of the bitter fact that the continuation of this unfortunate trend could endanger the very survival of the regime. Thus, the restructuring of national economy found its way to the agenda of the decision-making apparatus of the system and the parliament voted for an economic reform plan and the executive decided to go for its implementation.

Despite the fact that most people see only one dimension of the scheme for which they feel most affected, i.e. energy, the plan has several aspects each of which is as important as the others. The plan calls for restructuring Iranian economy inter-alia in the following fields:

Subsidy reform plan; ‎
Reform in banking system and currency; ‎
Reform in insurance ; ‎
Reform in customs control & excise; ‎
Reform in taxation and wealth distribution ( V.A.T tax reform); ‎
Increasing productivity – ( Internet and e-commerce in Iran); ‎
Improving distribution of goods and services and the functioning of state organizations and ‎ privatization in Iran.

Without attempting to go into the detail of the above program, which is quite complicated and requires specialized knowledge, the objective here is to contend that the implementation of the economic reform plan needs a number of prerequisites without which chances for its failure are very high. We can summarize those preconditions tentatively as follows:

A favorable domestic environment paving the way for people bearing eventual economic hardship created due to inflation and price adjustments after the abolition of subsidies on energy and consumers goods;
People confidence on the capacity, honesty and competence of the government. This factor has been under serious strains, especially after the alleged fraud and unconvinced presidential elections of 2009;
A favorable international environment which facilitates foreign investments and transfer of technology. This dimension is seriously damaged due to the nuclear crisis which has deprived Iran from all transactions with the rest of the world through the adoption of four UN Security Council resolutions devising economic sanctions against Iran;
A realistic understanding of the world’s rules of the game and a rational decision about friends and foes with a view to promote national interests in all circumstances and making Iran less vulnerable to outside threats;
Transparency and truthfulness on all aspects regarding economic reform and sincere cooperation with the parliament with respect to the gradual implementation of the plan.

Political constraints of the economic reforms in Iran encompass social, cultural, psychological and human factors as well. Handling the above requisites at present Iran seems rather difficult. Since, people have learned by experience during the past years that they should not rely much on government officials whose promises, actions and intentions are not always genuine. This stems from lack of transparency and accountability which in turn gives way to rumors and negative information propagated by opposition groups inside and outside the country. Recurrent revelations about high level civilian and military corruption in various sectors of the society are indeed not helping the accomplishment of an unprecedented national plan for structural changes. Thus, people seem not prepared to sacrifice their short and long-run interests in situations that require devotion, dedication and support for those who have no true sympathy for them and their causes.

In order to gain support for its economic reform, the Islamic government has to convince people of its good intention and its capacity to cope with its adverse impact on people’s daily life. For that purpose it has to set up a parallel plan for confidence-building inside the country and with the rest of the world. Without fulfilling this requisite, the success of this bold and historic national scheme seems difficult to guarantee.

Two weeks after the official start of the initial phase of the economic reform plan, despite the fear of mass protests against ramifications of the scheme, nothing substantial has happened so far. This may mean one of the two things:

- Either people are satisfied with the cash payment they received for subsidy compensation, which is an overly optimistic assessment, given the overall condition of the society;

- Or they are waiting to see how the government will cope with price hike and inflation at least in the short-run, as repeatedly promised by the officials.

This latter hypothesis seems more realistic; since people are more or less skeptical of the success of the plan but they don’t want to be blamed for its failure and they are waiting to see its final fate without actively getting involved in its eventual crumple./

‎* Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and -International Relations in Tehran-Iran.
- Students, researchers, academic institutions, media or any party interested in using all or parts ‎of this article are welcomed to do so with the condition of giving full attribution to the author and ‎Strategic Discourse. ©All Copy Rights Reserved.‎

The Global Crisis : World Order in Peril

2010-12-15T08:47:00.000-08:00

        The Global Crisis : World Order in Peril
         Collected Papers

         Ali Asghar Kazemi
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‎* Students, researchers, academic institutions, media or any party interested in using all or parts ‎of this article are welcomed to do so with the condition of giving full attribution to the author and ‎Strategic Discourse. ©All Copy Rights Reserved.‎

Iran’s Diplomacy: Embarrassment and Unpredictability

2010-12-14T05:45:00.001-08:00

Iran’s Diplomacy: Embarrassment and Unpredictability

Ali Asghar Kazemi

December 14, 2010

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If somebody ventures to delve into the decision making process in Iran’s foreign policy, he will probably end up to frustration. Thus, the rationale behind sudden firing of the incumbent foreign minister, while he was in a diplomatic mission abroad, and the appointment of Iran’s chief Nuclear Agency in his place, shall remain in shadow for some time. The truth of the matter is that the overall decision making process in Iran in domestic and foreign affairs does in no way follow any established rule or pattern. In other words, one might say that it is very personal, rudimentary, and emotional.

One of the major impediments of Iran’s foreign policy, more than three decades ‎after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, seems to be the continuing ‎persistence on its revolutionary nature. In fact, this feature has created a ‎strong barrier before Iran’s national objectives and aspirations in setting clear ‎criteria for determining friends and foes. This does not suggest however that ‎the same quandary is settled in domestic sphere. Perhaps many unfortunate ‎events and vicissitudes during the lifespan of the Islamic regime so far are ‎geared to this very important dimension of the revolutionary Iran.‎

Nevertheless, when states choose to engage in interactions with their peers, ‎they must have a lucid definition of their ends and means, a realistic ‎assessment of their partners and above all a faithful commitment to certain ‎primordial standards (rules of the game) in international relations. Indeed ‎revolutions have their own peculiarities and manners and do not necessarily ‎follow conventional norms and expected behavior. They usually have a ‎tendency to challenge the status quo and even alter those rules. Thus, many ‎states prefer not to be in love with revolutionary regimes which by nature have ‎a propensity to be rejectionist than receptive.‎

The problem of not being able to distinguish between its ideological concerns ‎and vital national interests has impeded the revolutionary Iran to identify its ‎friends and foes and this has almost paralyzed Iran’s diplomacy during recent ‎nuclear crisis. While international pressure was gradually increasing in order ‎to push it to stop all nuclear activities, Iran was helplessly looking for friends ‎here and there in order to get some support for its intransigent position. To ‎this end, a number of lucrative deals were offered to some potential partners,‎ ‎ ‎but, at the critical moment when Iran needed their help, they turned to its ‎opponents.‎ Russia and China are two exemplary cases that prove this argument.

Iranian leaders should not be surprised by this unfortunate experience. Indeed, ‎this is the golden rule of the game in international relations; states only have ‎permanent interests and no permanent friends or foes. Yet, an intelligent and ‎rational foreign policy should put the right emphasis at any particular moment ‎on the means and leverages it has on its potential friends in order to neutralize ‎or bypass the negative impacts of its presumed foes’ actions and decisions. ‎When a state puts all of its eggs in one basket, it may soon end up with ‎unpredictable situations in which it should sacrifice all at once. No diplomacy ‎that would stake everything on mere rhetoric and intimidation or concessions ‎deserves to be called intelligent.‎

While the conservative government and policy makers in Iran persist on a ‎return to revolutionary slogans of the regime and do everything to show this ‎feature, the international community seems quite alarmed with the ‎development. Thus, most states are reluctant to engage in deep interaction ‎with a nation defying the prevailing norms. This is not to suggest that those ‎norms and rules of the game are necessarily ethical, just or fair.‎

The mere fact that the newly appointed in charge of foreign ministry comes from a nuclear background in Iran may suggest that the government is sending a somber signal to the West and the rest of the international community that it has no intention to soften its intransigence on the nuclear issue and that this latter is on the forefront of Iran’s foreign policy.

But, the truth of the matter is that this reshuffle seems to stem rather from a personal and emotional grudge of the hard-line president vis-à-vis the outgoing minister and should not be construed as a fundamental change in the decision making process in foreign policy,. Since, neither the criteria for the nuclear objectives in the overall national interests nor the actual pattern of negotiations are to be expected to follow a professional and rational pattern devised by the foreign ministry. Thus, those who eventually expect a breakthrough in the future round of 5+1 meeting with Iran next January in Istanbul, Turkey are giving up to illusion./

New Trends in Diplomacy

2010-12-08T08:38:00.000-08:00

New Trends in Diplomacy :In the Light of U.S. Diplomatic Leaks

Ali Asghar Kazemi

December, 2010

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Generals and diplomats are said to be at the forefront of a state warriors in defense of its national interests. They act concurrently through wise tactics to “conquer” land in war and tactful diplomacy to “convince” minds in peace for the achievement of a “grand strategy” in pursuit of national goals. While the nature and substance of the two groups’ decisions and actions differ, traditionally they both submit to certain rules and discipline without which no task can be performed and no plan can be achieved successfully.

Now imagine what happens if we take away those two important elements from the equation for the sake of openness or moderation? This will indeed lead to chaos and anarchy in the field, hampering the fulfillment of the assigned task. This will damage the whole national strategy and interests. Thus, we cannot strip off the soldiers and diplomats from their distinctive outfits and leave them naked under the astonishing public eyes.

Recent diplomatic leaks of U.S. Embassies’ cables throughout the world are indeed a formidable event in diplomatic history which eventually will usher a new era of international relations and diplomacy.

Diplomacy is the major instrument of foreign policy by which a state can achieve objectives, realize values and defend national interests. Governments have the function to communicate through their diplomatic agents with those whose actions and behavior they wish to influence, deter, alter or reinforce. This process requires a clear definition of a state’s objectives, rationalizations for them, threats, promises, and the setting up plans and strategies to tackle with problems and contentious issues.

Thus, in its widest meaning the task of diplomacy is fourfold: a)It must determine state’s objectives in the light actual and potential power available for the pursuit of these objectives; 2) It must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available to them for the pursuit of their objectives; 3)It must determine to what extent these different objectives are compatible with each other; and finally 4) It must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.

With the development of mass communications, diplomacy in its classical terms, i.e. “secret diplomacy” has gradually lost its original meaning and has become a bureaucratic technique performed by carrier diplomats. They have no other choice than to rely on pieces of information they gather in their interactions with their counterparts or the public at large in the host states or during diplomatic conferences. Such pieces of information are rather crude and can only be analyzed along many others gradually accumulated by experts in the field.

The first blow to “secret diplomacy” came about after the Russian October Revolution of 1915 which changed the political configuration of the world. In fact, it was the Bolshevik revolutionary and Marxist theorist Leon Trotsky who first blew the horn. While serving as one of the leaders of the Russian October Revolution, as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, he ordered that all secret documents of the Tsarist regime should be made public. Thus, the undisclosed treaties previously signed by the Triple Entente that detailed plans for post-war reallocation of colonies and redrawing state borders were published. Trotsky believed that ‘Abolition of secret diplomacy,’ “is the first essential of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy.” ‎

Woodrow Wilson expounded somehow similar view in his “Fourteen points” after WWI where he called for “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.”

Neither the Soviet revolutionary open diplomacy nor the Wilsonian ideal of peace through cooperation and accommodation lasted long enough to produce positive results. Thus, the creation of the League of Nations as a forum of open diplomacy failed to achieve its sublime objectives and World War II occurred with all its atrocities. The conclusion of WWII and the creation of the United Nations were anew the product of a secret diplomacy in Paris and Yalta for the distribution of power and territories among the victors.

Many still believe that secret diplomacy in the past has caused more harm to the world peace and order than any other reason. Opponents of this view claim that it was open diplomacy that in several occasions brought the world to brink of war and disaster. In fact, there are enough arguments for and against the above contention and it is difficult to pass a wise judgment on the matter. The real problem is what degree of secrecy or openness should be tolerated in diplomatic dealings and negotiations.

Proponents of “conspiracy theory” see the hands of U.S. State Department (or at least a fraction of it) behind the leaks and warn against sordid implications of the scheme. To them this whole venture has been initiated behind “the velvet curtain” of “American imperialism” with a view to discredit many world leaders and officials around the globe.

With respect to the actual ramifications of the leaks on Iran’s relations with its neighbors in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East, despite the seriousness of their hostile position on the nuclear issue and their willingness of a U.S. military intervention, the Islamic leaders have shown a low-key approach to the allegations. But, there is no doubt that the matter will remain in the memory of the revolutionary regime and will be added into the records of malevolent states of the region.

With regard to the rest of the world, including the 5+1 states involved in the nuclear negotiations, at first Iranian officials showed interests on the leaks as proof of their accusations against the “Western imperialism.” But, subsequently they condemned the scheme as mere fabrication and worthless documents having no legal value.

Whoever behind the venture and whatever the true aim of recent leaks of U.S. diplomatic correspondence, they seems to cause incontestable damage to states’ mutual confidence in discussing issues and critical matters susceptible to influence their national interests. Those persons responsible for these divulgations have not shown that they are really pursuing a benevolent cause for their deeds. They could eventually be labeled opportunists or anarchists who have no respect for long-established institutions of diplomacy and international affairs. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: ‎http://www.aakazemi.blogspot.com ‎

Strategic Discourse – Index

2009-12-15T22:21:00.001-08:00

List of papers and Articles: By Subjects

General

Iran-US Relations

Middle East

Nuclear Issue

Political and Social Issue

Foreign Policy & Strategy

Articles en Français

Articles Sorted by Dates

* * *

______________________________________________

A Letter to the "Great Satan"
The Dream of "Pax Persica"
Euphorie Nucléaire de l'Iran
Iran's Nuclear Euphoria...
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Iran's Mixed Signals to the West
Iran: The Moment of Truth
If Iraq Falls Apart: A Worst Case Scenario
The Shadow of Terror over Iraq
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The Dilemma of Iran's Foreign Policy...
Iran's Nuclear Gamble: Boldness vs. Prudence
The Weird Child of Democracy
*Strategic Implications of WMD Proliferation in the ME

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* Religion, Peace and War...

* The Guardian State (3)

**The Guardian State (2)*

* The Rise of the Guardian State (1)

____________
*
* Religion, Politics and Terrorism
* The Persian Paradox and the West
* Iran's Nuclear Case: One Step to the UN Security Council
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* Iran: The Price of Going Nuclear
* Iran's New President and the Nuclear Issue
* Iran-U.S. Nuclear Wrangle...
______________
* Iran-Iraq Rapprochement...
* Iran's Presidential Elections...
* Insurgency in Iraq...

Previous Posts
* The Dilemma of Nation-Building and State Formation in Post-Saddam Iraq
* Bush Reelection and the Middle East:Iran in Focus
* Iran's Quest for Regional Hegemony
* Security Dilemma and Threat Perception in the Persian Gulf...
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* Iran's Nuclear Venture: Legal Obligation and Political Temptation
* Shifting U.S. Threat Perception after September 11 and the Fear of Iran's Nuclear Ambition
* Mounting Challenges to U.S. Military Presence in Iraq and the Rising Costs of Occupation
* The Legality of U.S. Armed Interventions and Prospects for Peace and Democracy in the Middle East
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* The End of Politics and the Last Myth..(Excerpt)
* Environmental Impacts of Iraq's War against Kuwait

Iran: Preparing for “Soft War”

2009-12-06T22:03:00.001-08:00

Iran: Preparing for “Soft War”

Ali Asghar Kazemi

December 2009

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Changing Conflict Environment

Ever since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, as the most powerful rival of the United States in the bipolar system, without a single bullet being fired, the expression of “Soft War” entered into new military and strategic jargon in the world. While the use of hard power or military forces is still a prevalent means in interstate clashes, the advent of the internet as a popular method of communications introduced a new dimension in the conflict environment.

Cyber war is a form of applied soft power in conflict situations where various vital strategic points and institutions of the target state are susceptible to cyber attacks. The range of such targets is very wide and diverse: from civilian power plants, banking system and defense establishments to media and cultural centers and academic institutions. Many states are now investing hard in the field of soft war as a legitimate investment with the objective to avoid the fate of the “evil empire.”

While conflict environment is being radically changed, means of encountering threats should also be transformed accordingly. However, there seem to be some misperceptions about non-violent and peaceful capacity of states to influence the course of international relations. This dimension has always been an important element of interstate interactions. In other words, use of soft power to complement other means of military power in peace and war has always formed an integral part of states’ grand strategy.

How far new schemes to cope with the threats of “soft war” is realistic? What are the risks of such strategy for society as a whole?

New Threats Perceptions

The post-elections turmoil in Iran has already lasted too long to be turned into an attrition domestic conflict. The hard-liners in Tehran are now announcing that they are facing a “soft war” initiated by the West for the purpose of toppling the Islamic regime. They argue that Western powers, disappointed from the threats of use force and hard power against Iran, and deterred from Iran’s defense and military capability, have been staging an unparalleled aggressive scheme through “soft power.” In their view, the plan is to instigate people against the government by claiming freedom, human rights, democracy and so on. They perceive that these latter demands are merely intended to press upon the Islamic system to surrender to western evil secular institutions and way of life.

The apprehension seems to be real and serious. Since, the forces of law and order are now being directed to cope with soft threats coming from the public media influenced by the West, including the satellites, internet and other means of communications. A parallel campaign has been initiated against academic institutions for teaching Western oriented secular social sciences. This whole has given a legitimate pretext to the ruling system to widen its rigorous control over the media and to press upon journalists, scholars, academics and opposition groups who one way or another have been criticizing the government during the past turbulent months.

Exaggerating Western Soft Power

There is no doubt about the technological capacity of the West and their capability to influence course of events anywhere in the world. But apparently, the threat of soft power is being immensely exaggerated in order to suppress domestic dissents which seeks its roots somewhere else

Ibne Khaldun, (1332-1406 AD) Moslem philosopher and scholar, pioneer in ‎sociology and historical analysis, was the first to argue that the defeat of the ‎Islamic domination in Western Mediterranean (Spain) was due to moral and ‎material decay of Moslem warriors and rulers. The main cause of this ‎phenomenon in his opinion was the clever plot designed by Westerners to corrupt ‎Moslem zealous through inducing lust for material amenities of life which detracted them ‎from their fervor and eagerness to defend the conquered realm of Islam.‎

In a way, the Khadunian suggestion seems to be still valid in any society where there is a cleavage between people and the ruling system because of mutual distrust. There are many factors through which people lose faith in their political system. Lack of accountability and proper democratic institutions, infringement to their principal rights, non-conformity to moral and ethical values, are among the most important factors leading to people mistrust and alienation. When people lose faith in the political system, they become discontent and thereby vulnerable and subject to all sorts of exogenous influence and intrigues.

Therefore, when people rise up against a political system and claim legitimate rights, one should not put all the blame on extraneous factors. Rational management of domestic crises requires that indigenous elements be taken seriously into consideration. In other words, we must first have an adequate grasp of our own society before initiating policies to counter with outside mischievous plots. People should be immunized against the influence of others’ soft power through appropriate cultural and educational preparation. Uses of repressive and restrictive measures usually have counterproductive effect. The problem needs to be tackled open-mindedly and rationally by specialists and not by unqualified forces that could jeopardize the whole scheme.

Dialogue and Diplomacy as Instruments of Soft Power

When states are engaged concurrently in two fronts (domestic and international) with disagreement, they should use both dialogue and diplomacy as instruments of soft power for crisis management. Exaggerating too much about “soft war” may further close the society and isolate the nation from the mainstream of international relations. At the same time, investing too heavily on hard power and military strength will not produce the necessary security assurance for a country.

The fall of the Soviet Union was not due to their lack of hard power, but rather to the disregard of the ruling elites of people’s essential rights and closure of the communist society to perceived “imperialistic plots.” Preparing for “soft war” requires a national consciousness of our strength, advantages and weakness and our standing in the global political configuration. Hard power and soft power are complementary components of national strategy in pursuit of vital interests. No matter how powerful a nation might be, it should show some degree of flexibility and tolerance in domestic and foreign affairs. The instruments of dialogue and diplomacy should be used as appropriate means to offset domestic unrest and to neutralize conceivable threats directed against our national interests. /

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‎ ‎* Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: ‎www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

‎* Students, researchers, academic institutions, media or any party interested in using all or parts of ‎this article are welcomed to do so with the condition of giving full attribution to the author and ‎Strategic Discourse ©All Copy Rights Reserved.‎

Iran, Beating the War Drums!

2009-11-24T06:48:00.001-08:00

Iran, Beating the War Drums!

Ali Asghar Kazemi

November 24, 2009

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In the midst of a confusing stalemate in the nuclear negotiation with the 5+1 powers, Islamic hardliners are engaging in an unprecedented military exercise with the objective to show a deterrent air defense umbrella for Iran’s nuclear sites and strategic points. The Islamic government has so far shown reluctance to go along with the West on the matters concerning its nuclear undertaking and the proposed confidence-building measures. Instead, it is aggravating the situation by organizing maneuvers that would eventually create further suspicions and hostility.

How far the major challengers of the controversial projects are susceptible to be deterred from this and similar military exercises? Is really military confrontation a rational solution to the problem? What are eventual scenarios in this conflict? Is a military clash between Iran and its main nuclear contenders inevitable?

It is normal that countries plan in peacetime for regular military maneuvers in order to keep forces in a state of readiness and efficient condition to confront potential foreign threats. Also, it is quite understandable that such exercises be made known to public with a view to deter those who may have ill intentions about the security, independence and territorial integrity of another state. But, the odd thing about the recent air defense exercise in Iran is its timing and configuration.

At the outset, the exercise was supposed to cover almost the whole space of the country for the purpose of the air defense protection of nuclear sites and other strategic targets exposed to eventual hostile air raids. This has included both active as well as passive defense. But, one missing important element in this defense puzzle was the promised Russian S300 which so far was not delivered to Iran. Eventually, the lack of this vital weapon system pushed the Islamic Guard Corps- Pasdaran- to stay away from this particular operation. Since, without this air defense system, the chances for an effective active defense would be highly diminished. Understandably, Pasdaran, who are now in control of almost everything in the country, do not want to enter into a contest whose outcome is unclear.

Thus, unlike most other exercises, this time the regular military forces (and not the Pasdaran) have been tasked for carrying out operation. This is indeed a significant change from the past when the Guardian Corps assumed the responsibility of all show of forces in similar cases. In the central command post, a clergy with black turban and army uniform was sitting next to the commanding flag officer of the maneuver; implying that everything is under the control of the clerical hierarchy. It is interesting to notice that we seldom saw similar situations when a high profile “Pasdar” assumed the responsibility of an operation.

As for military and political implications of this untimely exercise, the following points can be observed:

· Considering the timing of this exercise, the Islamic government seems to be losing hope in diplomatic negotiations with the 5+1 powers and is trying to put more pressure to them for further concessions;

· Despite wide publicity in the domestic media, while public at large might be impressed by the extent and scope of the exercise, Iran’s potential hostiles, namely the United States and its ally in the region (Israel) appear not be deterred by the show of forces. Since, they have a practical estimate of Iran’s actual defense potentials and state of technology ;

· While a clash seems to be still remote under present circumstances, in an unfortunate worst case scenario, the conflict would be fast (blitzkrieg) and decisive leaving no option for Iran to project power beyond its borders;

· Should the worst case scenario occurs, the extent of damages to strategic points will be beyond calculation and the result of the last 50 years investment in infrastructure and economic resources will be put to nil.

· In case of a quick round up of the conflict, the blame of the defeat will be put on the regular armed forces and a number of outside factors beyond incumbent government control.

Given that the Islamic government has partially lost public support in the wake of the controversial presidential elections, it seems rather hard that the regime could mobilize a long-run attrition war against its enemies. This means that the ruling clergies might not be able to count on people’s religious or patriotic fervor for effective support. However, should the conflict drags on for more than a few days after the first rounds of strikes, then, Pasdaran might try to organize retaliatory brushfire strikes against the invaders or American allies in the region.

On the rationality and logic of Islamic hardliners to organize such costly exercises for the purpose of deterring their potential adversaries, one should realize that defending national interests of a country is no longer possible with mere hard power and weapon system. No matter how powerful a state might be, it needs to use diplomacy and negotiation for the purpose of protecting its security and sovereignty.

There is no doubt that the West and their allies in the region have a good grasp and assessment of Iran’s defense capacity and potentials. They know well its vulnerabilities and weak points as well as the technological state of its defense system. Hundreds of research centers and institutes permanently follow every bits of defense development or procurement in the world. Therefore, one ought to be realistic enough not to engage in a confrontation whose outcome is at least unclear if not totally adverse to its national interests.

Let’s hope that politicians involved in this critical situation act vigilantly in their decisions and actions. The Middle East has enough problems and bottlenecks that we need not another new situation that could engulf the whole region into a new crisis and bloodshed. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

* Students, researchers, academic institutions, media or any party interested in using all or parts of this article are welcomed to do so with the condition of giving full attribution to the author and Strategic Discourse. ©All Copy Rights Reserved.

The Russian Connection

2009-11-17T22:12:00.001-08:00

The Russian Connection

Ali Asghar Kazemi

November 16, 2009

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Iran and the United States have been competing hard to gain Russian support for their mutually antagonistic nuclear policies. Russians as usual are playing a villain opportunist who tries to get the most benefit out of this tripartite connection. How far this game can continue and how long Iranians should pay ransom to the Kremlin in order to put into operation Bushehr nuclear power plant that has become a source of prestige and the symbol Iran-Russia cooperation after the revolution in Iran?

Upon the conclusion of a meeting between Obama and Medvediev during the November 15, 2009 APEC conference in Singapore, Russian have announced that Iran’s nuclear power plant at Bushehr will not be operational at the end of this year for technical matters. This is the fifth or sixth time that Russians have postponed the inauguration of the plant during the past years; whilst it has become a matter of pride and prestige for the Islamic regime. Despite Russian claim to the contrary, Iranians firmly believe that this action has a political motivation and is a direct result of American pressure on the Russians with respect to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Opposition groups blame the incumbent government for the mismanagement of the project and accuse Russians as unreliable and erratic party who should not be trusted for major undertakings.

In fact, this is not the first time that Russians are in flagrant breach of their contractual obligations towards Iran. They have done the same with regard to another important deal with the Islamic regime for a vital air defense project (S300). That too became victim of secret connection between the United States and Russia that has so far abstained to deliver the system on the promised date while they had been prepaid for the deal. Disregard of the substance and logic of this latter agreement, Russians have indeed proved to be an untrustworthy and opportunist partner in almost all interactions with Iran during the past history.

Russia’s villain conduct with respect to Iran’s legitimate rights in the Caspian Sea is another case in which the children of Tsars and Marx, with not much scruple and rudimentary norms of moral principles, are deceiving Iran. While political realm has its own morality, a minimum standard of fairness is expected without which no just and durable relations among nations are possible.

Ever since Iran’s controversial nuclear project was exposed to international debate, Russia along with China, as two permanent members of the UN Security Council, have played a crucial role in this issue. During the past years, the Islamic regime has done its utmost effort to benefit from these two powers’ leverage to evade from sanctions and punitive actions taken against it.

Despite a number of lucrative deals offered by Iran to Russia and China during the past years, thus far American influence has proved to be prevailing in the game. This means that Iranian leaders have not been able to divide between the 5+1 powers and attract Russia and China in support of their nuclear undertaking.

Iranian leaders are well aware of Russian moral fiber and feel betrayed by them. But, they are not prepared to admit the fact, since they have invested so much on the nuclear power plant and other projects during the past 15 years that they fear they may lose the whole if they turn back to their defective partner. Tehran’s reluctance to go along with the IAEA suggestion to transfer low degree enriched uranium to Russia for further process, as a measure of confidence building, seems to be motivated from Iranian apprehension of the overall Russia’s irresponsible record in the past.

Russians have shown in the past that whatever promotes their sole material interests is permissible and moral. This is not to contend that their counterparts are in a better position. However, we know that politicians who have no respect for their words and promises are condemned to be isolated from the mainstream of the global interaction. This is equally true for Russia, America, Iran or any other country.

The Russian connection had a terrible cost for Iran ever since the Islamic regime decided to enter into an unequal contest with the United States. At the end of this year, when Russia and China once again turn their back to the Islamic regime, we will be witnessing the final outcome of this vital competition.

Many believe that Iran’s extending friendly hands to Russia has been out of urgency and political expediency created as a result of its unwarranted enmity with the United States. Iranians think that continuous hostility with the Americans is not leading to anywhere and is damaging Iran’s long-run interests. They believe that it is high time that Iran explicitly protests against Russians for their malicious conduct and should review its policies towards Moscow before it is too late. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Obama: Between Idealism and Realism

2009-11-13T23:56:00.001-08:00

Obama: Between Idealism and Realism

Ali Asghar Kazemi

November 2009

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Less than a year in the White House, Obama is caught in a perplex situation: the Wilsonian ideals of peace, democracy, self-determination etc on the one hand; and American prestige, power and hegemony in the world on the other. There is no doubt that Obama is personally and by nature a decent man with many good human traits. But, as president of the United States, he is supposed to follow the Machiavellian advices in order to preserve “Prince’s” power and interests.

Perhaps, it is normal that when one begins to exercise in some fresh field, at initial steps the element of wish and purpose is overwhelming strong and the inclination to ponder upon facts and means are weak or non-existent. Realism is based on the assumption that the key concept in politics is interest defined as power; and everything else in the realm of ethics and morality is at the service of those interests.

Obama’s idealistic stand during his presidential campaign with respect to foreign policy and defense strategy was a natural position of a democrat candidate vis-a-vis a republican president who became the most detested leader in US history. But, he was enough conscious not to let him-self mired by illusion. Thus, in his initial speech after the election he touched to concrete facts on the way of the United States when he said: “the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime, two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial crisis in a century.” In fact, the troubles that Obama inherited from his predecessors were so profound and beyond reach that nobody could deny their existence and complexities.

About ten months in office has given enough experience to Obama that war in Afghanistan is not leading anywhere and public diplomacy with respect to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is a wishful illusion. Constructive realism dictates on the one hand that sole use of hard power cannot protect US interests anywhere in the world. On the other hand, relying on public diplomacy alone for the purpose of settling perennial disputes with Iran is merely a waste of time.

In Afghanistan, the United States and its allies are gradually loosing face and credibility and Taliban “freedom fighters,” as they like to be labeled, are gaining ground and becoming stronger and more violent against the NATO forces. Obama’s recent decision to revise American strategy in this respect is indeed a realistic approach to the problem. But, as we said previously, the issues of Taliban and Talibanism in Afghanistan and Pakistan should be addressed on their own merits.

“Fighting Taliban with hard power, i.e. force of guns, artillery and fighter planes will surely not solve the problem; neither in Pakistan, Afghanistan nor anywhere else. Americans and their allies should realize this bitter fact that they are fighting an idea and not a group of devoted people who could regenerate itself through time and more ferociously. They must search for avenues to cope with intolerance and fanaticism in this hostile region. They should find appropriate ways and means to neutralize that idea through education, cultural change and economic development. Otherwise, the world will experience much worse condition in the future.”

With regard to the American entanglement in Iraq, Obama kept his promises during the presidential campaign by withdrawing forces from cities, but the situation there is still very vulnerable. The Middle East peace process too is in a fragile deadlock, despite earnest attempts by the democrats to bridge the gap between Israel and Palestinians.

In Iran, the situation is not better than what it was in the past. The Islamic regime is now more determined in its nuclear ambitions and more aggressive in its attitude towards the West and the United States. Hard-liners in Tehran seem to have reached the conclusion that neither the UN Security Council, nor the 5+1, including the US, are in a position to do anything tangible against them.

Swinging between idealism and realism by the new president has induced the impression of perplexity and indecision to Obama’s administration. His observation in a statement after the elections reflects that point: “As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals…. America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.” He recalled that “earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions.” But, he is not quite clear as how he intends to put into practice these convictions to tackle with terrorist groups in Pakistan and elsewhere.

Concerning nuclear challenges ahead, he assures the world that the United States will work tirelessly “with old friends and former foes… to lessen the nuclear threat ….” But again, he falls short of explaining how this objective will be achieved. He has shown that he is very lenient to “those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents.” North Korea is still blackmailing the world with its nukes and Iran is simply showing deaf ears to military threats and economic sanctions.

As we said in our previous comments, change in “agency” will not necessarily bring about change in “structure.” This means that Barack Obama is before anything the president of the United States and is duty bound to protect American national and world interests. This fact may eventually work to the detriment of other rivals or opponents. But, what is important for the United States and its leaders, whether republicans or democrats, is to secure American interests at all cost and not to rectify any wrong or unjust situation in other countries. History bears good witness that this argument is quite true in the case of Iran. Therefore, we should not expect much from president Obama or any other leader in the world for that matter.

During recent months, Obama has tried to please both the Islamic regime and the people of Iran, especially the progressive groups who seek to change the situation in a peaceful and democratic manner. Outside the usual political rhetoric, if this proves to be the actual American strategy with respect to Iran, it is inherently contradictory and self-defeating, not producing positive result. Obama wants to show to the world that he really deserved the Nobel Peace Prize. But, he is still much perplexed as how to demonstrate this sentiment. He is trapped between his personal tendency to idealism and the collective American expectations to face realities of our time.

Idealist leaders have done more harm to the world than realists. Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. That is, human being is a composite of political, economic, moral and religious man. Hans J. Morgenthau once said: “a one dimensional political man would be a beast lacking total moral constraints; and a man who was nothing but “moral man” would be a foul.”

Whether Obama is an idealist, realist or a pragmatist, Iranians should not expect much from him in the fulfillment of their legitimate cause and aspirations. They are in fact learning by experience that in the final account “Obama is neither with them nor with the regime,” but he is and will remain with American long-run interests. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Towards “Secular Nationalism” in Iran

2009-11-10T22:22:00.001-08:00

Towards “Secular Nationalism” in Iran

Ali Asghar Kazemi

November 2009

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While nationalism in the Moslem world is commonly considered as an alien ideology imported from the West, Persian nationalism has been emerged from a religious ground. Shi’ism is an outgrowth of this phenomenon that distinguishes Iranian from other Arab and non-Arab Moslems in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.

Up until the advent of the Islamic regime in Iran, national consciousness has been with Iranians parallel to their religious traditions. In other words, religious nationalism formed an inherent trait of the Persian identity for a long period of time[1]. This feature helped Iranians to consolidate, fight against their enemies and secure the country from disintegration and collapse. However, this trend has changed its course during the past several years. A new generation of Iranian intellectuals, academics and educated people is gradually moving away from the political Islam and traditional religious values toward a more universal and secular approach to various issues of society and the nation.

The progressive “Green Movement,” that emerged amidst the controversial presidential elections of June 2009, can be considered as the social and political manifestations of this new tendency. Upon a series of bloody clashes with the regime during the post-elections turmoil of June 2005, the movement has turned to radical and secular nationalistic slogans that aim at the very foundation of the religious system.

What is the substance of this new nationalistic awareness? How far this movement is capable to pressure the regime for fundamental changes? What are the implications of changes for the domestic and foreign affairs of the nation?

Islam and Nationalism

Nationalism has essentially a secular nature that originated from European civilizations. When it reached the Middle East it brought some fruits but it did cause serious dislocation to Moslem societies and produced serious challenge to traditional Islam.

With the gradual disappearance of Western colonialism from Asia and Africa, the struggle for self-determination and political independence led the Islamic communities to adopt nationalism as their liberating ideology. Thus, the quest for sovereignty and statehood created a sense of political nationalism that inevitably diverted and diluted the consciousness of belonging to the wider Islamic community (ummat.)

The relationship between nationalism and Islam is not always clear and various writers at different times and occasions have given different thought and explanation to it. As a matter of principle, Islamic doctrine adheres with the idea of “internationalism” and thus, theoretically, it should oppose such ideology. Some Moslem scholars have condemned nationalism as a regressive move to pre-Islamic tribalism.[2] Others have supported nationalism as long as it has its source and driving force in Islam. In some instances, nationalism in Moslem countries has attained the status of sacredness. In this kind of nationalism, protecting the nation from foreign aggression is considered as a “religious duty,” because only in a free and independent nation can there be a “religious self-respect.”[3]

Islam’s internationalism, along with its spiritual and political unity, stem from its pure monotheism. Thus, the kind of nationalism that emerged from secular and material interests is principally repudiated by Islamic doctrine. In this conception, nationalism without religion is inconceivable in Islam, since it is loyalty to the nation whose gate is religion.

Persian Nationalism

As we said previously, Persian nationalism expressed and articulated through the adoption of the Shiite doctrine fundamentally distinguishes Iranian Moslems from the other creeds in the broad spectrum of the religion of Islam. It has served as a strong unifying force against Persian enemies and rivals in the past centuries. But, with the ascendance into power of the clergies after the 1979 revolution in Iran, the political thrust of the religion gradually diminished and people became dismayed of the poor performance of politico-religious institutions.

As regards the evolution of nationalism, Shiite doctrine shall be viewed in two historical periods: before and after the 1979 revolution in Iran. The trend of nationalism in pre-revolution Iran is more or less similar to other movements in the region; in the sense that it was basically guided by a sense of self-determination, sovereignty and independence within the context of secular political system. The impact of Shi’ism has been considerable during the constitutional revolution of 1907. The later development of nationalist sentiment in Iran after World War II was also the product of secular intellectualism, whose effectiveness as a political force was marred by the lack of support from the religious sector.[4]

The Shiite fundamentalism that gradually took over Iran’s revolution of 1979 is considered analogous to the French Jacobin nationalism. In fact, the pattern of interaction and the trend Iran’s revolution resembles in many aspect to the French revolution of 1789. Five distinct phases can be observed in both historic events:1)The collapse of the “ancien regime” ; 2) the rule of the moderates; 3) The ascendency of the extremists; 4) The reign of terror; and finally 5) The “Thermidorian” period.[5]

The nationalist image of Iran’s revolution, manifested in form of the Shiite fundamentalism, bears many signs of the French Jacobin nationalism. In both cases they developed in the midst of foreign war and domestic turmoil. The main characteristics of this development can be observed in the following common features:

First, they became utterly suspicious and fiercely intolerant of domestic dissents. Thus, they made every effort to annihilate any group or faction which appeared to be lacking in faith and loyalty to the homeland “ la patrie” and “Vatan-e- Eslami.” They both fought vigorously any tendency toward partition and provincial autonomy.

Secondly: both revolutions relied heavily on force and militarism to attain their ends. They did not hesitate to use terror and violence to intimidate and cope against domestic dissenters. [6] As to foreign enemies, the whole nation and all the resources were set in motion. The Islamic devotees seeking martyrdom in war against the infidel regime of Baathist Iraq are example of nationalist manifestation under the banner of religion.

Thirdly: both movements have become fanatically religious. Finally, the common characteristics of the two nationalist movements lied upon their excessive missionary zeal. They both used every conceivable means to secure popular conformity.[7] This later trait pushed people away from strict religious norms to more tolerant secular values.

Secular Nationalism

With a view to make the traditional Islam more responsive to the needs of the present modern society, a number of progressive attempts have been initiated by Iranian elites, intellectuals and reformist during the past decade. They were all Moslem zealous who developed and lived within the religious system established after the revolution. Some of them even came from radical students followers of the late founder of the Islamic regime in Iran, who jumped over the walls of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and participated in the hostage taking American diplomats for 444 days.

The coming into power of the hard-line government in 2005 and its reelection in June 2009 was a serious blow to reformist groups’ ideals paving the path for the resurgence of a strong opposition front which later became known as the “Green Movement.” Thereafter, the green color which was merely the identity sign for one candidate became the emblem of a movement which is now standing as a challenging opposition front with new goals confronting the incumbent regime.

Thirty years after the revolution in Iran, people now seem to be changing their views and values in a direction opposite to that pursued and advocated by the Islamic regime. Despite earnest effort by the system to Islamize the nation, people sense of nationalism is being diverted towards secular values more attune with Western liberal democracy. This is indeed a major setback for hardliners who seek to enforce their backward interpretation of Islam for the whole nation. Their main objective is to dominate public and private life of the people.

As we said earlier, the new nationalistic movement in Iran stems from a different environment that is dissimilar from the past. We may attempt to recognize characteristics of the new movement in the following way[8]:

1) It is primarily a reaction against an ideology that has become unbearable for many even among religious figures;

2) It is an antithesis of a political system that came into power in a very particular point of time and circumstances that is no longer responsive to the actual expectations of the people;

3) It is a self-propelled movement with no official platform and has no particular leadership inside or outside Iran;

4) It is a “positive nationalism,” meaning that it is not against the current trend of the international society but it strongly objects the existing domestic divergence from that trend and wants to rehabilitate the true Iranian identity and status in the present world;

5) It is omnipresent and it uses all old patriotic and revolutionary slogans of the past as a tactical challenge against the ruling system;

6) It is a secular, forward-looking and peace-loving movement that denies all sorts of segregation, subjugation, arms races and interventions in the internal affairs of other countries and wants to live in peace with all people and nations.

Although the traditional Persian nationalism has a tendency to be dormant in quiet times, the new emerging secular consciousness tends to be dynamic and alert to the critical condition of present Iran. Persian nationalism which, was once associated with religious faith as a driving force in the fulfillment of national and political aspirations, is now awakening in a new environment. They still stem from the same main source that is people with their faith and loyalty. But, it appears that the substance of the devotion is being transformed to secular values.

While Persian nationalism transpired from a religious premise in the past, it is now changing its course to secular values of the modern society. What we are witnessing now in Iran is a profound metamorphosis in people’s expectations and demands. Though the supporters of the “Green Movement” occasional and sporadic manifestation might be perceived as typical urban unrest with low level violence, its persistent dynamism during the past months infers the thrust of a real deep revolution[9]. The ramification of this transformation is not yet quite clear; nonetheless the impact is inevitable for present Iran. [10]/

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

[1] This dates back to about five centuries ago, during the Safavid dynasty when the Persian king (shah) conceived Shiism as Iran's official religion, largely to distinguish themselves from Ottoman Turks and Arabs. Shiism is Iranian or” Iranianized” Islam. Its very existence signifies the irrepressibility of Iranian nationalism. See: Hooshang Amirahmadi, From political Islam to Secular Nationalism Iranian Archives 1995- 2006

[2] This is the view expressed by Muhammad al-Ghazali. Cf. E.I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, London; Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965. Pp.109-110

[3] See; Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslem Brothers , London; Oxford Univ. Press, 1969 . p. 264.

[4] -Iran’s national Front ( Jebheye Melli) came into existence as a coalition of political groupings revolving around Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. It began to fragment and ultimately collapsed with the approach of the showdown between the prime minister and the Shah of Iran in 1953.

[5] Cf. Hosein Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran 1962-1982 ( Beckenham Kent : Croom Helm, 1984), passim

[6] . The same is true about those who one way or another turned back to the regime, including the entourage of the spiritual leader who accompanied him in his journey from Paris to Tehran. Almost all of them were either executed, jailed, exiled or isolated from political activities.

[7] Cf. Carlton J. H. Hayes, “ Five types of Nationalism,” in Ivo D. Duchacek Conflict and Cooperation Among Nations, New York: Holt,Reinhart and Winston, Inc., 1960, pp. 44-51

[8] I have taken these characteristics from my earlier article “ Rise of New Nationalism in Iran” See: Strategic Discourse, October 2009.

[9] Some people prefer to call the phenomenon a “velvet revolution,” referring to the experience of colored movements in Georgia and Ukraine, but the comparison seems irrelevant in the case of Iran.

10 For more sources on the subject see:

Christoph Marcinkowski Islam and Nationalism in Iran, Iranian nationalism is to remain a driving force behind Iran’s foreign policy. Security Watch Policy Briefs Special Report, Oct. 2006

- Naser Ghobadzadeh Value Changes in Iran (Second Decade of the Islamic Revolution) Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 77-108, Fall 2004

- Jonathan Manthorpe, The roots of radical Islam Meddling by western powers fueled the radicalization of Middle East, The Vancouver Sun 27 September 2001

Iran: Islamization vs. Secularization

2009-11-01T22:04:00.001-08:00

Iran: Islamization vs. Secularization

Ali Asghar Kazemi

November 2009

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Introduction

The controversial presidential elections of June 2009, which ignited a social crisis in Iran, had a definite impact on the society and truly polarized the nation in two antagonistic camps: pro-government conservative hard-liners on one side and reformist opposition groups on the other. At first the quarrel was limited to the results of the elections which were alleged to be performed with widespread frauds. Ruthless reaction of the government to peaceful manifestations of the unconvinced people pushed the opposition to take a much more radical stand against the whole Islamic regime. This prompted the religious leader to find about the cause and origin of this prolonged crisis which is still threatening the very foundation of the system.

Radical conservatives, while claiming foreign involvement in this turmoil, believe that the Islamization process should continue with much stronger vigor until the nation has converted to zealous followers and supporters of the religious regime. Reformists on the other hand contest that the crisis is a natural response of the people to years of repressive rule, deception and injustice. They express the opinion that as long as the country is under a backward system of government, democratic changes are almost impossible. They believe that Islam has limited capacity for transformation and adaptation to the needs of our time. Therefore, they suggest that secularization is an inevitable and necessary trend of the future of Iran.

Despite earnest attempts of the ruling regime in Iran to impose the strict law of Shari’a, as interpreted by the Shiite doctrine, the result was frustrating. Thus seemingly, the process of Islamization of all vital sectors of the society during the past three decades was quite unsuccessful. We have said that some political elites have singled out Western “social Sciences” taught at the higher education, as the main cause for this failure. Some others are still trying to put the blame on “Western imperialism” and enemies of Islam, who are incessantly conspiring to topple the Islamic regime.

To what extent these arguments hold true in present Iran? What are the main causes of the young generation distancing from Islamic traditional principles and leaning towards secular values? Why those who were brought up in the Islamic environment are now rising up against the ruling system and reject the Islamization process under the guise of what we may label “national secularism”?

Islam as State Religion

Iran is a typical country which after its people accepted Islam in the first century of the Hegra,[1] replaced its former religion and followed the Shiite school. In this respect, some scholars believe that Persians extreme devotion to the Shiite doctrine and its symbol of faith and martyrdom stems from their spiritual and cultural background. They believe that Shiism is an outgrowth of dominant Persian social and political traditions, translated into a more bearable and tolerable doctrine associated with Islam.[2]

The state in its modern sense, is not one of the fundamental elements in the building of Islamic society, but emerges through the institution of Caliphate or Imamate for the protection of Moslem community (Ummat).[3] The word ‘Islam’, commonly used as synonymous to ‘religion’, is a misinterpretation that usually confuses the Western conception of – for example- Christian faith. Rather, Islam is an expression including in its total meaning: religion, politics, economics, society, etc.[4] Therefore, the notion of Church and state separation widely debated in Christianism seems not relevant to the relation between Islam and state. Since, according to the Islamic doctrine, Din (religion) and Dowlat (state) are both expression of Islam.[5]

One of the most important institutions in Islam is the mosque. The mosques in Islam are the focal point and the main place of gathering for both religious and political purposes. They usually supplant traditional forum for modern Western political parties. They are run and maintained ordinarily with private fund and endowment.[6] Before the advent of the Islamic regime in Iran, the power of secular government traditionally stopped at the doorstep of the mosque. Being literally self-sustained and politically independent, the mosques have played an influential role in the social and political business of Moslem countries. The mosques played an undeniable role in bringing down the monarchic regime in Iran. Many governments in the Middle East have always had to deal with the mosques and in order to limit their influence of religious institutions over political business of the states, by devising laws and regulations to control their activities.[7] In present Iran, the mosques are managed and to some extent funded by the state. In other words, the state has the absolute prerogative to appoint the religious authority of each mosque and supervise his activities. This means that they are no longer independent institutions and consequently cannot deviate from policies and guiding principles of the ruling system. This issue has been one of the major arguments of the opposition groups as well as independent clergies who believe that the state should not meddle in the business of local mosques.

Impact of Modernism on the Moslem World

The trend toward secularization in the Moslem world in the last hundred years has meant a decline in the overt influence of religious ideas and organization upon social and political life.[8] As we said earlier, unlike other religions, Islam is not merely a religion; it is a culture, a polity, a legal system and a whole range of social institutions. In consequence, the Islamic Shari’a is not only a constitutional system but also an ideal of conduct and behavior as well as legal code dealing with every-day life.[9]

Not until late nineteenth century the conservative Islam of the time realized its painful dislocation caused by the technological superiority of Western civilization, but also found itself invaded by Christian missionaries which paved the way for colonialism.[10]The once great civilizations of the Middle East, which under Islam had experienced a long period of conflict, hostility and socio-economic stagnation, suddenly realized that they were far behind European states. In fact, for centuries they had looked backward to nourish from the greatness of their civilization and their memory, while Europe had gone into various stages of industrial and social revolution. Progressive Moslems, in contact with the West, felt this backwardness deep in their minds and their souls. Thenceforth, religion was perceived the major stumbling block and thus the demand for change through secularization of states political system spread all over the Moslem world.

Moslems had to choose between two courses of action: either to go along with the strict dictate of religion (the medieval synthesis); or to face the realities of the modern world.[11]The choice proved to be a difficult one and no consensus to this time seems to be established. Practically, some Moslems tried to adopt an almost alien concept of faith, applying a little Protestant- style reformism to their creed. Others opted for secularism and still another group adhered to fundamentalism which preaches Islamic Shari’a’ as a political ideology.[12]

During the nineteenth century, modernist movements developed in the Moslem milieu of Egypt and Indian Subcontinent to interpret the Qur’an and Tradition so as to bring practice in Islam into general conformity with certain aspects of Western thinking of those days.[13]Despite some independent attempts by certain Moslem scholars to show the necessity of the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers in Islam, the reform did not go far before it was resisted by a fundamentalist group called Moslem Brotherhood. Neither the socialist movement of Jamal Abd-al-Naser nor the subsequent moves toward left and right, proved to be effective in establishing a secularized democratic state. Egyptian Islam today is characterized as apologetic and political and all reformers have reacted in these two directions.[14] In other Moslem countries such as Iran, the trend was somehow different in form and in substance.

Trend to Secularism in Modern Iran

Attempts at secularization of political power in the Moslem world of the twentieth century, begun with Kamalism movement in Turkey. Kamal Ataturk, the Turkish officer who overthrew the old Turkish monarchy after World War I, is the first to challenge the influence of religion (Islam) in Turkish politics. He deposed the religious elements in Turkish political instructions and substituted them by secularized ones.[15]He removed the veil from Turkish women, as a symbol of their emancipation in social life and instituted land reforms and social-bureaucratic reorganization.[16]

In Iran, Reza Shah the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty, made similar attempt around the same period .The ruler displayed implacable hostility to the tight grip of Moslem clergy over many aspects of public life, including education and justice, and took steps to break their power and prestige.[17]

As a consequence, the clergy lost direct control of much of its vast trust funds and religious laws gave way to civil and criminal codes. Licenses were required for the wearing of clerical garb. Traditional religious teaching gave way to state schools and a host of other changes, which restricted religious section to meddle in the political life, were instituted by the ruler. The object of these transformations was not religion per se, since Reza Shah was believed to be a faithful Moslem. Rather, it was perceived that for revitalizing Iran’s social structure, religious precepts hindering the development process had to give way to a secular system.

The secularization process in Iran somehow meant Westernization of all aspects of life including for example compulsory Western clothes, replacing many different tribal, regional and traditional costumes.[18]The attempt, which was later, pursued by his son Mohammad Reza Shah, failed to produce the desired effect. What it did, however, was the deepening of hatred and grudge of the clergy class and their followers. The hatred later mounted into what is now known as Islamic Revolution, which caused the fall of the Iranian monarchy in 1979.

Before the revolution, the secularist trends in Iran were growing in the sense that the political leadership of the Islamic clergy and their traditional influence on the educational system reduced. The secularization, however, did not mean “anti-religiousness but rather a-religiousness.”[19] Some groups and individuals have made attempts, though not on a systematic basis, to purify or “regenerate” Islam, but they have not gone too far.[20] During this period, religion was not so much frontally challenged as a system of beliefs by the political elites, as it was peripherally ignored. Where religion was accorded deference by the ruling system, it was often as a political force.[21]

The Islamic regime put all its efforts to reverse the secularization process in Iran by force and unprecedented vigor. However, it seems the more the state pushed for Islamization of the nation, the more people distanced from the official creeds and restrictive principles of the religious system. The post- presidential elections crisis was a symptom of people discontent about the political trend. Despite all the impediments on the way of the reformist movement, it seems to pursue with vigor its secular objectives and demands. The “Green Movement” is now in a face to face encounter with the Islamic regime and poses a real threat for the incumbent government. But, its success depends on a number of factors which seem very difficult to achieve in present time.

Conclusions

The process of secularization in the Islamic World in general and in Iran in particular, did not follow a unique and concrete identifiable pattern; rather it was disparate and in some cases blurred by other aspects of political life. However, from recent development, it is safe to say that the conflict between the “mosque” and the “palace” is gradually rising to a critical point. Some countries have already attempted to align their political apparatus and socio-economic system with the growing exigencies of Islamic doctrine, but the process has proved to be a difficult one and in some instances painful.

In Iran, while the Islamization process in post-revolution failed to generate the expected outcome for the Islamic regime and in some instances counter produced, the secularization was not quite successful either. The reason is believed to be the substance of traditional culture and mores in the society. Average Iranians are by nature spiritual and fatalistic. The new generation and educated people are very much eager and enthusiastic to adhere to many values and norms of democracy. Concepts such as independence, freedom, social justice, human rights and other attributes of Western style polity are much cherished by people, but they are not yet prepared to accept their rudiments. The shadow of deep-rooted of authoritarian culture is still present in today Iran. For example, tolerance as the most basic requisites of democratic process is almost absent in personal and collective interactions. The problem is more or less the same in Moslem countries of the Middle East.

In sum, the idea of secularism, though still very much cherished by liberal and intellectual Moslem, seems to have little appeal among traditional layers of developing Moslem societies. In some places, secularism is considered as the residue of Western influence and imperialism; thus, a return to religious ideas is perceived synonymous to anti-imperialistic movement. In other cases, religion is gaining momentum very dangerously as an ideological drive to face the ever growing danger of globalization.

Iranians seem now to be more and more leaning toward a “new nationalism” as an alternative expression of their secular objectives. This could be arbitrarily labeled as “National Secularism,” which is indeed a clever way to express opposition against the present religious system and to circumvent harsh reaction of conservative hardliners.

We shall further elaborate on this dimension in our future comments. /

__________

Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

[1]. Hegra or Hegira is the year of migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in A. D. 622, according to most account on September 20. This is the milestone of Moslem calendar dates counted on lunar or solar system.

[2]. CF. Morteza Motahari, Mutual Services of Islam and Iran [in Persian] (Ghom, Iran: Sadra Publishers, 1980), p. 122.

[3].It is argued that the Prophet founded a religion and a state at the same time, but his main goal was that of religion and the founding of the state was only secondary. CF. Ibid. p. 8.

[4].CF.Richard p. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 243.

[5].Sayyed Qutb. Quoted in Idem.

[6].The main institution providing financial support to Mosque is wagf which confers the right to use the fruits and return of property without transferring ownership. The wagf is extended to all kinds of voluntary charitable purpose of the Moslem community.

[7].Government control over mosques activities has been mostly performed through financial and administrative regularizations regarding wagf institution and other assets of the mosques.

[8].CF. Morroe Berger. Islam in Egypt Today: Social and Political Aspects of Popular Religion, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 2-9.

[9].Ibid.p.3.

[10].Cf. Religion in the Middle East, op. cit. pp. 26-7.

[11].CF. e.g. Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power, (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), passim.

[12].Moslem Brotherhood founded by the Egyptian scholar Hassan Al-Banna was an outgrowth of the Islamic movement which insisted on a return to the Qur’an and the Tradition (Sunna) of the Prophet. Similar fundamentalist movements emerged in Iran Fadaiyan-e-Islam, Pakistan Jamaat-e –Islami. Though founded on different grounds, their objectives were more or less the same asserting political role of Islam in the daily business of state and social life.

[13].The initial inspiration of the Egyptian movement stemmed from the ideal of Pan-Islamism of Sayyed Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Assad Abadi, the Iranian version) 1839-1897 who preached for the union of all Moslem states into a great empire. Interestingly this ideal was seized by the opportunist and reactionary Turkish Sultan Abdul-Hamid, who in fear of the overthrow of the Ottoman dynasty, laid emphasis on the Ottoman claim to legitimate succession of the early Caliphs of Islam. See: Religion in the Middle East, Ibid. p. 28.

[14]. CF. Jacques Jomier, “Islam in Egypt”, in Ibid. pp. 31-47 at 47.

[15].On 1 November 1922 the Turkish National Assembly stripped the last Ottoman Sultan of his power and proclaimed itself the sovereign authority. It permitted the existence of a Caliphate divorced from the Sultanate. But when Mustafa Kemal came to power eliminated the Ottoman Caliphate for good by a decree of 3 March 1924.

[16].See e.g. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

[17].See e.g. Donald N. Wilber, Iran: Past and Present, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 125-129.

[18].Ibid. p. 128.

[19].See. Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 148.

[20].Ahmad Kasravi, a controversial Iranian scholar, and his followers endeavored to render Islamic teaching meaningful for our times but he ended up giving his life on the matter. He was assassinated by a Moslem fanatic belonging to an underground group called Fadaiyan Islam (Devotees of Islam), CF. Ibid. pp. 148-149.

[21].CF. Ibid. p. 149.

علی اصغر کاظمی :خلاصه شرح حال

2009-11-01T21:31:00.001-08:00

مشاهیر ایران و جهان

کاربر میهمان به پرتال راسخون خوش آمدید ورود به محيط کاربري فراموشی رمز عبور عضویت

Links to other sites for profile: 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4

مشاهیر ایران و جهان / کاظمی، علی اصغر

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معرفی مشاهیر

کاظمی، علی اصغر

( ملیت: ایرانی قرن: 14 )

سيد علي اصغر كاظمي در6 بهمن 1319 در يك خانواده مذهبي در محله قديمي سرآسياب دولاب تهران متولد شد. قبل از آغاز سن دبستان ابتدايي در مكتب خواندن قرآن را فرا گرفت. دوره ابتدايي را در دبستان صابر در همان محله و دوره متوسط را تا كلاس نهم در دبيرستان ابوريحان در خيابان دلگشا (دروازه دولاب) طي كرد. سپس در سال 1335 وارد دبيرستان نظام تهران شد و در سال 1338ديپلم رياضي را اخذ نمود. در همان سال از طريق كنكور نيروي دريائي با اخذ رتبه اول براي طي دوره آكادمي دريائي به كشور فرانسه اعزام شد.

در سال 1342 با درجه افسري وارد خدمت نيروي دريائي شد و تا سال 1370 در سمت هاي مختلف انجام وظيفه كرد. در طول خدمت در نيروي دريائي فرصت يافت مدارج مختلف علمي و آكادميك را در رشته هاي مديريت و حقوق بين الملل در كشورامريكا طي كند. پس از بازنشستگي به عنوان هيات علمي مدارج دانشگاهي را تا مرتبه استادي طي نمود. هم اكنون نيز مشغول تدريس در واحد علوم و تحقيقات دانشگاه آزاد اسلامي مي باشد.

گروه : علوم انسانی

رشته : علوم سياسي

گرايش : حقوق و روابط بين الملل

والدين و انساب : پدر سيدعلي اصغر كاظمي حاج سيد كاظم كاظمي دولابي فرزند حاج سيد باقر از سادات اصيل ، متدين و خير سر آسياب دولاب بود كه املاك و مستغلات معتنابهي را وقف اهل بيت براي صرف مساجد و تكايا نمود.

خاطرات کودکي : سيدعلي اصغر كاظمي از دوران كودكي خود اينطور ياد مي كند كه : «من فرزند دوم خانواده هستم يك برادر بزرگتر،دو خواهر و سه برادر كوچكتر دارم.دوران كودكي ما در تهران قديم مانند ديگران بسيار ساده بود. وجود باغها و مزارع سر سبز اطراف محله ما نوعي انس با طبيعت و ذوق هنري را در من پرورش داد. در اولين سالهاي آشنائي با قلم مبادرت به سرودن شعر كردم كه شديداً مورد تمجيد اطرافيان بويژه مادر بزرگم كه زني اهل فضل بود قرار گرفت. از همان كودكي به نقاشي،خطاطي و موسيقي علاقمند بودم. بسياري از اشعار حافظ را كه معاني آن را به خوبي فهم نمي كردم از بر داشتم وبا كودكان ديگر مشاعره مي كردم. علاقه به مطالعه و نگارش از همان اوان كودكي در من ايجاد شد. در مدرسه همواره شاگرد ممتاز بودم و مورد تشويق قرار مي گرفتم. دروس مدرسه هيچگاه كنجكاوي مرا اغناء نمي كرد و در هر فرصتي مطالعه مي كردم. البته طبيعي است كه اين مطالعات چندان جهت دار و هدفمند نبود. بعدها هنگامي كه به كشور فرانسه رفتم سعي كردم در جوار موضوعات تخصصي به مطالعات خود جهت بدهم. هنوز هم در عصر انقلاب اطلاعات با بهره گيري از ابزارهاي نوين از هر فرصتي براي افزايش دانش عمومي استفاده مي كنم. »

اوضاع اجتماعي و شرايط زندگي : پدر و مادر سيدعلي اصغر كاظمي به دليل اعتقادات مذهبي هيچگاه با رفتن وي به خارج از كشور براي تحصيل و خدمت در نظام موافق نبودند. در اصل هدف او از پيوستن به نيروي دريائي تحصيل در خارج از كشور بود. اما حرفه تخصصي او مانع از ادامه تحصيل در ساير رشته هاي دانشگاهي نشد.

تحصيلات رسمي و حرفه اي : مدارج تحصيلي سيد علي اصغر كاظمي به شرح زير مي باشد: -فارغ التحصيل آكادمي علوم دريائي كشور فرانسه (مدرسه كميسرياي دريائي) 1342- 1338 -درجه كارشناسي ارشد(M.S.) در مديريت از مدرسه تحصيلات تكميلي نيروي دريائي امريكا 1970 -درجه كارشناسي ارشد(M.A.) در علوم سياسي (رشته امنيت بين الملل ) از مدرسه حقوق و ديپلماسي فلچر وابسته به دانشگاه تافتس و هاروارد امريكا(1977) -درجه كارشناسي ارشد(M.A.L.D.) در حقوق و ديپلماسي از مدرسه حقوق و ديپلماسي فلچر(1978) -درجه دكتراي فلسفه(.PhD) در حقوق بين الملل (تخصص حقوق دريائي)از مدرسه فلچر(1979)

فعاليتهاي ضمن تحصيل : بيشتر فعاليت سيد علي اصغر كاظمي در تخصص حرفه اي نيروي دريائي بوده كه در جوار آن به تحصيل و پژوهش نيز پرداخته است.استادان و مربيان : از ميان استادان سيد علي اصغر كاظمي كه وي به خوبي از آنها ياد مي كند به شرح زير است كه همه داراي تاليفات متعدد هستند: دريا دار دكتر ژاك فريهJacques Ferrier رئيس دانشكده كميسرياي دريائي فرانسه پرفسور رابرت فالزگراف Pfaltgraff .Robert L. استاد راهنماي رساله دكتري و رئيس مركز مطالعات سياست خارجي- كمبر يج ماساچوست پرفسور دانيل نايهارت Daniel Nyhart از دانشگاه MiTاستاد مشاور رساله دكتري پرفسور جفري كمپ Geoffrey Kemp استاد راهنماي رساله كارشناسي ارشد،فعلا رئيس بنياد نيكسون امريكا پرفسور لوتيز سون Luis Sohn از دانشكده حقوق دانشگاه هاروارد پرفسور لئو گروس Leo Gross استاد حقوق بين الملل پرفسور آلفرد روبينAlfred Rubin استاد حقوق بين الملل

هم دوره اي ها و همکاران : سيدعلي اصغر كاظمي از دوستان و هم دوره ايهايش به خوبي ياد مي كند مي گويد كه يكي از آنها بعدها رئيس جمهور ماداگاسكار ، و يك از همكلاسي هندي اش معاون دبير كل سازمان ملل و يكي ديگر فرمانده ناوگان دريائي ايالت متحده امريكا در جنگ دوم خليج فارس بود.

همسر و فرزندان : سيدعلي اصغر كاظمي در سال 1349 هنگامي كه در ايالات متحده امريكا تحصيل مي كرد به صورت غيابي ازدواج كرد. همسرش خانم طيبه محرر كه از بستگان آنهاست فارغ التحصيل رشته حقوق قضائي از دانشگاه تهران است. حاصل ازدواج شان دو فرزند پسر است كه هر دو پزشك هستند. فرزند بزرگتر كاميار فارغ التحصيل دانشگاه تهران و متخصص جراحي چشم از دانشگاه شيراز است. فرزند كوچكتر فرزاد دندانپزشك دانش آموخته دانشگاه شهيد بهشتي است. كاميار متاهل و داراي دو فرزند دختر و پسر است. همسرش نيز پزشك متخصص جراحي زنان مي باشد. فرزاد مجرد است و عاشق موسيقي است.

مشاغل و سمتهاي مورد تصدي : سيدعلي اصغر كاظمي علاوه بر تصدي مشاغل رسمي طي 32 سال (70-1338) خدمت در نيروي دريائي و ستاد مشترك ارتش فعاليتهائي به شرح زير داشته است: عضو و مشاور حقوقي هيات نمايندگي ايران در اجلاس هاي مختلف كنفراس سازمان ملل درباره حقوق درياها عضو و حقوقدان كميته برآورد خسارات جنگ تحميلي ،دفتر حقوقي وزارت امور خارجه عضو و مشاور حقوقي هيات نمايندگي جمهوري اسلامي براي اجراي قطع نامه 598 و استقرار آتش بس عضو و مشاور حقوقي هيات اعزامي براي مذاكرات صلح ايران و عراق زير نظر دبير كل سازمان ملل متحد عضو كميته آتش بس و اجراي قطعنامه 598 عضو پيوسته كميته تخصصي شوراي عالي برنامه ريزي وزارت فرهنگ و آموزش عالي (گروه علوم سياسي و روابط بين الملل)

فعاليتهاي آموزشي : سيد علي اصغر كاظمي در زمينه آموزشي فعاليتهايي را داشته است كه به شرح زير مي باشد: استاد دانشگاه دفاع ملي ارتش جمهوري اسلامي تدريس به صورت پاره وقت در دانشگاه هاي مختلف كشور استاد تمام وقت دانشكده حقوق و علوم سياسي واحد علوم و تحقيقات دانشگاه آزاد

مراکزي که فرد از بانيان آن به شمار مي آيد : سيد علي اصغر كاظمي از بانيان مراكز زير مي باشد: - مركز مطالعات خليج فارس در نيروي دريايي كه بعد به وزارت خارجه منتقل شد - مركز مطالعات استراتژيك در ستاد مشترك ارتش جمهوري اسلامي - دانشكده حقوق و علوم سياسي واحد علوم و تحقيقات دانشگاه آزاد اسلامي

ساير فعاليتها و برنامه هاي روزمره : از جمله كارهاي روزمره سيد علي اصغر كاظمي نقاشي و موسيقي كلاسيك ايراني ( رديف هاي سنتي ) با سازهاي ويلن ، تار و سه تار مي باشد.

آرا و گرايشهاي خاص : از نظرات سيد علي اصغر كاظمي مي توان به : « همواره به فرزندان و شاگردانم مي گويم كه نسل ما در تاريخ ايران منحصر به فرد است، چرا كه ما هم «چراغ نفتي » را تجربه كرده ايم وهم ماهواره و اينترنت را . قطعاً در هيچ دوره اي چنين تحولي شگرف در زندگي گذشتگان رخ نداده و در آينده هم بعيد است اتفاق بيفتد. ما سهمي در اين تحول نداشته ايم ولي اميدوارم آيندگان دين خود را به ملت و كشور ايران آنطور كه شايسته است ادا كنند. كساني كه با آثار متنوع اين قلم آشنا هستند معتقدند كه تقريباً همه آنها با درون مايه اخلاقي و انتقادي نوشته شده اند. تا آنجا كه به خود من مربوط است هيچ عمدي در اين كار نبوده است و شايد اين ويژگي ناشي از ساختار بينشي و ذهني من باشد كه در محيط اوليه خانواده شكل گرفته است. نگاه انتقادي من به برخي مسائل تخصصي نظامي و انعكاس آن به رده هاي بالاتر گاهي موجب دردسرهاي جدي شده است .»

جوائز و نشانها : دريافت نشان دانش به خاطر فعاليتهاي علمي در سال 1353 ( قبل از انقلاب) برنده دوازدهمين دوره جايزه كتاب سال 1374 جمهوري اسلامي برنده پنجمين دوره جايزه اول كتاب دفاع مقدس

چگونگي عرضه آثار : سيد علي اصغر كاظمي مقالات حقوقي ، سياسي و بين المللي متعددي را در مجلات و نشريات مختلف داخل و خارج كشور به چاپ رسانده است كه ليست گزيده برخي از مقالات در سايت علمي معرفي شده موجود است.

:آثار و کتابهای چاپ شده :

-( ابعاد حقوقي حاكميت ايران در خليج فارس (دفتر مطالعات بين المللي وزارت خارجه 1368-

- ابعاد حقوقي دورنماي صلح بين ايران و عراق( تهران : دفتر نشر فرهنگ اسلامي 1377) برنده پنجمين دوره جايزه سال دفاع مقدس

- اخلاق و سياست : نظريه سياسي در عمل ( تهران : نشر قومس، 1376) - بحران جامعه (مدرن ( تهران : دفتر نشر فرهنگ اسلامي 1377

-( بحران نوگرايي و فرهنگ سياسي در ايران معاصر( تهران : نشر قومس، 1376

-( پايان سياست و واپسين اسطوره ( تهران : نشر قومس، 1381

-( جهاني شدن فرهنگ و سياست ( تهران : نشر قومس، 1380

ديپلماسي نوين در عصر دگرگوني در روابط بين الملل ( تهران : دفتر مطالعات وزارت خارجه1365

- روابط بين الملل در تئوري و عمل ( تهران : نشر قومس، 1374) برنده دوازدهمين دوره جايزه كتاب سال

-( روش و بينش در سياست ( تهران : موسسه چاپ و انتشارات وزارت امور خارجه 1374

- زنجيره تنازعي در سياست وروابط بين الملل. (نشر قومس 1370

-( سياست سنجي ( تهران : موسسه چاپ و انتشارات وزارت امور خارجه 1374

-( مديريت بحرانهاي بين المللي ( تهران : دفتر مطالعات بين المللي وزارت خارجه 1366

- (مديريت سياسي و خط مشي دولتي ( تهران : دفتر نشر فرهنگ اسلامي 1379

- نظريه همگرايي در روابط بين الملل ( تهران : نشر قومس، 1370

-( زنجيره تنازعي در سياست و روابط بين الملل ( تهران : نشر قومس، 1371)

-( نقش قدرت در جامعه و روابط بين الملل ( تهران : نشر قومس، 1369

-( هفت ستون سياست( تهران : دفتر نشر فرهنگ اسلامي 1379

فعالیتها: •تدریس حقوق، علوم سیاسی • محقق

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• بهجت، محمدتقی (1861)
• مصباح یزدی، محمد تقی (1308)
• خمینی، روح‏اللَّه (1248)
• مطهری، مرتضی (1203)
• آئینه‏وند، صادق (1071)
• رحمانی خلیلی، ابوالقاسم (1033) )
• کاشانی، غیاث الدین جمشید (934)
• خویی، ابوالقاسم (781)
• شهریار، محمدحسین (781

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Iran, Islam, and Secular Social Sciences

2009-10-24T21:04:00.001-07:00

Iran, Islam, and Secular Social Sciences

Ali Asghar Kazemi

October 2009

_________________

Introduction

In our previous commentary on the problem of Iran’s recent social turmoil after the presidential elections of June 12, 2009, we alluded to the issue of “Social Sciences” that has caused widespread alarm among conservative hard-liners.

In that article the emphasis was made essentially on the question of religion in general and Islam in particular as an ideological dynamic, influencing the function of society in the domain of human actions and interactions. It was argued that religion has to do with human mind, ideas, the belief system, values, attitudes, and behavior. While politics as an interdisciplinary branch of social sciences deals essentially with the pursuit of power and to some extent the distribution of values in society. Thus, the marriage of the two may inhibit man from his choice between the rational and the spiritual. This is indeed a major dilemma on the way of an ordinary citizen who wants to remain aloof of the impact of official creeds, unless he lets himself dragged by the formalistic rituals of the dominant religion.

Secular Approach to Social Sciences

As we know, social sciences are not “science” as we understand in the field of hard or pure sciences, such as physics, chemistry, astronomy etc. They form a body of knowledge accumulated during times from the antiquity to the present that comprises everything that relate to the study of human beings in their individual and collective interaction. This even encompass the subject of religion in its entirety as well as philosophy, history, psychology, sociology, economics, politics and the likes, that in one way or the other entail man’s life in his natural and artificial environments.

Once our knowledge of the spiritual and material world was limited to a range of dogma inherited from holly books as well as classical philosophers and scientists’ traditions. Some of these were later endorsed by the Christian church through sanctifying Aristotelian teachings, which had to be accepted blindfolded, and no one was permitted to pose question on their truth. Renaissance changed the methodical knowledge of the world by scientific inquiry and the domain of metaphysics became restricted to the inner-self in the Christian world. Amazing discoveries, inventions and innovations in all fields of sciences are the propitious outcomes of this period.

Of course, the Christian world had to pay dreadful price for this transition. Beside the horrifying experience of persecution and harassment of scientists and intellectuals, protracted wars among sects and nations ended up with some sort of balance between the Church and the State or the temporal and spiritual powers. The hundred years war of fifteenth century resulted continuous conflicts over the distribution of power between religious and temporal sectors, church and the state or popes and the kings. In the seventeenth century the same issues provoked the thirty years war. The resurgence of secularism replaced the medieval theocratic paradigm and ushered the age of enlightenment.

Religion and Secular Conception of Power

The secular consideration of power began its reappearance with Machiavelli’s doctrine of pragmatism in political theory. The basis of this doctrine was to answer the question of what needs to be done by a ruler to remain in power. That is to say that the necessity of political life often required the breaking of moral law. [1]Machiavelli’s princes, unlike Plato’s philosopher-kings, ruled because they were shrewd in manipulating power. Thus, power became devoid of virtue. For Machiavelli, good and evil were traits of all human beings and a successful ruler had to be “part lion and part fox.” [2]

Bertrand Russell wrote that faith, ideology and religion as a whole are undisputed elements in forming the power of a state.[3] Indeed ideas influence the development and use of command over power and violence. In cases were nations are not fully developed from a political-democratic standpoint and party politics as well as other social institutions lack the necessary appeal to unite people in the pursuit of their objectives , religion can fill the gaps. Translated into ideology when put into motion, religion may assume a determinant role in a society, provided it is properly used.[4] It can also weaken a state, and deteriorate its internal and external relations if its potential power is not directed toward constructive path and is used in the pursuit of evil objectives.

Secularism in the Christian World

In the turn of twentieth century it was the general feeling of most learned social scientists that everywhere in the world, religion was in the decline. The argument stemmed from the fact that religion was “opposed by powerful forces.”[5]Some even argued that religion was under the most serious threat that it had ever been in the past centuries.[6] The magnitude of the threat was even compared to the advent of Reformation in Europe but the change was characterized as an anti-religious trend rather than a crisis within the sphere of religion.

Humanism, which was commonly an alternative to theism, developed in Europe chiefly from a belief in the science and an exaggeration of human power and freedom. It was an intellectual movement that opposed the “religious institution.” In the nineteenth century the reaction to religious norms and institution was negative and the emerging idea antagonistic.

The main trend away from religion during the past centuries is considered as the growing sense of secularism [7]which Christianism had put in the doctrinal concept of church and state separation. This was probably an inevitable and necessary complement of the processes of social and political adjustment after the scientific discoveries and revolution in the field of industry and technology.

An immediate consequence of the industrial development was the emergence of a new social class called urban industrial proletariat, which led to the rise of socialism and Marxism as an ideological means for social adjustment. Among these latter ideologies, some did not negate religion and were ready to coexist and cooperate with it and others, which were antagonistic to any religious institutions. Marxism-Communism and its derivatives are examples of the latter type.

Secularism requires that all matters pertaining to man-to-man relationship be determined by representatives of the people, while relationship between men and God be determined by religion.[8] This position, however, was not endorsed by those who believed that all aspects of life without exception be governed by religious principles formulated many centuries ago and whose interpretation is solely in the hands of the ruling clergies.

The issue of secular state as opposed to a state governed by religious principles has become a fundamental problem of many traditional countries with diverse ethnic and religious background. Religion, in fact, serves both as a divisive and uniting factor in various countries. Practice of secularism also is not easy in territories of multiple religions such as e.g. India. This country has been subject to territorial partition and numerous turmoil because of religion. The peculiar aspect of Indian secularism is that religion and politics get mixed up taking advantage of the democratic system, while the evolution of a common civil law is blocked in the name of minorities’ right in a secular state.[9]

Islam and Secularism

The Islamic conception of religion and its evolution rests upon principles different from Christianity as regards social, economic, legal, political and the way of life in general. Hence a comparative study on the impact and influence of religion in social and political affairs may be obscured by the fact that for example, Christianity and Islam are evolved from and founded upon different conception of religion. Thus a discussion on the subject of secularization of political power can naturally not be based on similar sets of assumption and elements contributing to it. The Islamic conception of religion is more or less what religion has been through most of the course of human history.[10] The secularization process in the Islamic world, thus, shall be viewed and judged against its own distinct evolution.

In this sense, secularization is defined as the process by which political and social activities, explicitly controlled by the religious institution, come under the power of non-religious or temporal body. The definition, however, does not explain the whole conception as interpreted in Christianism and Islam, two major monotheist religions of the world.

It has been suggested that, for example, secularization in the Middle East has had the effect of substituting the European conception of religion by the Islamic doctrine.[11] There may have been such understanding in times among Moslem scholars, but this does not seem to be representative of a general belief. This was the fact and apprehension of a minority fundamentalist Moslems who opposed to that conception and nowadays seems to reemerge throughout the region.

Conclusions

While secularism is considered as the main characteristic of Western conception of religion, in the world of Islam no elaborate and widely endorsed philosophical expression of the subject can be found. Thus, various attempts by rulers or intellectuals to establish a secular system of government, political institution and social tradition in predominantly Islamic nations have not proved to be fruitful and practically possible. Kamalism movement in Turkey, Nasserism in Egypt, Pahlavism in Iran and other cases are typical example of such failure, which in the long run worked even against the very viability of the political system. In most cases cited above, the trend was not merely a process of secularization but it was viewed by conservatives as an all-out offensive against the religious institutions which otherwise meant an anti-religion movement. This has given rise to some misunderstandings that still persist in our own country and elsewhere in the region. Islamic fundamentalism is a direct consequence of this misapprehension.

The contrast between the secularization attempts and processes, particularity in the Christian world and Islamic community will be further discussed in our future commentaries. [12]

Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Notes

[1] . See e.g. David E. Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis. (Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 1981, p.77.

[2] .see: Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism. (New Haven: Yale University press. 1962), Quoted in David E Apter, Ibid.P.78.

[3].CF. Bertrand Russell, Power, A New Social Analysis, (New York: Norton, 1938), PP.145-156.

[4]. This is especially true in the case of the Third world states where political parties as key organizations for uniting people of different and rather immature opinion can not perform social and political results. A party, said, Edmund Burke, is a group of men united to promote, the common good in accordance with a principle upon which they are agreed. In the Third World the most widely accepted principles belong to religious teachings.

[5] .CF. Montgomery Watt, “Religion and Anti-Religion”, in: A.J.Arberry ed. Religion in the Middle East, (London: Cambridge University Press .1969), vol. 2. PP.605-639 at 605.

[6]. Idem.

[7].The process of secularization is sometimes distinguished from the idea of secularism, which is defined as an attitude of mind or set of beliefs with its focus in the assertion that there is nothing beyond this world. In this respect scientific materialism, humanism, naturalism and positivism are all considered forms of secularism. See Ibid. 609-610.

[8] .K. Subramanyam, “Norms and Interests,” in Strategic Analysis, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, February, 1985.p.1035.

[9] .Idem.

[10]. CF. Montgomery Watt, Religion and Anti -Religion. Op. cit. p. 609; see also: Hamilton A.R. Gibb. Religion and politics in Christianism and Islam. (Persian translation) passim; Modern Trend in Islam. (Chicago:1947)

[11].CF.Ibid.p.609.

[12].see my earlier writings on the subject in: Ali Asghar Kazemi, Religion and Politics... Monograph, Tehran 1985.

Iran: Roots of the Post-Elections Crisis

2009-10-18T06:58:00.001-07:00

Iran: Roots of the Post-Elections Crisis

Ali Asghar Kazemi

October 2009

_____________

“A new world society is gradually emerging.It is growing quietly, imperceptibly in the minds and hearts of men. The tumult and the excitement, the anger and the violence, the perplexity of spirit and the ambiguities of expressing are the pangs of he birth of something new. We of this generation are called upon to work for this new order with all the strength and capacity for suffering we possess.

S. Radhakrishnan[1]

______________

Introduction

Thirty years after the advent of the revolution, that brought an Islamic regime in Iran, religious leaders are still looking for ways and means to transform the society into a rigid bloc of faithful and zealous citizens who fully submit to the official principles and precepts put forward by them. While during the past three decades every effort has been made to disseminate religious teachings at all levels of public education, from the kindergartens to the universities, seemingly the result has been frustrating.

The post-presidential elections public turmoil, that brought the country to the brink of a real social revolution, was another vivid indication that the whole scheme of “Islamization” of the society was an ineffective and futile social investment. Since, the effort merely counter-produced and youngsters who were brought up with Islamic rigorous teachings after the revolution simply did not show interest to them and much less to obey them blindfolded. Indeed, this phenomenon should not surprise anybody who has a little familiarity with the very rudimentary concepts of the philosophy of education and social sciences.

Misconception about Social Sciences

With a view to cure this incongruity, the Islamic system recently came to the conclusion that the problem emanate from the dominance of the Western “social sciences” books and materials taught by Western educated and/or oriented teachers and professors in the higher education structure. To that end, a new round of purge has been initiated at different levels of educational institutions and expert committees are being set up once again to remedy the problem once for all!

How far this conclusion about Western “social science” is logical? Can the Islamic regime succeed in its new effort to eradicate the roots of restlessness among students and educated people against the system by simply changing the contents of textbooks? Where should we look for proper answer to the problem?

Problem of Religion and Politics[2]

From the beginning of human history, man has been guided by two strands inextricably woven in his very nature, the rational and the spiritual. These forces have influenced human destiny in varied patterns and in different periods when one or the other may have been more prominent.[3] Religion has been the great force for the disciplining of man’s nature, though it has also worked against his fate by denying the domain of reason.[4]

Religion has to do with human mind, ideas, the belief system, values, attitudes and behavior. Politics as an interdisciplinary branch of social sciences, deals essentially with the pursuit of power through “the art of influencing, manipulating, or controlling [groups] so as to advance the purposes of some against the opposition of others”[5] The struggle over conflicting ideas, values and interests directed by religious beliefs have existed throughout history. Great religions such as Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and last but not least Islam have at one time or other claimed to have answers for all problems of the society. But, history bears good witness that almost in all cases, religion married to temporal power, became imbued with a formalism which deprived it of its moral and spiritual values.[6]

Some religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism have sought to base their beliefs on tangible elements and hold that the two sides of human nature, the rational and the spiritual, should work together.[7] Western religions have been long engaged in the struggle to come to term with the spirit of reason.[8] In later periods, scientific developments overshadowed faith in traditional beliefs. The process led to the intellectual questioning of the metaphysical view of the world and the revival of animistic science in the period of Renaissance.

Since the Renaissance two divergent lines of thought have prevailed in the philosophical perspective. One deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, and the other, that belonged to cultures which escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking retained the view that the real world is completely internal to the observer.[9]

Where to put the blame?

When Socrates was executed for religious heresy, it was not merely an act of religious fanaticism, such as later became common, but rather a serious response of society to subversion. The early Christianity was attacked by the Roman government not only out of religious exclusivism in modern sense but because it was seen as revolutionary and subversive, a threat to the organization of society. The Christians incurred the supposed guilt of an unnatural and unpardonable offense. They dissolved the sacred ties of custom and education and violated the religious institution of their realm.[10]

Once it was believed that only religious and metaphysical limitations could restrain rulers and power-holders from committing acts of violence and suppression. This may still prove a valid argument, only if we can make a definite distinction between religious ideology and the actual process of politics. But when the frontiers between the two realms fades away and one identifies its very existence with the other, then, the moral and metaphysical constrains to power-holders become irrelevant. In such circumstances, religion fails to its duty. With the alienation of power-blinded men from moral restraints, aggressive behavior and suicidal tendencies occur.[11]

In today’s world, where hope and peril run side by side, among great and vital issues of our time are those which involved the suppression of the evil which drive societies toward wars, hostilities and terrorism. How then the whirlwind of revolutionary social forces can be directed towards a safe and constructive path?

Considering the fact that constitutional foundation of world order and international law have proven inefficacious for the maintenance of peace and assurance of democratic process, the problems remain to be tackled with in future are the minimum moral and spiritual requirements in order to preserve peace, security and human dignity in a tormented world.

In the absence of a superior authority over and above nation-states, claiming sovereignty and political independence, power with legitimacy is the necessary instrument of governments. Without these latter, political order could neither be established nor maintained and guard society against anarchy. Power without legitimacy spawns tyranny and violence, corrupts the mighty and crushes freedom.[12]

In a general sense, individual quest for power has the effect of leading a ruler to act against the will of the people.[13] But when religion becomes politicized and gets involved in the competition for power, it has the effect of encouraging its followers to act against the accepted norms of civilized nations. As a result, domestic power struggles spill over into the international system. The immediate implication of such behavior is to impose its will and ideology on another state(s).

Religion can help people to establish harmony in their souls, to illuminate human spirit, and to liberate nations from despotism and tyranny. But surely it cannot supplant politics, in the sense it is understood in our contemporary world system, dominated by sovereign nation- states, national interests and competition for power. Religion, says Radhakrishnan, “is the direct apprehension of the Supreme. It is in the attaining of a state of illumination. While the reality is omnipresent, human being is able to apprehend it directly in his own inmost being.”[14] When statesmen attempt to measure -or make semblance to do- political events and social phenomena of the real world by religious standards, they are merely submerged in their illusion.

Future of Religions

Religious belief and faith of any kind have always posed dilemma for humanity. Like a two-edged sword, religion has been hard for men to live without, and almost equally hard to coexist with. Just the same, when man is passionately submerged in his religious obsessions, he is tempted to preach it to others. If they prove deaf to his preaching, he is often tempted to impose it by fire and sword. [15]

Religious wars of the past are now over, but the legacy of intolerance, persecution and slaughtering of man by man on ideological and religious grounds is still with mankind. Religion has become scapegoat for obstipated “old leaders clinging too long to power in a world they no longer understand,”[16] and for power hungry younger generation deeply indoctrinated in myths and delusions. The world no longer represents the long cherished compassionate and fraternal ideals of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc.

Encountering realities of this tormented world is a difficult task of the new leaders of our time who are not trained to overcome the lust of power. Religion has the potential ability to free politicians from the evil forces that enslave their spirit. But politics cannot help an obstinate religious to straighten his conduct or to regain his purity. No institutional or legal patterns, no revolutionary theologies, and no chastisement of the other world can make a society to become a safe place to live, unless the people set out to rid of spiritual poverty. In this respect, it is rightly argued that “the quality of our life is the evidence of our religion.” [17] Indeed, religion in this context is not incompatible with politics, neither is it in competition with it in the pursuit of secular power, but it is its mentor.

Religions will lose their redemptive power, if societies are not prepared to accept their human and spiritual principles. People need not to adore saints and their illusions; they have to seek redemption through faith and reason which lead to the path of salvation.

Conclusions

From the dawn of human history to our present time, prophets, philosophers, thinkers, academics and social scientists, disregard of their beliefs and native origins, have helped men to understand their social environment and to overcome the evil of tyranny and despotism in their communities. They should be respected and be given credits for their achievements. Western social and political sciences are not in dissonance with the essence of religions and spiritual needs of human beings. On the contrary, they teach us how to comprehend and deal with evil propensity of political leaders who use religious principles to promote their power and greed despite the will of the people. /

__________

Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Notes

[1] Religion in a Changing World, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1967) p. 15.

[2] Parts of this article are readapted here from my earlier writings in : Ali Asghar Kazemi, Religion and Politics …, Monograph , Tehran, 1985.

[3]. CF. S. Radhakrishnan, Religion in a Changing World (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1967), p. 18.

[4]. Ibid. p.9.

[5] Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations, ( New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1965), p.130

[6]. CF. Jacques Pirenne, Tides of History, op. cit. p. 407.

[7]. Ibid. p. 34.

[8]. Ibid. p. 35.

[9]. Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Inc. 1974), p.48.

[10]. CF. Edward Gibbon, the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, I, (New York: Modern Library), p. 448.

[11]. CF. R. Strausz- Hupe and Stefan T. Possony, International Religions (New York, 1954) p. 11. Quoted in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and James E. Dougherty, Contending Theories of International Relations ( New York : J. b. Lippincott Co. , 1971 ) p. 91..

[12]. Robert Strausz-Huoe, Power and Community (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p.3.

[13]. This is for example the case of Iran in the pre-revolution period as well as during the past years when the essence of religion gradually changed in the pursuit of political power.

[14]. Religion in a Changing World, op. cit. p. 102.

[15].CF. Charles Yost, The Insecurity of Nations- International Relations of the Twentieth Century, op. cit., p. 212.

[16]. Idem.

[17]. Ibid. p. 110.

Rise of “New Nationalism” in Iran

2009-10-11T23:16:00.001-07:00

Rise of “New Nationalism” in Iran

Ali Asghar Kazemi

October 2009

_______________

The “Green Movement” that emerged in the midst of presidential campaign 2009 in Iran, gained momentum after the unconvinced defeat of reformist candidates and became a genuine and strong opposition front challenging the very foundation of the Islamic regime. The more the hardliners pressed upon the movement with the intention to wipe out once for all its driving force, the more it tended towards radical nationalistic slogans and acquired anti-regime propensity.

While the Islamic government does not mind the resurgence of the people’s nationalistic fervor upon which it could embark in case its survival is threatened by foreign threats, nonetheless, it seems determined to confront with all force the growing danger of the “Green Movement” to its internal security. Recent horrific clashes with masses protesting in the streets in the post-elections manifestations are vivid indication that the hard-liners would not allow the demonstrations for reform turn into a real revolution.

How far the Islamic regime is capable to contain the movement or benefit from the revival Iranian nationalism without being victim itself of this reawakening phenomenon?

________

Political scientists agree that high level of political participation in a developing societies where the governments lags behind people expectations for higher level of institutionalization of democratic values, accountability and truthfulness, lead to social frustration and political instability. Samuel Huntington calls this phenomenon praetorianism, or the growth of political decay which paves the way for increasing repression, societal closure and growing military involvement in politics. In other words, social mobilization in an authoritarian environment with low economic productivity and efficiency leads to social frustration. This process increases the level of participation and in the final stage it ends up to political instability. In such circumstances, increasing demands for stability and order in a society gives justification for men of arms to step in by using coercive power for the containment of the crisis. Maintaining a coercive system in power requires large scale military and secret police establishment which in turn create economic burden and hardship for people; leading to social unrest and instability and the process continues in escalating cycles.

The foremost dilemma for the community in crisis situations is to avoid its own disintegration by maintaining social unity and solidarity outside the purview of official institutions. For this purpose, the society is guided to organize around a motto, symbol or emblems that give it a new identity to cope with the oppressive forces. Growing discontent with the incumbent regime, which seeks to promote and enforce its own ideology despite the will of citizens, will instigate the nonconformists to go their own way and look for alternative ways to counter the official values. Thus, the emergence of “Green Movement” with nationalistic overtone in the post-election Iran can be characterized as a growing force in quarrel with the regime.

Historically, the Persian nationalism has been expressed and articulated through the adoption of the Shiite doctrine that fundamentally distinguishes Iranian Moslems from the other creeds in the broad spectrum of the religion of Islam. It has served as a strong unifying force against Persian enemies and rivals in the past centuries. But, with the ascendance into power of the clergies after the 1979 revolution in Iran, the political thrust of the religion gradually diminished and people became dismayed of the poor performance of politico-religious institutions.

Upon several unsuccessful democratic attempts to perform necessary changes in the system by reformist Moslems in order to make it more responsive to the needs of the modern society, the last presidential elections of June 12, 2009 brought to an end the efforts by a series of repressive actions which led the post-elections crisis. After that, the green color which was merely the identity sign for one candidate (Mir Hossein Moussavi) became the emblem of a movement which is now standing as a challenging opposition front with new goals confronting the incumbent regime.

The truth of the matter is that the new nationalistic movement in Iran stems from a different environment that is dissimilar from the past. Since: 1) it is primarily a reaction against an ideology that has become unbearable for many even among religious figures; 2) it is an antithesis of a political system that came into power in a very particular point of time and circumstances that is no longer responsive to the actual expectations of the people; 3) it is a self-propelled movement with no official platform and has no particular leadership inside or outside Iran; 4) it is a “positive nationalism,” meaning that it is not against the current trend of the international society but it strongly objects the existing domestic divergence from that trend and wants to rehabilitate the true Iranian identity and status in the present world; 5) it is omnipresent and it uses all old patriotic and revolutionary slogans of the past as a tactical challenge against the ruling system; 6) It is a secular, forward-looking and peace-loving movement that denies all sorts of segregation, subjugation, arms races and interventions in the internal affairs of other countries and wants to live in peace with all people and nations.

While the new movement is against foreign interventions of all kinds and sanctions that are aimed at the well-being of ordinary people, it has been accused by the regime for collaborating with the enemies of Islam and Iran in order to discredit its efforts. It is also against all government policies that entail such actions against the nation. Supporters of the movement have already paid a dire price for their endeavor and seem to be prepared to keep on their lawful and democratic attempts for changes. Most enlightened people, academics, intellectuals as well as average citizens of all walks seem to support their cause.

The “new nationalism,” manifested in the form of “Green Movement,” can become a constructive democratic force in Iran if properly managed by their leaders and followers. They should be given the opportunity to exercise their lawful citizen rights in expressing themselves towards a democratic, united, developed, peaceful, and prestigious Iran. /

__________

Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Strategic Implications of Nobel Peace Prize for Obama

2009-10-09T23:36:00.001-07:00

Strategic Implications of Nobel Peace Prize for Obama

A. A. Kazemi

October 10, 2009

_______

Whatever the true intention and justification behind the decision of the Committee of Nobel Peace Prize to give this prestigious award to Barack Obama, the event should be optimistically taken as a heavenly grace for peace and order in the Middle East in general and Iran in Particular. Though previous politician winners of the prize failed to achieve much in this respect, there is hope that at this critical point of time, when Iran is under increasing pressure and military threats from outside, President Obama would feel very reluctant to opt for a harsh and hostile strategy against the Islamic regime for its nuclear ambitions.

The mere fact that the Nobel Peace prize is awarded to a powerful figure like the incumbent president of the United States, would prevent him, from a psychological point of view, to keep extreme policy options, such as use of hard power on the table against Iran. This would also mean that he might not endorse any preemptive strike against strategic targets inside Iran by Israel, should diplomatic negotiations fail to achieve constructive results. This is of course a very important achievement of the award.

Therefore, it is safe to suggest that the Islamic regime should be happy about the event and ought to seize the opportunity not to aggravate the situation by broadcasting negative analyses about the decision of the Committee of Peace Prize in the state radio and television. It should either keep silent or praise the event and embark on the occasion by putting full effort on the diplomatic endeavor underway with the 5+1 powers.

This will further encourage the American President to support peaceful means for the settlement of the nuclear issue with Islamic regime and abstain from endorsing any harsh measure that could put at risk Iran’s national interests and security in the region./

_________

Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Struggling onTwo Fronts for Survival

2009-10-02T23:32:00.001-07:00

Struggling on Two Fronts for Survival

A. A. Kazemi
October 2, 2009
___________

Iranian hard-line conservatives are caught in an appalling stalemate in the post-election period. On the one hand, they are facing growing opposition at home in the wake of the unconvinced presidential elections that truly polarized the nation on the credibility and legitimacy of the new government. On the other hand, they are under increasing international pressure for their deceiving maneuvers on the question of nuclear activities. Recent revelations about new enrichment site came as an unambiguous indication that despite its recurrent negation, the Islamic regime is aimed at acceding to a nuclear power status.

Since the mass uprising of 1979 that ended up into the collapse of the monarchic regime, the events which followed the presidential elections of June 12, 2009 will be remembered as a new keystone in contemporary history of Iran. Threatened from abroad for its nuclear ambitions and vulnerable inside for its horrendous performance, the Islamic regime is helplessly fighting in two fronts for its survival.

How far the Islamic hard-liners are capable to carry on successfully the fight in two decisive battlegrounds? What are the plausible outcomes of this concurrent struggle in domestic and international fronts?

_____

Two days after the announcement of the results of presidential elections in Iran, people were still dizzy of the shock they received by the unexpected outcome. Street riots in big cities by disappointed public refreshed memories of the heated days of the 1979 revolution which uprooted the monarchic regime in Iran. Protesters with green emblems, symbol of reformist presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, rushed to the streets to claim their votes, allegedly stolen by the regime in favor of the controversial hard-line incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Reformists’ peaceful demonstrations turned out to bloody protest rally that took an unknown number killed, hundreds injured and according to officials about 4000 arrested around the country.

The Islamic government tried to manage the crisis which escalated by hours due to the alleged manipulation of ballot boxes. Despite earnest attempt of the government to justify the results of the elections through faked data, people and observers did not believe the statistics and firmly maintained that the regime has cheated and deceived the nation by manipulating their votes in favor of Ahmadinejad. The reformist candidates requested the abrogation of the results and renewal of the elections.

The Post-election crisis consequences in Iran unveiled the persistent appalling repression of the Islamic conservatives against opposition groups who accused the regime for fraud and manipulation of votes in favor of the incumbent president. The newly re-reappointed president, Ahmadinejad, took the oath of office in a tense atmosphere of security and strict precautions while protesters were demonstrating and shouting against him outside the parliament. Abroad, exiled Iranians throughout the world took to the streets in support of their compatriots and shouted the same slogans against the religious regime in Iran.

For the first time in thirty years, since the birth of the Islamic regime, the whole world witnessed with bafflement and disgust what truly was going on in Iran and the amount of support claimed by the regime. The international media coverage of the unfortunate events pressed foreign governments to take position in condemning the Islamic leaders for their brutal reaction against peaceful public manifestation. People around the world too expressed deep sympathy with popular uprising in Iran.

About four months after the turmoil, the crisis has now receded at least on the surface, but it is not sure that it has ended for good. At this very critical moment, Western powers (5+1) who had given severe notice to the Islamic regime for its alleged doubtful nuclear activities became outraged of a new secret nuclear site near the religious city of Qom (Fardou). American President Obama, along with French President Sarkosy and British Prime Minister Gordon, Brown accused the Islamic leaders for their deceiving behavior and warned the regime against the undesired consequences of its defiance. Meanwhile, Israel, anxious for its security, publicized much about its plans for preemptive strikes against strategic targets including nuclear sites inside Iran.

The Islamic leaders caught in a delicate condition at a very inopportune moment, took a series of actions in order to contain the escalating situation:

· With respect to the revelation of the new nuclear site, they prepared and sent a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the establishment of the new nuclear enrichment location, planned to go into operation next year. This has been done a week before the Geneva Talk 2 of the 5+1 and the Iranian delegation and after the disclosure of the so-called “clandestine project” by the American intelligence.

· Ahmadinejad decided once again to attend the UN General Assembly session; which turned out to be a complete failure, while his pompous speech did not attract any attention. Meanwhile, widespread demonstrations against his presence in New York created nightmare for him and his entourage.

· The Islamic Parliament adopted a quasi-unanimous resolution in support of Iran’s nuclear endeavor as a warning to the 5+1 second round of talks scheduled for October 1^st. 2009 in Geneva, Switzerland.

· With a view to deter “opponents” and “ill-wishers” and to overshadow the effect of the nuclear concealment, the Islamic regime has set up a new military exercise in which a number of medium range missiles were tested. This was perhaps to persuade the Americans that in case of Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, the Persian Gulf waterways and littoral states would be at risk of retaliatory attacks.

· With respect to domestic affairs, the regime decided to release a number of reformist leaders and journalists from the jail and terminate the arbitrary arrests and humiliating trial of the so-called “green movement” protestors. It also promised to prosecute officials who had ordered and performed atrocious deeds against dissidents.

· On the level of the supreme leadership, the Assembly of Experts endorsed the incumbent leader once again and invited the whole nation for unity and solidarity.

Despite all these precautionary measures, while the Islamic regime ardently needs the support of the nation to carry out its aggressive diplomacy in nuclear talks with the 5+1, new turmoil in campuses around the country will eventually ignite anew popular unrests. Thus far, the commencement of the new academic year and dispersed ceremonies here and there has given the students fresh opportunity to resume their protests against the president and his government. It appears that hard-liners are now caught in a terrible dilemma as how to tackle simultaneously with two crucial fronts endangering their very survival.

In the domestic front, they are like riding on a tiger; they can’t continue on and are afraid to get off. It seems that the use of violence against angry demonstrators can no longer deter “Green Movement” supporters to relinquish their cause. Repressive measures to curb the popular unrest by the government will further diminish the legitimacy of the regime and provoke dissidents to widen their demands.

On the international level, the Islamic regime is now considered as an unreliable party in the upcoming negotiations. Since, it has virtually lost the confidence of all 5+1 powers, including Russia and China, after the surprising revelation about the new nuclear enrichment site. Western powers seem now prepared to go for “paralyzing sanctions” against Iran, should the Islamic regime continue to defy UN Security Council demands on the nuclear issue. In a worst case scenario, Israel might be tempted to launch preemptive strikes against strategic targets inside Iran before “risking its total annihilation.” This could of course escalate hostilities throughout the Middle East and the larger world. Therefore, containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions has become a vital objective on the agenda of the world powers.

Let’s hope that decision-makers in Tehran come to their sense and opt for peaceful settlement of the ongoing dispute before things get out of control. We shall wait and see how the case will develop in the coming days and weeks. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Iran’s National Security and the Nuclear Gamble

2009-09-27T07:13:00.001-07:00

Iran’s National Security and the Nuclear Gamble

A. A. Kazemi

September 27, 2009

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Recent revelations by US president Obama about Iran’s new secret nuclear site in the vicinity of the religious city of Qom came as a new shock to the already soured relations of the Islamic regime with the West. The timing of this disclosure was quite cleverly calculated by Washington. This came while the United Nations General Assembly was in its regular yearly session and the newly reappointed Iranian president Ahmadinejad was visiting the United States, leaving behind the post-election crisis at home.

How far the new divulgation is susceptible to cause structural trouble for the Islamic Republic, which is now in its deepest political hurdle at home and lowest credibility at the international level? Can Iran continue to gamble on its nuclear undertaking and defy the upcoming fourth resolution on the agenda of the 5+1 powers for the UN Security Council?

The surprise revelations about Iran’s new secret nuclear establishment could be construed as another vibrant indication as to why the Islamic Republic consumed so much of its political credibility and legitimacy in order to keep an odd figure like Ahmadinejad in office. Perhaps, in the eyes of the Islamic leaders, only he and not any other personality from the opposition camp (reformists) could continue to handle such a bizarre messy business!

There is no doubt that Iran is now caught in a thorny trap laid meticulously by the new American democrat president. I had predicted the matter not long ago on Feb. 3, 2009 in an article titled “US Democrats are Pushing Iran to the Corner.” According to the Americans, they had knowledge about the new secret site during the presidential campaign and eventually Mr. Obama had a good grip of the intelligence before assuming the office. Thus, we can presume that when he extended his hands towards Iran for diplomatic negotiations, he knew an awful lot about what was going on behind the scene. There is even possibility that the Americans have yet much wider knowledge about other eventual secret undertakings and dealings of the Islamic regime, but they don’t intend to disclose them for the time being.

As I stated in my previous comments, Americans have set a broad range of policy alternatives to tackle with Iran as a whole, including nuclear activities. To that end, they are believed to be ready to use all available leverages comprising the use of hard power. The expected outcome would eventually make the situation much tougher for Iran’s defying stance pushing it to the corner in a manner to commit itself to some sort of bitter concessions on various pending issues including the nuclear project.

It is adequate to review here my earlier guess about the new American approach which could be shaped around the following facts and criteria:

· Any viable solution to the Middle East problems including Israeli-Palestinian issue as well as Iraq and Afghanistan depend on settling Iran-US perennial quarrel;

· The Islamic regime’s ties with radical movements in the Middle East and its defiance to this date to comply with the UN Security Council demands with respect to the nuclear enrichment issue are serious barriers to the settlement of all other issues in the region;

· The United States alone cannot force Iran to adopt a cooperative stance merely by using hard power, especially after the awful quagmire created by the US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq;

· Iranian leaders are more vulnerable to soft power effects such as diplomatic pressure and sanctions than military engagement, since this latter would consolidate all people behind the regime against the invader;

· Gradual pressure through legitimate instruments may push the regime to the corner in such a way that it would finally surrender to the will of the international community.

Apparently, American partners and allies like UK, Germany, France and Israel had been informed about the new Iran’s secret nuclear project and the US president has informed Russian president of the fact in his recent meeting with him in New York. Now Russia and China, whose tactical support of Iran so far instigated this country to continue to defy UN Security Council resolutions, are in a rather grim situation. They can no longer continue to prop up Iran’s intransigence on the nuclear issue.

Iranian authorities claim that they have complied with the IAEA regulations by announcing the matter to the Agency prior to the operational use of the site. Yet, the emerging situation could give a good basis of justification to the United States to take advantage of the new revelations for reaching a solid consensus in the UN Security Council in adopting harsh sanctions against Iran. Though the Islamic leaders maintain that they don’t fear UN sanctions, there is no doubt that the country is susceptible to suffer severely in the wake of post-election social turbulence and declining position of hard-liners in the country.

The West has given Iran another chance “to come clean” on the matter until this coming December. Therefore, time is running out for the Islamic regime and its future course of actions has severely diminished to a few: either to go along with the 5+1 demands and avoid serious sanctions ahead; or insist on its previous stance and run the risks of incurring “paralyzing sanctions” and/or a sudden preemptive strike on its strategic targets by Israel.

In all circumstance, given that the post-elections crises of confidence and legitimacy have not been wholly contained and resolved, the Islamic regime is at risk to encounter serious troubles at home susceptible to cause structural changes in the country. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Iran’s Post- Election Political Environment

2009-09-25T23:50:00.001-07:00

Iran’s Post- Election Political Environment

A. A. Kazemi

September 25, 2009

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« Il y’ a beaucoup de choses que ne valent pas la peine d’être dites, et il y’a beaucoup de gens qui ne valent pas que les autres choses leur soient dites, cela fait beaucoup de silence ! »

« There are many things that are not worthy to be said and there are many people whom are not worthy that the other things be said to them, this makes a lot of silence!”

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Silence is Gold

Indeed, “silence is gold” at a time when public uprising swabs intellectual discourse. The last time I published an article was exactly on June 13, 2009, just the day after the presidential elections in Iran. The comment was a short review on the amazing result of the election and its plausible consequence for the country afterward. The title of the article bears good witness that we had to expect something unusual after the announcement of the results: “ Iran’s Elections 2009: The End of Hope for Peaceful Democratic Reforms.” I don’t intend here to imply that I had foreseen the social commotion that followed the election, but it is fair to say that there was some truth in the conclusions of the comment about the astonishing results which could spark the long-accumulated revulsion about political repression in Iran.

During the past months, I went into a “voluntary silence” for which I praise myself. There are many reasons for that: First, I had no reliable information about what truly happened during the elections and whether there was a material and substantive breach of law or fraud in the process; Second, thanks to the internet and international media, the whole world witnessed with bafflement and disgust the events after the election in Iran and there was no need to analyze or repeat the uncertain account of the facts in the heat of their unexpected development; and Finally, fear of being accused of a one-sided partisanship of the so-called “Green Movement,” that emerged in a dubious circumstances on the political landscape of Iran, pressed me to keep quiet for a while until the clouds of uncertainty pass away .

Walking in the Dark

When one has no coherent and reliable information about a developing situation, intelligent analysis is difficult and there is always the risk of falling in the trap of faked data, propaganda and disinformation. This whole state of affairs pushed me to abstain from “walking in the dark” by repeating the story of either rival parties (conservative hard-liners or reformists” or lamenting on the abhorring situation that our society and our people went through during the period of social turmoil and political crisis after the presidential election.

Now that things are apparently quieter and the crisis has been contained at least on the surface, the time is opportune to ponder upon the ramifications of the post-election events. Therefore, I intend to resume my occasional comments on the critical national and international issues related to our country.

A note of appreciation

During the past months, many friends, colleagues and students have expressed concern and inquietude regarding my situation and whereabouts, for which I am grateful. The post-election social uprising in Iran coincided with the summer vacation which was indeed a heavenly gift for me. I took the opportunity to retreat from the unpredictable social environment of Tehran to my homestead out of town with no internet and other means of communications, such as cell phone. Upon my return, I realized the amount of mails and messages which I missed during my absence.

New Academic Year and Fresh Expectations

My voluntary solitude away from overly heated political atmosphere in the capital provided me with the chance to go back to the nature and reflect upon things that never come to mind in normal conditions. Now that the new academic year has started, although there are still many question marks about what really happened during the presidential election in Iran and the unfortunate events aftermath, I hope to be able to share these solitary reflections with friends in my future commentaries and articles. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Iran’s Elections 2009...

2009-06-12T21:09:00.001-07:00

Iran’s Elections 2009

The End of Hope for peaceful Democratic Reforms

Ali Asghar Kazemi

June 13, 2009

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Presidential elections of June 12, 2009 in Iran shall be remembered as the end of an era of democratic process toward political reform in a religious-revolutionary regime in Iran. For the first time in recent history, Iranians felt they are changing the course of events through peaceful means using their citizen’s rights. But, when the results were announced, they have been shocked and disheartened by the results. Despite all encouraging polls and optimistic anticipations in favor of reformist Mousavi, the incumbent hard-line president was declared victor!
What happened during the campaign for presidential elections in Iran which distinct it from the previous ones? What are the implications of this new trend for political development and democratic process in Iran? Who are the real winners and losers of this historic contest?
*
Perhaps the emergence of an odd personality such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran’s political landscape paved the way for rising demand for truthfulness, honesty and accountability. As I stated elsewhere, Ahmadinejad was the product of a period of eight years of controversies between two conflicting views: that expressed by a moderate soft-spoken clergy, Mr. Khatami, who was considered as “reformist” by Western political standards; and the opposite represented by the conservative religious-revolutionary groups, who pretended to be the legitimate guardian of the Islamic regime.
As we remember, Ahmadinejad came into power after a period of crises-ridden challenge for moderation and proliferation of civil liberty in which people tasted the flavor of freedom and began a gradual march towards a modern civil society in Iran. This however, did not please the conservative traditional layers of the country and the religious system, feeling much vulnerable, was alarmed to the point that the previous open-minded president, Khatami, was coined as the “Gorbachev of Iran” risking the survival of the regime.
During his two terms in office, president Khatami failed to accomplish his promised goals due to obstacles on his way created by his opponents in the legislative body and judiciary. Feeling deceived, young and enthusiastic people who had voted for Khatami turned back to him and thus reformist movement and supporters gradually disintegrated and vanished from political scene, leaving the ground to hard-line conservatives with new attractive promises.
Almost four years after the conservative grip of absolute power, with a nation at the brink of social and economic crises, the reformists embarked for a new comeback. Upon several months of speculations, finally the former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, backed by former president Khatami, decided to run for president with the slogan of saving the country from total collapse and insolvency. Allegedly, he had the implicit support of another powerful figure, Hashemi Rafsanjani, former speaker of the parliament, a two-term president, and incumbent chairman of the Expediency Council and head of Assembly of Experts.
With a view to overcome the bad memory of the previous presidential elections, which ended up in favor of the hard-line conservative front, purportedly through dubious circumstances and manipulations of ballot boxes, and to deal with the rumors of fraud, the Islamic regime decided to allow candidates to use the state-run Radio and Television( Seda va Sima) for their publicity. This included a time-table allocated for live debates between different contenders. This was organized mainly as a sign of free democratic process and in order to attract the most possible participation in presidential elections.
The competition was essentially among four key personalities coming from the inner circle of the Islamic regime. They were: the incumbent president, Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezaie (secretary of the Expediency Council) from the conservative wing on the one side and former speaker of the parliament, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi known as “reformists” on the other. However, when they started their debates, the differences in their positions and programs turned out to be real. Apparently, the heated debates between the president and the other three contenders on various issues, especially in the fields of economy and foreign policy, was quite decisive for those people who had not yet made their mind about candidates.
For the first time in the current history of Iran, the Islamic regime decided to tolerate such democratic exercise whose outcome was not quite known to many. The debate between the incumbent president and the former Prime Minister Mousavi ended up by rival defamation and war of words and serious accusations which put the credibility of the whole system and its major personalities into serious doubts. People watched the show with enthusiasm and bafflement and took to the street afterward chanting slogans against rival candidates.
While such debates are even rare in democratic countries, naturally in Iran, without much experience in this area, the face to face challenge went beyond rule of ethics and good conduct and in some instances encroached upon constitutional requisites. Critiques and accusations raised in the debates echoed those nourished by opposition groups during the past several years.
Upon the conclusion of several rounds of debates among and interviews of presidential contestant, polls have tilted adversely against the incumbent president. People, especially from among educated and middle class layers felt betrayed and manipulated by Ahmadinejad. Many expressed the opinion that he was neither a genuine academic, as he wished to be identified, nor a religious-revolutionary, as pretended, or even not a “petty dictator” as labeled by the Columbia University president; he was simply a pompous liar, a miserable hypocrite and an arrogant individual with megalomaniac character who could endanger the security of the country and the well-being of the people by his eccentric behavior and odd policies.
In effect, Ahmadinejad proved to be a master manipulator of populace who managed to stay in office by rhetoric, pretensions and fabrication of false statistics about inflation, unemployment and many other major economic indexes. Iranians and the country as a whole have suffered very much during his tenure in office.
When finally the results of the votes came out in early morning of June 13, surprisingly, Ahmadinejad came out as victor with a landslide difference with other contenders. Only God knows what happened to the ballot boxes and the smart people of Iran in casting their votes in the memorable elections day!
While reformists are baffled about the results of the elections, there is little hope that they could recover from the decisive defeat in the foreseeable future. In all circumstances, there was little chance for Moussavi, even if elected, to perform better than Khatami on essential issues, due to structural limitations and deficiencies of the Islamic regime. The defeat of reformists should be regarded as the end of hope for enthusiastic Iranians around the world who believed they can change the situation in Iran through peaceful democratic process.
Despite the ill-fated result of this contest for the reformists, there is no doubt that this event will boost people expectations and their demands for more transparency and accountability in future. Indeed the Islamic regime will need some time to recover from the shock of these unexpected revelations to its credibility and legitimacy.
On the other side, this paradoxical outcome will undoubtedly pave the path to further repression, poverty, insecurity and a host of other socio-political crises in Iran. From now on Iranians should be prepared for a harsher condition and a darker horizon unless some kind of miracle happens.
Iranians have been once again deceived in their earnest attempt towards shaping their destiny for a brighter future. Whatever the explanation for this strange occurrence and its plausible ramifications for Iran’s political development, the outcome of the elections can be construed as the demise of truth and reason and the triumph of deception, superstition, fanaticism and blind adventurism. /
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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. See: www.stradis.blogspot.com
* Students, researchers, academic institutions, media or any party interested in using all or parts of this article are welcomed to do so with the condition of giving full attribution to the author and Strategic Discourse. All Copy Rights reserved.

Who should be the Next President in Iran

2009-05-19T21:48:00.001-07:00

Who should be the Next President in Iran?

Ali Asghar Kazemi

May 20, 2009

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Almost three weeks away from the presidential elections in Iran, I have been asked by my students to give them some hints and advices regarding the most suitable candidate in the race. While I have my own personal views and preferences about the potential contenders, I feel very much reluctant to take side in public forum in favor of any of them at this particular point of time. Since, I believe, my duty as an academic is to shed light on the common traits of the would-be president in the present political and international environment of our country, rather than to speak in favor of any particular candidate.

In my previous comments regarding the presidential elections, I have listed a number of reasons for which people of various layers of the society may fell indifferent to participate in the process. Those considerations could still be valid as long as candidates do not explicitly clarify their positions with respect of a number of critical issues entailing the country and their concrete measures and policies to cure them. These issues encompass all sectors of the society including, social, economic, political, strategic, legal, environmental etc.

Of course, as I mentioned before, the president is not powerful enough to bring all the changes we might envisage. But, the least that he can achieve is to demonstrate his determination for change and to assure people of his resolve to cope with many socio-political malaises which inhibit the overall trend of the country towards democracy, human rights, justice and equity.

Here are some main points in my humble view to be considered in our choice of the next president for Iran:

1) Before anything, the president should be a person who is mentally sound and without prejudice of any kind. Since, once elected, he will be the president of all people disregard of their beliefs, religious preference, political tendency, economic status or social standing. As the symbol of national identity, he should represent the whole and not a fraction of nation in international scene. He should realize that from the minute he becomes president his words, behavior, attitude, manners and the overall world views become under scrutiny inside and outside the country.

2) Our country has a long history of tyranny, authoritarian rules and repression. The president should exercise to keep away from those historical syndromes by being restraint, tolerant, broadminded and forward thinking. He should avoid the temptation of using malicious instruments at hand for revenging his political opponents. These require that he should be accountable and be open to critique even if it comes from the opposition groups.

3) The president is not supposed to have full knowledge about all the sophistication and subtleties of economics, politics, military and legal matters, but, he must be intelligent and receptive enough to get the advices from the elites, intellectuals, academics, scholars and specialists in various fields. The president should be experienced and humble enough not to be mired by the power of the office or become overwhelmed and exalted by the authority bestowed to him by the nation.

4) Thus, he should avoid favoritism, discrimination and intolerance and in all instances he should think of our national interests, our prestige, history and stature of the country. He may be a fine, compassionate and generous person, but as a president, he is not allowed to give out the wealth of the country to dubious and questionable groups and movements outside the country; neither is he supposed to provide money to people for the sake of his own popularity.

5) The president should govern the country on the basis of wisdom, rationality and according to collective wills and interests. He is responsible for the security of our country, thus, he should avoid turning our potential friends into foes by taking unnecessary positions on critical issues. He should capture opportunities through appropriate policies and actions to neutralize threats; to turn our rivals into associates and to transform our enemies into friends.

The above characteristics are only few important traits of a typical president that we should look for in the next elections. Of course, it is extremely difficult to find all those features in one particular candidate, but, we have to elect the one who is relatively in a better position than the others to the best of our knowledge.

We should use our constituent power not to allow demagogues and obsessive personalities to unduly ascend to the office of the president in Iran. Because, our nation merits a much higher status in the present world order and our people deserves a much better condition of life than what we experienced during the past years. Despite all the encumbrances and shortcomings we have in our political institutions and legal system, there is little doubt that we can achieve our demands and objectives in the years to come, provided we use our collective power to change the situation before it is too late. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran- Iran. For detail see: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

The Logic of War against Taliban and Talibanism

2009-05-15T22:19:00.001-07:00

The Logic of War Against Taliban and Talibanism

Ali Asghar Kazemi

May 15, 2009

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Ever since September 11, 2009 events, Taliban and Talibanism have been chased and killed by masses, yet, they are still full of zeal and causing widespread troubles in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Recent Pakistani raids on their agglomerations on the initiative of the United States bring about a number of crucial problems about the rationality of Obama’s recent policy in this respect.

While I have no fond of these fanatical groups who fight with rudimentary means the most equipped and powerful forces representing the NATO, I have serious doubts about the logic of this protracted war and the humanitarian aspects involved therein.

In this short comment I venture to examine the flagrant flaws of American policy under Obama to open new fronts against Taliban in Pakistan with the objective of eradicating this movement, which supposedly is endangering the legitimate government of a nuclear power state.

Indeed September 11 attack was an awful experience and humiliation for the United States and changed many precepts in international relations including prevailing conceptions on war, terror, religion, radicalism etc. We shall not attempt here to trace the dubious account of the creation and support of Afghan Mujahedeen including Taliban- since, it is now well known that they were recruited and equipped while studying in Pakistani religious schools (Madrassa) during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980s. It is believed that Pakistan’s army intelligence is the godfather of Taliban. Surprisingly, the same forces are now tasked to carry on the new American strategy against Taliban in that country.

American invasion of Afghanistan to topple the self-invented Taliban, who had ousted Russians from their land, momentarily, satisfied Washington’s desire for revenging Al-Qaeda. But, the United States and its allies in the NATO failed to understand the nature of the threat and characteristics of their enemies. Taliban only represented a radical idea of traditional Islam and a culture that cannot be defeated by naked force.

The collapse of the Soviet empire and the decline of communism in the last decade of the 20^th century led to the resurgence of dormant ideologies imbedded with religions inspired rigid traditionalism, especially in the Middle East. The fact of the matter is that religious motivated movements have been so far able to free occupied territories and to fight against powerful countries for people liberation by using tactics which is labeled “terrorism” for simplicity. In such case the freedom fighters or liberation movements sought justification for their operations via the attainment of a legitimate cause. For example, the Algerian struggle for independence turned into terrorism, once the rebel armies were virtually beaten in the field by the French forces. It was only after recourse to such activities that French military might in Algeria came to its knees.

The Moslem Shiite Militia in South Lebanon pushed the Israelis out of their occupied land through harshest “terrorist” activities. Afghan Moslem Mujahedeen (Taliban), too fought a Superpower (USSR) through guerrilla warfare and “terrorist operations” in occupied Afghanistan. They caused the most trouble to Moscow, as did North Vietnamese to the United States.

Surprisingly, after so many years of fighting and subjugation, Taliban are now on the move anew against NATO forces in Afghanistan, considered as enemy and occupiers. Taliban have already demonstrated that they can achieve disproportionately large effects with a relatively small number and limited capacity for violence. More recently in Pakistan, they have caused widespread alarm, compelling governments with a clear preponderance of conventional military power to negotiate with them, to grant them concessions or simply to back down with humiliation.

Urban guerrilla warfare, low-level violence or mob actions directed by religious groups are dimensions of ideological conflicts and revolutionary theories which now manifest in form of domestic and international terrorism. Dissidents of tyrant leaders and dictatorial regimes find their voice heard and their cause achieved through what we call "terrorism" for sake of simplicity, but they consider it legitimate “jihad” or just struggle against the infidels and their enemies.

Religiously inspired terrors are understandably more ferocious and crueler than mere political violence’s or mob actions. When for example, martyrdom is considered as a grace and blessing of God, a Moslem extremist and dedicated believer can easily risk his life in a suicidal attack in order to do damage to his ideological opponents. The resurgence of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the Middle-East whose participants preach total devotion and submission to the will of God, and negation of earthly materialism, is indeed a crucial development of our time which is capable of destabilizing the international system and world order.

There is no doubt that Pakistan army is powerful enough to cause extensive damage to the so-called Taliban. But, one should understand that they are only fighting a concept; a tradition and culture which happen to be more visible in that country. The collateral damages of recent offensive are unfortunately very high and in breach of the accepted norms and 1949 Geneva Conventions and related 1977 additional protocols. The consequences of this policy will be very costly for the region and for the American as well. Since, those who are familiar with tribal character and strict Moslem traditions, realize that this fratricide will only deepen the hatred and enmity among people of this country and the West for generations.

Fighting Taliban with hard power, i.e. force of guns, artillery and fighter planes will surely not solve the problem; neither in Pakistan, Afghanistan or anywhere else. Americans and their allies should realize this bitter fact that they are fighting an idea and not a group of devoted people who could regenerate itself through time and more ferociously. They must search for avenues to cope with intolerance and fanaticism in this hostile region. They should find appropriate ways and means to neutralize that idea through education, cultural change and economic development. Otherwise, the world will experience much worse condition in the future. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran-Iran.

Iran: Elections and Political Apathy

2009-05-06T21:26:00.001-07:00

Iran: Elections and Political Apathy

Ali Asghar Kazemi

May 7, 2009

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Aristotle described man as “political animal” on the ground that human being is compelled to live in collectivities within the boundaries of a political system. But, people are by no means equally concerned with political life. In other words, some people are indifferent and others are more concerned with political matters. Among this latter group, only a few get deeply and passionately involved in pursuit of power.

In open societies with developed democratic institutions and popular governments, opportunities for political participation of citizens are available and people are encouraged to get actively involved in formulating their demands through parties and interest groups. On the contrary, in oligarchic societies, citizens tend to choose apathetic approach to political realm and become relatively inactive in deciding their socio-political fate.

Political apathy is usually regarded as a social malaise in developed societies. In countries where civil society is still lagging behind traditional and fatalistic customs, apathy is a way of life to avoid hazards of political stratum. In this case, it is merely a cure manifested as conscious decision to cope with authoritarianism, demagoguery and repression in societies where expressing political opinions and criticisms are considered beyond the realm of citizen rights.

Some writers trace this malaise within the attributes of political culture that are strengthened by the force of ideology and beliefs, and others prefer to put the blame on institutions and structures. Whatever the cause, political apathy in public or private spheres relates to some kind of indifference towards events entailing collective interests.

Iranians by nature are suspicious to politicians and political matters. This is mainly due to vicissitudes experienced in the Persians history. Iranians have learned that they should avoid standing on the way of the rulers as long as they hold power, since; they may become victim of a mischance and lose their heads. There is a dictum in Persian which says “Always avoid walking behind an ass and in front of the Sultan!” Of course the Sultan here represents the tyrant par excellence whose behavior is unpredictable.

True that Iranians were the first to launch a constitutional revolution in the Middle East almost a century ago. But, even then, they were guided by mere immature and sightless temptation than a conscious political calculation. As a result, few years later they were driven again into a new oligarchy not better than the old one. The 1979 revolution, which led to the emergence of a religious rule, failed to generate the necessary environment for the creation of a strong “civil society” needed for political development and related institutions. Foreign war, domestic crises, economic depression and other socio-political malaises are taken responsible for the deficiencies.

While political apathy is more or less common to all societies, its causes are different in developed and non-developed countries. In Iran, thirty years after the second revolution, people are still perplexed as how to behave and which way to go in the political life and whether they should get actively involved in the political stratum or just leave things to the fate and divine providence.

There are several fundamental reasons why various layers of society including intellectuals, academics and ordinary people might not get actively involved in the coming presidential elections in Iran. The following propositions may fit into one or more categories and layers of citizenry leading to political apathy:

· Some people believe that the president is not the key person to solve fundamental issues of the country;

· People don’t see much differences between candidates;

· People have not enough information about various candidates’ program;

· Some people think that they can’t elect their true candidate;

· Some people don’t think their participation is decisive in the elections;

· People don’t get the expected benefit from their involvement;

· People don’t have confidence on the integrity and reliability of the elections;

· Some people think that the outcome of the election will not change their condition;

· Some people believe whatever the outcome of the election their interests will be served;

· And finally some people are inherently indifferent to political matters.

Apart from numerous odd figures who usually register for fun, thus far, a number of serious candidates of the conservative and reformist groups have declared their intention to run for the office. They all claim to feel duty-bound to devote them-selves to the cause of the nation and Islam. They all pretend to fight corruption, to promote justice and well-being, to improve economic structure and to cope with galloping inflation. They all declare to be obedient and true follower of the supreme religious leader. Yet, once in office, they merely think of their interests and survival.

As stated in my previous comments, while reformists seems to have better chances to win the upcoming presidential elections, due to the horrendous failures of the incumbent conservative government in domestic and international affairs , it is faire to suggest that neither the conservative nor the reformist candidates or any other person in that capacity is powerful enough to make substantive changes in the structure or religious-revolutionary nature of the Islamic regime. They both pursue the same goals with different styles. They can merely act within a limited boundary determined to them either by law or by the authority of the leader. The difference is purely that of approach reflecting individual character, social background and philosophical outlook.

We shall wait and see who will come out of the ballot boxes simply for satisfying our curiosity. But, we should not expect a drastic change in the course and substance of the Islamic regime’s policies entailing most critical issues of our time. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi holds PhD. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass, USA. He is former Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science and professor of Law and International Relations at the IAU, Science and Research Center in Tehran, Iran. For detail see: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Iran National Interests Victim of Blind Radicalism

2009-04-22T02:22:00.001-07:00

Iran National Interests Victim of Blind Radicalism

Ali Asghar Kazemi

April 21, 2009

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Almost two months before the presidential elections in Iran, on April 20, 2009 president Ahmadinejad made another controversial speech at the UN Conference on Racism in Geneva (Durban II), creating further dismay about this country in world public opinion. While many observers were expecting some kind of softening in Iran’s position with respect to world critical issues at this juncture, the speech came as a cold shower to naïve wishful thinkers.

The unfortunate events that overshadowed the substance of the conference at its start, are now well known to all; since the show was covered live on many world TV’s. Besides Mr. Ahmadinejad direct allusion to Zionism and Israel, which prompted the mass walkout of European delegates from the conference room, he took on other critical issues such as racism, segregation and intolerance that nobody can logically deny the fact as indefensible plagues in many countries including Iran and the West. But, hearing such accusations from the mouth of a pompous character, whose intolerance takes regular victims even among his own entourage in the cabinet (let aside the critics and opposition groups) for expressing their views, is indeed very strange.

How much ideological drives are permitted to encroach upon national interests? Are these conflict-ridden statements intended to promote Iran’s national interests or to satisfy personal hatred of an obsessive individual who happens to assume the responsibility of a nation?

Common sense dictates that national interests should be the guiding principles and compass of a state domestic and foreign policies. Ideology and other major elements of national power should be at the service of those interests. However, this is not always the case when “national interests” are not properly defined and “ideology” assumes the lead and trespass the requisites of states’ vital interests.

Man’s view of his universe and the realities of his existence have been shuttered by his acquired ideology, his faith and his environment. This has caused the progress or stagnation of civilizations in their challenge and competition for survival. Tactical use of religion has always been present, either to endorse an ideology which helps to establish or strengthen the legitimate power, or to supplant it by beliefs more attune with the wishes of power-holders.

In that case, ideologies are usually intended to simplify complex phenomena into a series of slogans, myths and dogma which can easily manipulate average people. In politics actors tend to use ideologies in order to disguise the immediate goal of their actions and behavior. The goal of ideology is power exerted over the mind and actions of men and not necessarily vital interests of a nation.

Ideology is thus an instrument for making the world look simpler and more consistent than it is. In the words of Karl Deutsch, “ideology is simplified picture of the world;” it serves as a map by which to create and guide certain behavior. In making distinction between moderate or reasonable ideologies, on the one hand, and radical ideology on the other, Deutsch argues that the difference between the two hinges upon “the capacity to recognize reality and to test the truth of opinions”.

Within the range of these two modes of ideology we can observe the ethics of Aristotle and the amoralism of Machiavelli; the constitutionalism of Cicero and the totalitarianism of Stalin, the natural law of Thomas Aquinas, the economic determinism of Karl Marx, the dictatorship of Nazi Hitler and the fundamentalism of Moslems. All of these fall in the broad spectrum of political ideologies which, once at work may shape human behavior, national character as well as state’s socio-economic and political attitude.

With the above academic clarification, one may question the rationale and necessity of Mr. Ahmadinejad presence in the Durban II Anti-racism conference in Geneva and his controversial speech at this very critical point of time. One gets the impression that neither he nor the speech writer has any idea about justice and fairness in international relations. They naively feel they are the first to discover and expose these anomalies in a world forum. A quick inquiry into the United Nations archives from its inception to this date and the related literature , will reveal the fact that thousands statesmen, diplomats, jurists and academics have written and spoken more eloquently about tantamount problems of the world and exposed much brighter ideas and thoughts for their remedies. Yet we are still where we stand today with not much progress.

Thus, what benefits we may envisage from these conflict-ridden statements for Iran except the widening gap between nations and deepening hatred at the expense of our national interests, prestige and reputation? Those who applauded for the president at the conference are not our friends. They are intentionally or inadvertently pushing our country to further radicalism and isolation. They know well that Iran has already paid very heavy price for sacrificing national interests for the sake of ideology.

Let it be clear to all peace-lovers around the world that there are other voices among academic, intellectual and ordinary people in Iran that are in discord with the prevailing situation and perception. We want to live in peace, harmony and good relations with all nations. We have no mandate to solve perennial issues in the Palestine, Lebanon, Hamas, Hezbollah, Jihad and the likes which do not fall in the realm of our vital national interests by any sane calculation and even not in the periphery of the presumed ideology. We have no business to straighten all the evils of the world and to guide humanity to the path of salvation. All we can do is to rectify our own actions and perceptions and set example for other to follow the suit. We fully realize that guiding principles of today’s statehood are tolerance, interdependence, cooperation towards mutual benefits.

The time has come to stop the unfortunate trend of blind radicalism before our nation falls in the disarray of populism, ideological obsession and delusion which could endanger peace and stability of the region and risk total disintegration of the country. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran-Iran.

Prospects for Iran-US Negotiations

2009-04-10T22:04:00.001-07:00

Prospects for Iran-US Negotiations

Ali Asghar Kazemi

April 9, 2009

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Barrack Obama’s Nowruz message to Iranians and leaders of the Islamic regime leaves the impression that the new US president intends to demonstrate that he is sincere to put into action his presidential campaign promises with respect to Iran. He had pledged to open direct talks with Iran for the purpose of alleviating the mutual misperceptions accumulated during the past 30 years with the purpose of paving the path for normalization of relations through diplomacy. While the Iranian supreme leader did not reject categorically the offer in response, he nonetheless used harsh words to criticize the United States past policies and advised the new president to take real actions in order to prove his good intentions.

Assuming that the two parties are indeed ready to engage into some sort of talks and negotiations, before this could materialized two important questions should be clarified: first, how to negotiate; and second, what to negotiate? It seems that without resolving these essential problems any ushering of the talks would be doomed to failure. This short comment shall try to discuss briefly the matter as preliminary thoughts on the point.

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The assumptions we made at the outset are rather arbitrary and perhaps not realistic. Therefore, before discussing on the whereabouts of the questions, let’s examine how much reasonable are our initial suggestions. It is true that for the sake of simplicity we assumed the two sides agree to start negotiations, but we should not lose sight of the intrigues and suspicions that might be involved in this proposition.

On the one hand, Iranians might think that Obama’s offer to open direct talks is not genuine and his diplomatic initiative is merely a trap to push the Islamic leaders to the corner for bitter concessions on vital issues (redlines). This may also give the Americans a chance to build-up the necessary consensus to put more pressure on Iran and further isolate the Islamic regime from the mainstream of international affairs.

On the other hand, Americans too might perceive that Iranian leaders are not really sincere in their agreeing to negotiate with the “Great Satan” and they are just pursuing a treacherous tactics for the purposes of: a) buying time to reach final stages of their nuclear undertaking; b) reducing the effect the mounting threats of pre-emptive strike coming from the new right-wing Israeli cabinet; and finally c) demonstrating that the Islamic regime is a rational actor and partner that can help the new US president to straighten out various American burdens in the Middle East including Iraq and Afghanistan.

These quandaries and similar misperceptions might detract the two parties in their initial engagement for negotiations. In fact, as many believe, this initial phase which consists of mutual “confidence building” is much more important than the modalities and substance of the negotiations.

Now, coming back to our opening questions and assuming that the above mistrust is settled, the problem remains as how to open negotiations and what to negotiate upon?

Diplomacy in theory is by and large the promotion of the national interests through accommodation and peaceful means. It is the major instrument of foreign policy by which a state can achieve objectives, realize values and defend national interests. Governments have the function to communicate through their diplomatic agents with those whose actions and behavior they wish to influence, deter, alter or reinforce. This process requires a clear definition of a state’s objectives, rationalizations for them, threats, promises, and the setting up plans and strategies to tackle with problems and contentious issues. Furthermore, diplomacy requires tact, patience, good- faith and above all will to negotiate with a quid-pro-quo (give and take) objective.

With respect to the modalities of diplomatic negotiations, it is important to settle before anything the problem of formalities and procedure. This relates to the question of open or secret diplomacy. In other words, at the initial stage of diplomatic endeavor, parties should agree on whether it must be open and public or close and secret. History of important diplomatic breakthrough between hostile parties has shown that psychological environment of the issues involved requires secrecy and confidentiality of the talks at initial stages. Since, the rival parties are usually not prepared for ideological reasons or other pretexts to enter publicly into negotiations. This however does not guarantee the success of the approach. Secret approach to China during Nixon and Kissinger was a major success but Iran-Contra initiative during the Reagan administration ended into major foreign policy flop. On the contrary, Iran’s secret dealing with US on other matters such as American strike on Taliban in Afghanistan after September 11 proved to be also a success.

It seems that the Islamic leaders are not yet prepared to enter into an open public diplomacy with the United States due to a number of understandable reasons for a revolutionary-ideological regime that has created a taboo about any rapprochement and dealing with the “Great Satan” during the past thirty years. Controversies surrounded the Hillary Clinton public announcement about unscheduled meeting between Iran and US representatives during an international conference on Afghanistan at The Hague on March 2009, is an example of open diplomacy. It seems therefore that Iranians are very cautious about how to engage into some sort of talks with the United States without losing face at home.

Americans eventually do not mind to deal secretly with Iran provided the approach fulfills their objectives. However, the risk of revelation of such negotiations by US media, over which the government has no control, is very high and Iranians may think twice before undertaking such dealing in secret. The price of open talks is also too high for Islamic leaders, since it is hard for them to move away from their official positions in public forum. Consequently, we may argue that any attempt towards starting negotiations between Iran and the United States might encounter serious difficulties at the initial phase.

Assuming that the “How” question is settled, the next thorny problem of “What” to negotiate upon still remain to be worked out. In diplomatic talks, states usually try to find common grounds upon which they can negotiate without difficulty. This means that after preliminary testing mutual interests on simple and trouble-free issues, the parties gradually move to more difficult subjects that require patience, tolerance and will to compromise or “give and take.”

This requires the preparation a meticulous plan or agenda for negotiations. The agenda should reflect issues of mutual interests upon which the parties declare ready to talk and negotiate. Here again we may encounter insurmountable problems which are susceptible to totally frustrate the whole effort. Since, as we know so far, Iran has a number of “redlines” from which supposedly diplomats and negotiators are not allowed to trespass. They may be tentatively enumerated as follow:

· Permanent suspension of nuclear enrichment process;

· Cessation of financial and military supports to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah;

· Recognition of Israel as a legitimate Jewish state in the Palestinian territory;

Other issues such as the following may be subject to negotiations:

· Non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Iraq and Afghanistan and other Muslim states of the region;

· Human rights;

· Traffic of narcotic substances through the Iranian borders and territory;

· Lifting of the sanctions and embargo imposed upon Iran;

· Release of Iranian assets in the United States;

· Other issues of mutual interests.

Given that the United States major preoccupations fall within the periphery of Iranian “redlines” upon which apparently no negotiations can take place, the prospects for a comprehensive settlement of Iran-US differences appear far remote. Yet the two sides may engage in some kind of talks along with the 5+1 states without substantive outcome.

As we stated in our previous comments, the Islamic regime perceives that a normalization of relations with the United States not only will not promote its interests, but might have adverse impact upon its security and survival in the long-run. Therefore, it will raise the costs of any eventual settlement to the point impossible to bear by the Americans. Some of these requests already put forward by the Iranian president are of the kind impossible to achieve. These may be considered as the American redlines upon which no compromise can take place, such as: cessation the support of Israel and withdrawal of all forces from the region.

For these clear reasons and other grounds which we tried to explain briefly here, the prospect for a normalization of relations between Iran and the United States are very meager. The shadow of pessimism is already surrounding the preliminary diplomatic efforts. Therefore we should not expect a miracle to happen suddenly in this difficult game in the weeks and months to come. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations at the IAU, Science and Research Center, Department of Law and Political Science, Post-Graduate Program. Tehran, Iran. For detail see: http://www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Legality of ICC Action against Sudan President

2009-03-08T22:33:00.001-07:00

Legality of ICC Action against Sudan President

Ali Asghar Kazemi

March 7, 2009

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On March 5, 2009 the International Criminal Court issued a writ of arrest against General Omar al Bashir, the incumbent Sudanese president, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although the matter was on the agenda of the court for some time and several month ago the prosecutor of the Court had announced the completion of preliminary investigations and gathering of evidences for possible criminal prosecution of the “Darfur Case,” public announcement of the warrant of arrest against the Sudan president came as a shock to those who may be liable for similar deeds.

Indeed, such court order for the arrest of a sitting president is a formidable event and “will further erode that sense of impunity shared by dictators the world over” as one human right activist said. In the past several years we had similar proceedings against Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia and Charles Taylor of Liberia by ad-hoc criminal courts. The news of the Sudanese president warrant sparked throughout the globe and alarmed authoritarian regimes that did not hesitate to condemn the matter as a political action and challenged the legality of the court order.

What is the legal foundation of the case? Who should be scared from this precedent and what are the ramifications of the case for repressive regimes? What are the prospects of bringing into justice heads of oppressive regimes in the future?

In July 2008, the prosecutor of the court (Luis Moreno-Ocampo) had charged Omar al Bashir with ten counts in total, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. After several months of deliberation and thorough examination of evidences provided to them by the prosecutor, the pretrial panel made up of three judges from Brazil, Ghana and Latvia finally decided to issue the warrant. They rejected charge of genocide against Mr. Bashir and only affirmed his “essential role” in the murder, rape, torture, pillage and displacement of large numbers of civilians in Darfur.

Although a number of states and organizations like China, the African Union and the Arab League had warned the warrant would be counter-productive and could destabilize the region; peace loving states and human rights activists welcomed the action as an historic victory for victims of repression, tyranny and subjugation. In issuing the order, the judges deliberately disregarded eventual political ramifications and social backlash that could aggravate the situation for innocent people in Darfur.

It is well to remember that about 2.5 million Darfur residents have been evicted from their homes and some 300,000 have died over the past five years in a ferocious conflict between non-Arab rebel groups and the Arab-dominated government and its allied militias. The court issued warrants for two other Sudanese citizens in 2007 — a government minister and a former militia leader — but neither has been arrested.

Iran along a number of Arab states have condemned the warrant of arrest against Sudanese president and Mr. Larijani, speaker of the parliament, paid a visit to Khartoum for expressing sympathy to Mr. Bashir. Iran accused the court to be under the influence of “Zionism and Imperialism;” whereas we know that neither the United States nor Israel is member of the International Criminal Court.

Article 63 of the Statute of Rome regarding the proceedings of the International Criminal Court, requires that the accused person be handed over to the court for trial. Yet there is no reason to believe that Sudanese ruler will voluntarily appear before the ICC or, for that matter, travel outside the Sudan and risk arrest. Accordingly, Bashir is likely to escape justice.

Sudan has always claimed that it has no effective control over feuding tribes; which is a self-indicting declaration of guilt. Since, it puts the raison-d’être of the government under serious doubt. The prosecutor believes that state support and coordination have been behind the outrages in Darfur.

The Sudanese government has repeatedly asserted that the human rights violations that have occurred were the work of independent forces, the so-called “janjaweed”” militia. It is true that these irregular units have committed many of the bloodshed, but the warrant application explains that they have done so “at the behest of the government.” While the warrant application acknowledges the right of a sovereign nation to respond to insurrection with armed force, but it also makes plain that Al Bashir has directed attacks specifically against civilians.

Sudan’s supporters, including the African Union and Arab League, have called for the UN Security Council to suspend any indictment. But France, Britain or the United States would probably use a veto to block such a move. The United Nations Security Council can postpone the prosecution against Mr. Bashir, but so far it has remained largely divided on the matter.

It is too early to conclude that the bold action of the International Criminal Court against the Sudanese president will create a deterring impact on the way of dictators and totalitarian rulers around the globe. Legal and criminal sanctions alone cannot bring justice, peace, democracy and human rights to a society. It may even worsen the situation for those under subjugation. Since, the international community still lacks an efficient police force to put into effect court orders. In rare occasions the United Nations Security Council may intervene under Chapter VII of the Charter (Article 42), but that also depends on a number of political factors which are not easily accessible.

Yet, as it is the first time that the tribunal in The Hague charges a sitting head of state with crimes against humanity, the case represents a major step by the court to implicate the highest level officials of a government for atrocities committed against innocent people. Certainly, it is hard to believe that the Sudan government would pay attention to the ICC warrant, but the case has a symbolic value and will create an important precedent in international humanitarian law. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations at IAU, Science and Research Center. Tehran, Iran

Strategic Games in the Middle East

2009-03-06T22:50:00.001-08:00

Strategic Games in the Middle East

Ali Asghar Kazemi

March 5, 2009

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On March 4, 2009 the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted a two-day international conference on Gaza and Israeli breach of humanitarian law and war crimes against Palestinians during the recent armed conflict between the two hostile parties. The conference took place after a similar meeting in Egypt backed by the United States for the reconstruction of Gaza Strip that endured severe material and human losses during the 22-day conflict. While the two conferences had more or less similar themes, they followed diverse objectives. The Gaza conflict can be visualized as a set of strategic games in which actors involved pursued different aims in the Middle East political arena.

How various actors perceive the games they are playing in the Middle East? What are the objectives, gains and losses pursued by rival states? What are the plausible outcome and implications of the games?

The United States under Obama appears to continue the traditional American policy of previous administrations in the Middle East namely: the unequivocal support of Israel and the establishment of a comprehensive and durable peace which would promote the stability of the region and interests of moderate Arab states and Israel. This policy can be characterized as a non-zero-sum benefiting all parties directly involved in the game.

The United States however perceive some obstacles on the way of this policy emanating from the Islamic regime of Iran.

Not long ago, on February 12, 2009, US Director of National Intelligence, Admiral (Ret) Dennis C. Blair provided a wide ranging assessment of threats involving the American security before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Referring to Iran, Admiral Blair stated the following remarks:

· “Hezbollah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry, and Iran’s senior leadership has cited Hezbollah as a model for other militant groups. We assess Tehran has continued to provide Hezbollah with significant amounts of funding, training, and weapons since the 2006 conflict with Israel, increasing the group’s capabilities to pressure other Lebanese factions and to threaten Israel.”

· “Iran’s provision of training, weapons, and money to Hamas since the 2006 Palestinian elections has bolstered the group’s ability to strike Israel and oppose the Palestinian Authority.”

Tying together the Middle East peace process with Iran’s nuclear undertaking, Admiral Blair observed:

· “With Hamas in control of Gaza and Hezbollah growing stronger in Lebanon, progress on a Palestinian- Israeli accord is growing more difficult. With Iran developing a nuclear weapon capability and Israel determined not to allow it, there is potential for an Iran-Israeli confrontation or crisis on that issue as well.”

· “Moderate Arab states fear a nuclear-armed Iran, want progress on Palestinian settlement—the absence of which deprives US Arab allies of crucial political capital to defend strategic ties to the US and wish to sustain a moderate, state-centered politics for the region.”

The testimony further predicted that:

· “Progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace track would increase opportunities for the US to broaden its engagement with Arab publics, including those aligning with the growing ideology of Islamic nationalism.”

· Israel and Iran are liable to enter into a confrontation or a crisis sometime this year (2009) “due to Tehran's progress in its nuclear weapons program and Jerusalem's determination to thwart it.”

This is to say that Israel fearing an Islamic regime with nuclear capability would not allow Iran to reach the point to threaten its survival and therefore there is potential for a clash between the two states. Israel has already shown its resolve in similar cases in Iraq and more recently in Syria.

With respect to varying intentions and perceptions behind rivalry in the Palestinian issue, they can be tentatively identified as follows:

Egypt, representing the pro-West moderate Arab states, tries to isolate Iran from the Middle Eastern issues related to Palestine and the peace process. Egypt seems to pursue a zero-sum-strategy which would exclude the Islamic regime from the game. To that end it intends to:

1. Strengthen Arab unity vis-à-vis Iran’s undesired interfering in the Palestinian problems;

2. Support the position of Mahmud Abbas as the legitimate Authority in all Palestinian territory including Gaza Strip;

3. Build a strong coalition of pro-West Arab states against the Islamic regime’s growing influence in the Middle East;

4. Take the initiative of the peace process by neutralizing all internal and external encumbering forces;

5. Ensure the continuity of incumbent moderate conservative regimes in the Middle East;

6. And finally, pave the way for a comprehensive peace settlement with Israel including all Arab states.

Iran also seems to be following a zero-sum strategy in a different direction with the intentions to:

1. Bring together all revolutionary movements in the region in a unified resistance front as leverage against the United States and its close ally Israel;

2. Demonstrate that it is the only true supporter and caring power for the Palestinian cause;

3. Show that no problem in the Middle East can be solved without its help;

4. Press on the Western powers that they should recognize Iran as an influential actor not only in the region but throughout the world;

5. Continue its nuclear undertaking without encumbrance from the 5+1 states, the Security Council or any other world bodies;

6. Consolidate and ensure its power grip in domestic affairs so that no opposition group could envisage challenging the regime.

Gaza crisis had already its impact over the elections in Israel and paved the way for the resurgence of the right wing to assume power. This means that reaching a just and equitable solution for the Palestine has become more difficult than ever. With respect to Iran’s nuclear venture, given President Obama’s reluctance to curb the presumed threat, Israel is susceptible to perceive still greater danger and may contemplate to engage in a real conflict with Iran.

With this somber and gloomy picture in the horizon of the Middle East political landscape, it does not seem that there would be a satisfactory outcome of the games in the foreseeable future, unless the parties involved change their rigid and uncompromising attitudes. In order to reach a mutually acceptable saddle point, actors are have to review their assessments and try to optimize their trade-offs in a non-zero-sum game with positive outcome which would benefit all parties concerned./

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations at the IAU, Science and Research Center, Tehran- Iran. For detail see: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Dilemma of Iran's Next President

2009-02-15T22:59:00.000-08:00

Dilemma of Iran’s Next President

Ali Asghar Kazemi

February 16, 2009

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Three decades after the downfall the Pahlavi regime and the ascendance into power of a clergy rule in Iran, the Islamic leaders still insist on the revolutionary nature of their institutions. While each revolution has its own follies and romantic slogans common to all at the beginning, the persistence of religious leaders on its continuity until the reappearance of the hidden Shiite Imam, is a peculiar phenomenon with important consequences on the national and international scene.

Despite widespread publicity about the miraculous achievement of the incumbent hard-line president, it seems rather obvious that Iran’s overall international standing has terribly diminished during the arch-conservative rule. With respect to domestic affaires the situation is much worse. An economy in shamble, a galloping inflation, and a general discontent of the accomplishment of Mr. Ahmadinejad who’s various promises simply did not materialize.

Ahmadinejad was the product of a period of eight years of controversies between two conflicting views: that expressed by a moderate soft-spoken clergy, Mr. Khatami who was considered as “reformist” by Western political standards; and the opposite represented by the conservative religious-revolutionary groups who pretended to be the legitimate guardian of the Islamic regime. During his two terms in office, president Khatami failed to accomplish much due to obstacles on his way created by his opponents in the legislative body and judiciary. Feeling betrayed, young and enthusiastic people who had voted for Khatami turned back to him and reformist movement and supporters gradually disintegrated and vanished from political scene, leaving the ground to hard-line conservatives with new attractive promises.

Now, almost four years after the conservative grip of absolute power, with a nation at the brink of social and economic crises, the reformists are embarking for a new comeback. Upon several months of speculations, finally former president Khatami has decided to run for president with the slogan of saving the country from total collapse and insolvency.

What are the chances of the opposing groups to win the presidential elections next spring? How far Mr. Khatami or his reformist comrades are able to restore the lost confidence of the populace to the competence and capacity of the Islamic government to respond to their widespread expectations? What are the prospects of normalizing relations with the United States under the new president?

In order to pass judgment on the performance of a high position office-holder such as the president in Iran, one must consider the facts against the religious-revolutionary natures of the Islamic regime and its worldwide objectives reflected in its constitutional structure and ideological aspirations. In present Iran, no one individual can trespass the redlines predetermined either by Shari’a, as interpreted by the appropriate body instituted for that purpose, or by the “supreme leader of the revolution”. Even the supreme leader who has the final say in matters of “high politics” or “strategic decisions” is bound to follow those rules. Of course, he has the prerogative to assess the situation and decide according to his evaluation of a particular issue. This is to say that the chief executive and other legislative and judiciary bodies are subordinate to the “supreme leader.” This means that nothing substantive can take place in the country without the consent of the leader.

With that assumption in mind, one of the major impediments of the Islamic regime overall conduct in running the business of the state seems to be the continuing persistence on its revolutionary nature. In fact, this feature has created a strong barrier before Iran’s national objectives and aspirations in setting clear criteria for determining friends and foes. This does not suggest however that the same quandary is settled in domestic sphere. Perhaps many unfortunate events and vicissitudes during the lifespan of the Islamic regime so far are geared to this very important dimension of the revolutionary Iran.

Nevertheless, when states choose to engage in interactions with their peers, they must have a lucid definition of their ends and means, a realistic assessment of their partners and above all a faithful commitment to certain primordial standards (rules of the game) in international relations. Indeed revolutions have their own peculiarities and manners and do not necessarily follow conventional norms and expected behavior. They usually have a tendency to challenge the status quo and even alter those rules. Thus, many states prefer not to be in love with revolutionary regimes which by nature have a propensity to be repelling rather than receptive.

The problem of not being able to distinguish between its ideological concerns and vital national interests has impeded the revolutionary Iran to identify its friends and foes and this has almost paralyzed Iran’s diplomacy especially during recent nuclear crisis. While international pressure was gradually increasing in order to push it to stop all nuclear activities, Iran was helplessly looking for friends here and there in order to get some support for its intransigent position. To this end, a number of lucrative deals were offered to some potential partners,[1] but, at the critical moment when Iran needed their help, they turned to its opponents in the UN Security Council.

Iranian leaders should not be surprised by this unfortunate experience. Indeed, this is the golden rule of the game in international relations; states only have permanent interests and no permanent friends or foes. Yet, an intelligent and rational foreign policy should put the right emphasis at any particular moment on the means and leverages it has on its potential friends in order to neutralize or bypass the negative impacts of its presumed foes’ actions and decisions. When a state puts all of its eggs in one basket, it may soon end up with unpredictable situations in which it should sacrifice all at once. No diplomacy that would stake everything on mere rhetoric and intimidation or concessions deserves to be called intelligent.

While the conservative government and policy makers in Iran persist on a return to revolutionary slogans of the regime and do everything to show this feature, the international community seems quite alarmed with the development. Thus, most states are reluctant to engage in deep interaction with a nation defying the prevailing norms. This is not to suggest that those norms and rules of the game are necessarily ethical, just or fair.

Recent American offer by President Barack Obama to open direct talks with Iran may simply be regarded as a calculated move in order to disarm the conservative groups from their revolutionary slogans and push Iran to the corner to comply with accepted norms in international relations. While Obama is pursuing his strategy through soft power and diplomacy[2], the Bush administration pursued the same objectives by threatening Iran by hard power. However, for the Islamic leaders, compromising on principles means giving bitter unnecessary concessions which would devoid the Islamic regime from its fundamental ideological drives and values.

While reformists have better chances to win next presidential elections, it is faire to suggest that neither Ahmadinejad nor Khatami or any other person in that capacity is powerful enough to make substantive changes in the structure or religious-revolutionary nature of the Islamic regime. They are both pursuing the same goals with different styles. They can merely act within a limited boundary determined to them either by law or by the authority of the leader. The difference is purely that of approach reflecting individual character, social background and philosophical outlook.

In the typology of political leaders, as classified by Harold Lasswell, Ahmadinejad represents the “agitator” type with extreme intransigence who sacrifices immediate gains for abstract principles and always seeks to instigate the emotional response of the public. While Khatami is a “negotiator” who is more concerned with acceptable solution to a conflict than a just or perfect resolution. Thus, he does not mind to compromise with his opponents. Nonetheless, important issues such as: relations with the United States, the nuclear project, the Middle East problems and the likes are only dependent variables geared to the very nature of the Islamic regime in Iran. /

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* Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. For detail see: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

[1]The deal on liquefied gas with China, which amounts to an overall value of $100 billion, is one such undertaking which would tie Iran’s political fate to China’s growing needs for energy over the next 25 years. Russians on the other hand, are very happy about the current nuclear plant in Bushehr and the prospective other nuclear plant deals with Iran and seemed not to be ready to forego this lucrative business just for the sake of giving a hand to American plan to contain Iran’s ambition to use nuclear technology, which in their view, is not harmful. But, as we have seen, both of them voted against Iran at the IAEA. India was also supposed to support Iran for promoting its interests in the prospective gas line project, but this did not happen either.

[2]See: Ali Asghar Kazemi, “US Democrats are Pushing Iran to the Corner”: Strategic Discourse February 3, 2009.

US Democrats are Pushing Iran to the Corner

2009-02-07T01:20:00.001-08:00

US Democrats are Pushing Iran to the Corner

Ali Asghar Kazemi

February 3, 2009

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In his first two weeks in office, Barack Obama sent an array of signals to various directions among which the Middle East and Iran are most vital spots to the new democrat president. In an interview with Al-Arabia, Obama implicitly invited Iran to come forward and get ready for direct dialogue with the United States. This offer might have been interpreted as a friendly gesture of the new president who had pledged to open direct negotiation without precondition with Iran in his presidential campaign. But, the reaction of the Islamic government pronounced by the hard-line president Ahmadinejad was rather cool and repulsive.

To what extent Iran is prepared to normalize relations with the United States? What are the consequences of such eventual rapprochement for Iran and the region? What are various scenarios that might emerge from the new US endeavor to solve the Iranian issue?

In tackling with the Middle East and Iran’s interrelated problems, the new democrat administration has to strike a delicate balance between two differing views i.e. that of Hillary Clinton and her associates which is harder than that of the president who promised to talk directly to Iran without preconditions. This however does not mean that there would be any difference between the two in the final account, in the sense that one is more proactive than the other leading to the same results. The ultimate objectives are: a) containing Iran’s appetite for power; and b) forcing it to take a more cooperative attitude vis-à-vis various problems of the region.

To that end, Americans are believed to be ready to use all available leverages including the use of hard power. The expected outcome would eventually make the situation much tougher for Iran’s defying stance pushing it to the corner in a manner to commit itself to some sort of bitter concessions on various pending issues including the nuclear project.

The new American approach may be shaped around the following facts and criteria:

1. Any viable solution to the Middle East problems including Israeli-Palestinian issue as well as Iraq and Afghanistan depend on settling Iran-US perennial quarrel;

2. The Islamic regime’s ties with radical movements in the Middle East and its defiance to this date to comply with the UN Security Council demands with respect to the nuclear enrichment issue are serious barriers to the settlement of all other issues in the region;

3. The United States alone cannot force Iran to adopt a cooperative stance merely by using hard power, especially after the awful quagmire created by the US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq;

4. Iranian leaders are more vulnerable to soft power effects such as diplomatic pressure and sanctions than military engagement, since this latter would consolidate all people behind the regime against the invader;

5. Gradual pressure through legitimate instruments may push the regime to the corner in such a way that it would finally surrender to the will of the international community.

Iran seems to be conscious of the fact and the plausible outcome of direct negotiations with the US will before anything disarm the Islamic regime of its most important ideological pillar. Besides that, as we said in our previous comments, Iranian conservative hard-line leaders firmly believe that their security and survival could not be secured through normalization of relations with the US. It is not much difficult to rationalize the apprehension of Iranian conservative hard-liners that in such circumstances, this would expose the regime’s vulnerability to US malicious covert operations for the purpose of toppling the revolutionary regime through “soft power.” Thus, instead, they would prefer to remain as rival to the United States by challenging American power and presence in the region.

Perhaps not incidentally, Mr. Ahmadinejad first reaction to Obama’s comment was rather cool. While he welcomed change in the new US democrat administration, he did not hesitate to emphasize that change should take place in the substance of American foreign policy and not in form. To that end, he went on to set a number of preconditions as prerequisites to any eventual direct talks. He said that the new president should take the following actions in order to show his good-will:

· The United States should excuse for its harmful deeds against Iran in the past 70 years;

· The United States should cease to support Israel ;

· The United States should withdraw all its forces from the region;

· Etc...

These unusual requests leave the impression that Iran is quite happy with the present hostile situation. As can be seen, the demands are so much impractical and unrealistic that can hardly be conducive to any logical arrangement in the foreseeable future. In effect, the Islamic president is willfully walking toward the trap skillfully laid by US democrats. By raising the costs of an eventual settlement, he is paving the way for the remnants of the neo-conservative hawks in the US Department of Defense to put forward the military option to the table of the new president.

Meanwhile the situation may give a good basis of justification for US democrats to take advantage of the case in order to reach a solid consensus in the UN Security Council in adopting harsh sanctions against Iran. Though the Islamic leaders claim that they don’t fear UN sanctions, there is no doubt that the country is susceptible to suffer severely in the wake of declining oil price and upcoming budget deficits.

Americans policy makers seem to realize that president Obama has little time to capitalize on his popularity in the United States and around the world for settling outstanding issues before things get out of control. Yet, they may be cautious not to open negotiations with Mr. Ahmadinejad, a subordinate of the supreme leader who has the final say in strategic decisions. Besides, this may give credit the incumbent president which will boost his position in the upcoming presidential elections next spring.

Thus, it is safe to say that the United States will either try to reach the supreme leader for an eventual effective dialogue or wait until the time the results of the elections are known. However, US may arrange to take part in some sort of collective talk with Iran along with 5+1 states. Meanwhile, US foreign policy will be directed towards exhausting all possible diplomatic avenues before it embarks on applying harsher measures. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran. For detail see:

www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Obama and a World of Expectations

2009-01-25T00:13:00.001-08:00

Obama and a World of Expectations

Ali Asghar Kazemi

January 23, 2009

We live in an age no prophet ever predicted. Our present world is under constant changes affecting the form and substance of our life. Changes usually bring expectations whose lack of fulfillment may induce desolation.

There is no doubt that leadership change in the United States affects many aspects of world affairs. Since, this country besides huge wealth and power assumes worldwide missions and generates more than 25% of the world production. Therefore, Obama as the new US President will have to face not only with a host of problems inherited from George Bush but also has to respond to huge and widespread expectations created around the world.

What are the prospects of this historic change in the Middle East? What should we anticipate from this change in Iran? How the Islamic regime should act in order to take advantage from this rare opportunity?

Indeed, Obama’s election as the President of the United States has raised the expectations of not only the American people but the whole world about prosperity, peace and security. But, as he warned in his first speech after election, “the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime, two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial crisis in a century.” In fact, the troubles that Obama inherits from his predecessors are so profound and complex which go beyond the capacity and power of this young leader and his fellow democrats.

First of all, we should not anticipate much from this change at least in this part of world where we live in i.e. the Middle East. We should recognize that change in “agency” will not necessarily bring about change in “structure.” This means that Barack Obama is before anything the president of the United States and is duty bound to protect American national and world interests. This process may eventually work to the detriment of other rivals or opponents.

Though President Obama did not speak explicitly about Iran in his inaugural speech on January 20^th 2009, in his broad observation with respect to the use of force to promote American interests, he said:

“As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals…. America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more. “Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions.”

He further recognized that “…. power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use. Our security emanates from the justness of our cause; the force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”

With regard to the American entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan Obama kept his promises during the presidential campaign by emphasizing that America guided by the principles and legacy of its founding fathers “….can meet…new threats that demand even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We'll begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard- earned peace in Afghanistan.”

Referring to the nuclear challenges ahead, he assured that the United States will work tirelessly “with old friends and former foes… to lessen the nuclear threat ….” He further warned: “those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that, "Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you. For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness.”

As to American relations with the Muslim world, he noted that the United States will “… seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” But, at the same time he warned:

“To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict or blame their society's ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”

Indeed, these words reverberate not only fundamental American ideals but also a realistic grasp of prevalent world malaises that inhibit the establishment of a just and durable peace.

President Obama seems to be receptive to all advises coming from personalities and institutions experienced in their fields of specialties. One such institution is the “Bipartisan Policy Center” which has recently released a “Comprehensive Report on Iran.”

The report titled: Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development, considering a nuclear weapons-capable Iran "strategically untenable,” argues that it "may pose the most significant threat to the United States during the new Obama administration. It further argues "The stakes are enormous…They involve not only U.S. national security, but also regional peace and stability, energy security, the efficacy of multilateralism, and the preservation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime."

The Task Force sponsored by the US National Security Initiative also found that Iran's nuclear program cannot be adequately safeguarded by the international inspections regime as currently designed. Furthermore, "It would be technically possible," once Iran has developed a sufficient feedstock of low-enriched uranium, for it to "enrich 20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium--the minimum necessary for a nuclear device--in four weeks or less."

This whole development and observations bear good witness to our earlier contention that the new US democrat administration under Obama is much more serious to counter the perceived challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear undertaking. Backed by a strong support, Obama is likely to use all means at hand to stop the Islamic regime’s quest to become a nuclear actor.

Based on the above facts, Islamic hard-liners in Tehran shall act cautiously in their future moves and are advised to be prudent in dealing with the new democrat administration if they are sincerely committed to stability and security in the Middle East as well as peace and prosperity for Iran./

Strategic Implications of the Gaza Conflict

2009-01-14T20:40:00.001-08:00

Strategic Implications of the Gaza Conflict

Ali Asghar Kazemi

January 14, 2009

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Israel’s carnage and excessive violence in Gaza and Palestinian resistance to this date is drastically changing the balance of world public opinion in favor of Hamas movement on the one hand and strategic configuration in the Middle East on the other. Even moderate Arab states and intellectuals, who implicitly endorsed the Israeli operations by keeping silent initially, are being forced to condemn the Palestinian civilians suffering in the conflict. Indeed, it is no longer possible for American allies in the region to close eyes on the ongoing slaughters and this is causing a sharp division between the radical camp in the region led by Iran, including Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas on one side and the rest of pro-western Arab states on the other.

Disregard of the outcome of the conflict, which could be only an unfortunate loss of human lives and material devastation for both sides, Islamic leaders in Iran are proving to be right in the eyes of Arab people at large in their harsh position with regard to Israel. Perhaps, never before Israel has been so much low in international public opinion, even during the 33-days war with Hezbollah in 2006. Those who used to denounce Ahmadinejad rhetoric about Israel in the past several years may now change their minds in the wake of the heart breaking events in the Gaza Strip.

This is indeed a quite favorable strategic gain for hardliners in Tehran who have been giving wide coverage in the official mass-media, depicting relentlessly the horrendous aspects of the Gaza conflict including the shocking pictures of dead and injured children and women. Moderate Arab states should now be very cautious about their unequivocal approval of US policies with respect to Israel and the Middle East at large. This will certainly make the job of the new democrat president, who conquered the White House by his two magic words “hope” and “change,” very difficult. Indeed, Obama will be facing with a real challenge and deadlock in the Palestinian affaire and US allies in the region. No longer will any of the Arab leaders dare to shake hands with the Israelis.

This whole gloomy picture could not but please hardliners in Tehran who will eventually succeed to divide the Arab world and undermine the power of Palestinian Authority in favor of Hamas and other radical movements in pursuit of their grand strategy in the Middle East. As a necessary byproduct of this shifting paradigm, the Islamic regime may feel to have a free hand to pursue its nuclear strategy without much hindrance and mistrust, at least among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. This will break the recent consensus among them against Iran’s nuclear project, reached under the patronage of the United States.

The Gaza crisis will have an unavoidable impact on Israel’s upcoming elections. It is not quite sure which faction may have upper hand, but there are vivid indications that Israelis are moving more to the right (Likud Party) because of policy failure of the incumbent government (Kadima-Labor Party) especially with respect to Gaza problem.

One should understand that Gaza conflict is different from the 33-days war with Hezbollah in summer 2006 in various aspects. Gaza has been under de facto Israeli occupation since Six-Day War in1967 and despite the fact that they have left the territory in 2005, they are still considered as occupying power. This means that Israel has a number of legal obligations according to the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). Israel still controls access to the area, imports and exports, and the movement of people in and out. Israel has control over Gaza’s air space and sea coast, and its forces enter the area at will. Therefore, as an occupying power, Israel has the responsibility under the said Convention to ensure the safety and welfare of the civilian population of the Gaza Strip.

As a consequence, when Israel finally ceases military operations in Gaza through some kind of settlement at the international level, it has to be legally accountable for its breach of obligations, namely excessive use of force against undefended civilian targets and causing unnecessary suffering to Hamas resistant groups by using forbidden lethal materials. This will have a wider impact on Israel arsenal of unconventional arms and materials in the future. The Islamic government Judiciary has recently set up a criminal tribunal for that purpose and has invited Islamic states to cooperate in the proceedings of this body.

Israeli leaders had mistakenly thought that they have gained experience in their previous war with Hezbollah in South Lebanon in 2006. They wanted to use that in Gaza against Hamas’ unyielding position on the path of peace process. However, they missed one important point: that is, unlike Israel’s mental vulnerability on human losses and casualties, Hamas resistant forces, despite their obvious shortcomings from strategic point and war equipment, have an unprecedented zeal and devotion for sacrificing their lives for their sublime cause. This factor is susceptible to change the balance in favor of those poor and subjugated people who have really nothing to lose in their resistance against the occupying forces.

Though one may argue that Israel is also fighting for its very survival in a hostile environment, yet, it will have extreme difficulty to restore the negative image it has created in handling the Gaza crisis in the foreseeable future. It will probably lose the support and sympathy of world public opinion including American citizens for its cruelty in Gaza. /

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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran, Iran. For detail see: www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

Iran-US Relations:From Enmity to Rivalry

2009-01-11T22:40:00.000-08:00

Iran-US Relations: From Enmity to Rivalry
A. A. Kazemi
January 8, 2009

_____________________________________________________________

George Bush will soon be leaving the White House with a huge burden of failures in domestic and foreign policies. The legacy of the “new conservative hawks” however will haunt the new democrat’s administration for some time. This is not to say that democrats have had a brighter achievement in the past, at least with respect to the Middle East insurmountable problems.

So far, many presidents have been awarded the “Noble Peace Prize” for their untiring effort to settle the Middle East tribulations and ordeals. Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, Menahem Begin, Yasser Arafat… are among those who only left a number of signed documents and photos of “hand-shaking hostiles” without much success. Perhaps George Bush should also be given a special award for his bold attempt to wipe out Iran’s two ferocious adversaries, the Baath regime in Iraq and Taliban in Afghanistan. Since undoubtedly, he has rendered the biggest service to the Islamic regime in order to claim a regional superpower status in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Among the many horny problems Obama’s administration will be facing, the issue of Iran will certainly be on the top of the agenda. Though it is not yet quite clear what kind of strategy the new democrat president will opt, before anything he has to decide how to look at Iran in the first place; whether it should be considered as part of the problem or part of the solution in the Middle East.

Recent development in Iran’s nuclear issue which brought a US high official to the negotiating table in Geneva and subsequent letter of congratulations to US president-elect Obama by president Ahmadinejad leaves the impression that the two countries are no longer enemies but, rather mutual rivals! Many Middle East observers believe that the unfortunate ongoing Gaza crisis and the previous 33 days war between Hezbollah and Israel are vivid indications of Iran’s power contest and rivalry with the United States in the region. Though it may look odd to consider the Islamic regime as a serious US competitor in the Middle East affairs, it appears a quite defendable hypothesis for the reasons explained here.

Is the United States really considered as an enemy or a rival party for Iran? How far the Islamic government and Iranian conservative hard-liners are prepared to re-establish normal relations with US? Who will benefit from this relation and for what purpose? Where the two rivals are headed in the weeks and months to come?

*

More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since Iran’s revolution driven out this country from the Western camp to what can be characterized as swinging between East and West, Islamism and nationalism, radicalism and tolerance. While many European states did not mind to deal with the Islamic regime in time of peace and war, the United States has never digested the existence of a religious ideology to run the affairs of a strategically important oil-rich country in the 21st century Middle East.

Several attempts to disperse the clouds of animosity and misperception between the two states proved to be ineffective and futile. It should not surprise anybody that the squabble over the nuclear issue is just a tiny portion of a wider and deeper range of problems overshadowing Iran-U.S. long-term relations. The already gloomy situation between Iran and the United States, which for several years has been put in the shade by the unfortunate hostage taking affaire at the very beginning of the revolution in Iran, has jumped to its critical stage after the American military interventions in Iran’s two neighboring countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, following the September 11th events.

Though these military interventions in two hostile neighbors of Iran were a heavenly gift for the Islamic regime from a strategic point of view and inadvertently promoted its position in the region, nonetheless, the United States remained as a serious contender of Iran’s new status. Now, the US is puzzled as how to put rein on Iran’s appetite for power. For Iranian leaders, still the main source of anxiety is perceived as the U.S. threat to their very existence.

As we said elsewhere, Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, have been characterized as the “axis of evil” by U.S. president, essentially for their quest of becoming a nuclear actor in international scene. Iraq’s Baath regime and Saddam Hussein were overthrown essentially on the pretext of possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although such things were never found in that country. North Korea has partially surrendered to severe international pressure to abandon its nuclear project. As to Iran, it was quite clear from the beginning that the United States would not allow a revolutionary regime flagrantly hostile to Israel to ascend to the rank of a nuclear actor.

This hypothesis is especially true after the end of the cold war, the unfortunate events of September 11, and the emergence of terrorism as a non-state phenomenon, threatening peace and order of the whole world and challenging the established rules of the game in international political arena and power structure.
Islamic leaders in Tehran seem not to be deterred by UN sanctions or various military threats, although at a point of time they are very much scared about an eventual pre-emptive strike by Israel or the US. They keep emphasizing on diplomatic talks and negotiations with all interested parties. But, at the same time they refuse to accept any precondition for that purpose and stress on equal footing in the negotiation process. In other words they want to be treated as an “important world power” and equal partner.

As a matter of fact, Iranian president did not hesitate to remind the 6+1 nations on this very contention in his last speech after the Geneva meeting. He said something along the following lines: “I advise you sincerely don’t threaten us; we are not scared since we are a superpower…! If you are polite and you accept our inalienable rights for nuclear enrichment and our supremacy in the region you can sit on the negotiating table and talk about various issues of mutual interests…”

This clearly shows the president unyielding stance that Iran should be dealt with as a rival power in the region in which no problem can be solved without its consent. In fact, so far the regime has shown that it can destabilize the whole region through its proxies. Many observers regard the unfortunate Gaza crisis is in effect the product of a power contest in which Iran has an active part. Recent missile exercises and other signals were designed to demonstrate that Iran has the power and will to become what has been termed as a “world power” by Mr. Ahmadinejad.

Iranian conservative hard-line leaders firmly believe that their security and survival could not be secured through normalization of relations with the US. Since, in such circumstances, this would expose the regime’s vulnerability to US malicious covert actions for the purpose of toppling the revolutionary regime through “soft power” in the long-rum. Thus, instead, they would prefer to remain as rival by challenging the power and presence of the United States in the region.

Iran has been using various diplomatic tactics and economic leverages to divide between the United States and its European allies with the hope of benefiting from their conflicting relations. The same means have been used with respect to Russia and China without much success. Though these latter have been giving lip service to the Islamic regime, in practice they always consented to various UN resolutions putting sanctions against Iran.

It is not quite clear how the new democrat president in the United States intends to deal with Iran. But it appears that Obama’s administration is being advised to consider Iran as a serious “part of the solution” to insurmountable problems of the Middle East without whose help neither the Arab-Israeli peace process nor the stability in Iraq and Afghanistan can be achieved. While George Bush acted with perplexity in regard to the Iranian hurdle, it seems that the new US president is determined to straighten the matter once for all. We shall wait and see how much this optimism is well founded.
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Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of law and international relations in Tehran, Iran.
For detail see: Middle East Academic Forum

Barack Obama and Iran

2008-11-07T22:58:00.000-08:00

Barack Obama and Iran (After Election)
A. A. Kazemi*
November 5, 2008
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Almost half a century after the historic speech of Martin Luther King Jr. that cost him his life, “wishes come true!” Barack Obama, a black man who seeks his ancestors’ roots in Africa (Kenya), has been elected as 44th President of the United States to lead the most powerful nation on earth at least for the next four years. Indeed, the power of democracy can make miracle in an open and free society!
What does this mean to the Islamic regime in Iran? Shall it be happy for this historic change and consider it as the will of God who promised the victory of the oppressed over the arrogant powerful? Can the Islamic regime continue to evade from the chastisement of its defying behavior in the nuclear venture?
*
Before we let ourselves drawn by the joy of this astonishing event, we should listen to Obama’s speech before the Jewish lobby AIPAC after his victory over Hillary Clinton in the Democratic Primaries, which has all the answers to the above questions. Perhaps, for the first time a presidential candidate took so bold and explicit stance vis-à-vis Israel’s security and survival in the tumultuous Middle East political strata. This is indeed a direct consequence of Iran’s hard-line president’s vicarious statements about Israel during the past years.
Obama’s further observations on Iran’s role in the instability of the Middle East, terrorism and the security of Israel bear good witness that the election of a democrat president will not change American political environment in favor of the Islamic government in Iran. To the contrary, as we can read through the document titled: “Bipartisan Policy Center Releases Comprehensive Report on Iran” there is enough evidence to believe that from now on things will be much tougher for the Islamic hard-liners in Tehran.
Those who think otherwise are either naïve or have no grasp of history. Since, Democrats have shown in the past that they are very strict on matters such as human rights, Israel’s security, Palestinian problem and WMD proliferations. On the issue of terrorism they are as much preoccupied as the republicans. They may even venture more risky and malicious plots such as “regime change” if they perceive that this will promote their cause. The previous regime in Iran has been toppled during the democrats.
Americans are amazing people and know well how to use their constituent power to express their ideas and decide their choices and preferences. Like many nations, they don’t compromise their solidarity on common causes. This means that they are not prepared to accept humiliation because of mishandling of crisis situations by their leaders. Barack Obama came at an opportune time when America was split on matters of terrorism after September 11, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Obama’s election as the President of the United States has risen the expectations of not only the American people but the whole world about prosperity, peace and security. But, as he warned in his first speech after election, “the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime, two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial crisis in a century.” Indeed, the troubles that Obama inherited from his predecessors are so profound and complex which go beyond the capacity and power of this young leader and his fellow democrats.
Besides that, Obama’s election may reawaken the residue of dormant racism in America susceptible to cause problem in future. I don’t want to speculate on an unexpected ominous event, such as those that happened to late Martin Luther King Jr., Kennedy brothers etc. But, there is always a foolish racist around the corner that would be tempted to fire a gunshot.
With respect to Iran- US relations under Obama, chances of some sort of rapprochement are very meager as things stand at present. Since, we should recognize that the problem of Iran-US entanglement goes well beyond the conventional bilateral relations and party politics. This is to say that in all assessment we shall take into account the problem pertaining to US most close ally in the region, Israel, as well as other Middle East critical issues on which the Islamic regime has shown stringency.
In fact, American foreign policy in the Middle East is intimately tied to Israel’s survival and everything that goes with it. To put it in a more sophisticated strategic context, Israel and its continued existence in the Middle East is an important dependent variable in US strategic schemes, disregard of who and which party is in power in Washington.Obama’s election as US president could generate a potential opportunity to break ices between the two countries. But, this is not an automatic occurrence and needs tactful planning and political will from the two sides. Despite the unpleasant situation that the Americans are now experiencing in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would not seem strange that a democrat president in the White House, backed by a strong democrat Congress, become persuaded to settle the Iranian issue by force if necessary.
Therefore, it is safe to suggest that Iranians leaders should watch carefully their future course of actions and avoid any provocation that might push further the democrats towards the republican hard-line policies. They should also be cautious not to fall in a dangerous trap on the naïve belief that U.S. democrats will endorse the Islamic regime and will give it “carte blanche” on the nuclear issue. /
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* Ali Asghar Kazemi is Professor of Law and International Relations in Tehran- Iran.

Crisis of Governance and new Generation of World Leaders

2008-10-26T22:00:00.001-07:00

Crisis of Governance and new Generation of World Leaders

Ali Asghar Kazemi

October 25, 2008

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Governing the sophisticated and diverse affairs of today’s nations has become so much complicated that goes beyond the capacity of any individual leader. This requires collective knowledge, initiative and action directed and managed by good leadership towards the fulfillment of national objectives and interests. Lack of sound management usually reveals during crisis situations, especially when it encompasses global peace and order.

September 11 crisis and its ramifications upon the international order have produced new generation of political leaders around the world which is different from the past. In the United States these changes appear more pronounced to the point of altering the course of history.

As the chances for Barrack Obama to conquer the White House increases, a new typology of leadership is emerging in the fields of political science and international relations. The new generation of world leaders seems to possess common traits and characteristics different from the traditional one. We are not yet quite sure about the direction and substance of these changes, but based on similar occurrences around the world, we may be able to build the main body of tentative new propositions which will eventually supersede the traditional theories of public opinion, governance and political leadership.

Are we experiencing a radical shift in world public opinion about the qualities and characters of political leaders? Are we witnessing fundamental changes in expectations and political taste of people on traits, capacity and orientation of leaders? Are these changes a necessary outcome of confidence crisis in leadership? Are these changes conducive to peace and harmony or we should expect more conflicts and hostilities around the world?

This introductory comment is merely the product an of an off-hand hunch which should be examined more closely by students of social sciences, politics and international relations in order to arrive at a clear and all- encompassing theory about the characteristics of emerging new leadership and governance in the world.

Without plunging deep into the old times and reminding reputes of great leaders who changed the course of history, names of famous political figures of contemporary world history, such as Churchill, de Gaulle, Eisenhower, Adenauer, Gandhi, Tito, and the likes, are still remembered with respect and grandeur. Indeed, they lived at a critical epoch of historical transformation after the Second World War when people still recognized heroes for their achievement and believed that they could save their respective nations from the moral and material catastrophe and devastation of the war.

As we move up towards our present time, we see a flagrant decline in the quality of leaders. In fact, leaders with mediocre capacity, intelligence and sense of accountability are emerging here and there whose performance is damaging the political status of their proper nations and endangering peace and order in the world. Is this the necessary outcome of the so-called “liberal democracy” and power of mass media to manipulating public opinions towards the election of weak leaders? Are new leaders more to the left or right? Are they more democratic or authoritarian? Are they more pragmatic, ethical, more pacifists or the opposite? How could we explain the current economic and financial crisis which has plunged the whole world into such deep trouble? Are we facing a crisis of leadership around the world?

Though we are not yet able to form a convincing argumentation about either of the above propositions, there is no doubt that September 11 and the subsequent events have drastically changed not only our perception, but also the political configuration and quality of leadership in the world. The truth is that we don’t have yet ready answers to these queries and in fact in some cases we have evidences to prove both sides of the dichotomy. For example, in Latin America we are witnessing the emergence of rather young aboriginal and rude leftist leaders whose main trait is feuding with the United States. They are challenging American policies and power to the point that they have become strategic allies of the Islamic regime in Iran. Though they have nothing in common with Iranian hardliners except their hostile attitude toward US, the Islamic regime is investing hard in order to gain partners and influence in the region.

In the United States, President Bush, son of a living ex-president, whose poor performance brought America and the world to the brink of political and economic insolvency, will soon leave the office eventually in favor of a democrat president who promised drastic changes in the American leadership.

How shall we explain such a strange phenomenon that may pave the way for the election of an “African-American” as the leader of the most powerful nation on earth? Is it due to the alteration of people’s political taste or shall we look to other causes for this metamorphosis? How comes that the American Public ended up to prefer a clever black man without much noble background to a war hero whose father and grandfather were among high ranking flag officers of the US Navy?

In Europe the crisis of leadership is felt all over the continent. People are protesting constantly against their leaders. They have little confidence on their government’s capacity to tackle with growing problems originated on the other side of the Atlantic. US mishandling of the post-September 11 crises by means of “hard power” has put NATO’s global mission in serious qualm and member states are not quite sure about the functionality and viability of this remnant of the cold war period. New leaders of not much charm such as France’s Sarkosy, Italy’s Berlusconi, and few others, while in deep trouble at home, are trying to identify themselves with the American political leadership. They may think that this will boost their position within EU and in the world.

East European political leaders are still in transition from the era of iron curtain to be integrated into a greater liberal community whose outcome is not yet clear. In the Middle East we have an array of left to right, from revolutionary hardliners challenging the West, to traditional conservative regimes whose new leaders are liberal minded and pro-West. Radical Muslims who staged the September 11 attacks (Al-Qaeda) are among the archenemy of this latter generation of leaders in traditional societies and earnestly seek to uproot their rules.

In the vast Asian continent, we still have the remnant of the old communist intelligentsia who have transformed to the requisites of the 21^st century. Incumbent Russian leaders, who come from an intelligence background (KGB), have now partly recovered from the shock of the collapse of the old Soviet empire. While Russians are trying to follow policies dictated by their geopolitics, most of the new young republics of the Central Asia and Caucasus are mired by the American hegemony and dance to the tune orchestrated by Washington. They are also in transition and their final fate is yet to be written in future. Georgian recent experience may well be repeated in other territories of the old union.

Besides China whose pragmatic leaders are distancing from the ideological dogma of the past and are now experiencing real miracle in their economy, new political leaders in East Asia are continuing to rely on American capitalism. They already have paid very onerous price for their ties with the West and are now going through further economic hardship due to recent financial crisis in the United States. Opposition leaders will soon capitalize on the matter and embark to take over the political leadership through launching anti-capitalistic slogans which now seem to please public at large.

We had no intention to cover and exhaust all the political leaders of the world in this introductory comment. We only attempted to give exemplary samples on the emerging new generation of leaders, and pose questions rather than to provide answers or justification to the main argument. The issue seems enough worthy for further academic debates and directed researches.

As a preliminary conclusion we may advance the following hypotheses to be tested through more in-depth debates and researches:

· September 11 phenomenon has changed not only world political configuration but also altered people’s perception of leadership;

· Inability of world leaders to take appropriate measures and policies to face the dangers of what is labeled as “international terrorism” has created a crisis of governance and leadership;

· People of advanced societies no longer trust their traditional leaders and are changing political taste and orientation towards unconventional faces who promise changes;

· It is not quite sure that they will get the expected satisfaction in their choices, nonetheless they prefer to test their chances;

· Only the future can reveal the rationale and benefits of this new trend and experience for peace and order in the world.

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US Economic Crisis and the Middle East

2008-10-10T23:55:00.000-07:00

US Economic Crisis and the Middle East

Ali Asghar Kazemi
October 10 2008
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The crisis that swept world financial markets in recent weeks did not surprise many analysts who expected the curse long before its occurrence. Some have compared it to the great American depression of 1930s which changed the political landscape of the world by the emergence of militarism and fascism that ended up to the Second World War.

There are solid indications that the American crisis that reverberated throughout the globe within days is a multidimensional phenomenon that seeks its causes in a number of dependent and intervening variables among which American military interventions in the Middle East and mounting threats against the Islamic regime in Iran are the most decisive.History bears good witness that the United States has always sought cure to economic crises and recession in massive military build-ups and interventions outside the American continent. Two world wars and wars in Korea, Vietnam and more recent military interventions in the Middle East are cited as vivid examples of this contention.

How far this argument is tenable in present international relations? What are the hidden dimensions of the crisis? What would be the impacts of the crisis for the Middle East as a whole and Iran in particular, as a plausible target of US preemptive strike? How the crisis should be managed in order to avoid the worse to happen?
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The crisis that engulfed the world financial markets in the past two weeks was in fact not a surprise to most economic and political analysts who had foreseen the initial signs and symptoms of the anomaly well before its occurrence. Two years ago in 2006, a significant estimate was issued by the Laboratoire européen d’Anticipation Politique Europe 2020 - LEAP/E2020 which had predicted with high probability that an economic and financial crisis of a scope comparable with that of 1929 is on the way which will have most adverse political impact the world has known since the fall of the Soviet empire in 1989. It was referred to as ‘The End of the Western World we have known since 1945.' According to the same document, in case an American or Israeli military intervention is conducted against Iran, the probability of a major crisis to start rises up to 100%.

The study has based its estimates on two verifiable events related to decisions taken by two key-actors: the United States and Iran. Here is the main argument of the survey:

• On the one hand there is the Iranian decision of opening the first oil bourse priced in Euros on March 20th, 2006 in Teheran, available to all oil producers of the region;

• On the other hand, there is the decision of the American Federal Reserve to stop publishing M3 figures (the most reliable indicator on the amount of dollars circulating in the world) from March 23, 2006 onward.

According to the document, these two decisions constitute altogether the indicators, the causes and the consequences of the historical transition in progress between the order created after World War II and the new international equilibrium in gestation since the collapse of the USSR. Their magnitude as much as their simultaneity will catalyze all the tensions, weaknesses and imbalances accumulated since more than a decade throughout the international system. (LEAP/E2020)The survey further predicted in 2006 that as a consequence of the above phenomenon, a world crisis is susceptible to emerge in seven important sectors which will affect the whole planet in political as well as military fields as follow:

1. Crisis of confidence in the Dollar;

2. Crisis of US financial imbalances;

3. Oil crisis;

4. Crisis of the American leadership;

5. Crisis of the Arab-Muslim world;

6. Global governance crisis;

7. European governance crisis.

As can be seen in the above estimate, the financial crisis is just the tip of the mountain of a deeper and more systemic crisis situation which we should expect throughout the world.

There is little doubt that the first repercussion of the current financial crisis will be seen in the domestic affairs of the United States where the fate of the next American president will soon be decided. Democrats have now more chances to conquer the White House, not that they have better solutions for the crisis but just because the republicans have lost their credibility in the American leadership for sound governance.

The psychological shock of the crisis in the mind of the American public in an inopportune time will eventually lead them to vote for a democrat president, although they may not like him. The setback for the republicans is almost certain, because they ought to pay the price of horrendous mistakes of an unpopular president who engaged Americans into futile entanglements in the Middle East which is still going on. That is not to say that democrats are more pacifist or more lenient and restraint towards engaging into conflicts and hostility with their contenders, especially Iran. Since surprisingly, as I have said elsewhere, most major wars the United States engaged into were initiated by the democrats and terminated by the republicans.

Seen from the vantage point of the Islamic leaders in Iran, the crisis is yet another sign of American decadence behind which lay the invisible hands of the omnipotent Allah. They may naively think that an America in crisis will neither have the incentive nor the guts to go for a preemptive strike or put further pressure on Iran for its nuclear venture.

Unfortunately, hardliners in Iran miss an important truth. Whether they like it or not, the fate of the global economy is intimately interwoven with the American financial market. This is especially true for Iran’s two potential supporters, Russians and Chinese, whose economic viability is more exposed to the crisis than any other states. Thus, they should avoid tying their fate with unreliable partners. They should remember the financial and economic shocks of the past decades which brought down to nil Asian flourishing economy. In all of these crises the United States was able to recover smoothly at the costs of other developing and oil producing countries.

Though Iran holds important geo-strategic assets in the current crisis and so far has been able to stay somehow aloof of its negative impact, it should be cautious about taking provocative decisions that could aggravate the situation and give pretext to its contenders to further apply severe sanctions or to form a coalition for an eventual military strike.

In conclusion, the world has to cross fingers that the United States recovers safely and promptly from the ongoing crisis and does not endure much structural harm susceptible to endanger the present vulnerable international order. Otherwise, adverse condition is susceptible to further aggravate hostilities and conflicts, by spreading the plague of terrorism and militarism around the world.

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